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An International Law Institution in Crisis:
Rethinking Permanent Neutrality
BRAN F. HAVEL*
In this Article, Professor Havel addresses the fate ofpermanent neutrality, a
commitment under international law to stay out of all future wars, in the
transformed legal and political world after the Cold War. Professor Havel
examines the new values that have become part of the international order--the end
of war as an instrument of national policy, the rediscovery of collective security,
and unprecedented economic interdependence These values present aformidable
challenge to the concept ofpermanent neutrality, which derives its meaningfrom
the classical right ofsovereign states to wage war or to stay alooffrom the conflicts
and survival of other nations. The Article reveals how permanent neutrality as
practiced by the world's most prominently neutral states-Austria, Switzerland,
Finland, Sweden, and Ireland-has proven juridically and strategically
incompatible with membership of NATO, the United Nations, and the European
Union. Professor Havel concludes thatpermanent neutrality can continue to be an
expedient means of conflict prevention and containment in the post-old War era,
provided that it is reconceptualized to break its juristic connection to the classical
law of war and has theflexibility to become an institution in the service ofpeace.
I. INTRODUCTION
For two centuries, permanent neutrality-an international law commitment to
military neutrality in all future warsl-has been a durable model of conflict
prevention and containment 2 Tethered juristically and instinctually to the classical
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Bassiouni, Dermot Cahill, Graeme B. Dinwoodie, and Barry Kellnan for their comments and
suggestions. I am also grateful to Chad Beaver, Andy Eastmond, Jennifer M. Jendusa, and Colleen
Sullivan for their exceptional research assistance, and to the DePaul University College of Law
for a grant to support this project. Most of the works published in French and German that are
referred to in this Article have never appeared in English. Unless otherwise indicated, therefore,
I am solely responsible for all translations of titles and content.
1 In this Article, the legal status of military neutrality, which states adopt in the wars of other
states, is called "classicar'neutrality. See infra text accompanying note 13. "Permanent" neutrality,
in contrast, is a commitment by a state that it will observe classical neutrality in all future wars
between or among third states. The critical conceptual distinction between the two forms of
neutrality is that classical neutrality applies only during wars, whereas permanent neutrality is a
binding obligation of states in peacetime, which guarantees their nonparticipation in all future
wars. See infra text accompanying note 43 (resolving the apparent conceptual paradox whereby
permanently neutral states are bound in peacetime to observe classical neutrality-a body of law
that only has meaning in wartime).
2 See Surya P. Subedi, Neutrality in a Changing World: European Neutral States and the
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laws of war and neutrality, permanent neutrality has enabled its adherent states to
avoid ensnarement in the political and military quarrels of vastly more powerful
neighbors. In the twentieth century, which has been dominated by two global wars
and a prolonged and bitter war of nerves between antagonistic superpowers, a
posture of permanent military impartiality toward rival blocs seemed to have an
assured and respected place in geostrategic thinking and as an institution of
international law. As the next century begins, however, the new values that are
coursing through the international political order-the end of war as an instrument
of national policy, the rediscovery of collective security, an unprecedented pace of
economic interdependence-present a formidable jurisprudential challenge to an
institution that derives its meaning from the classical polarization of war and peace
and a sovereign right to wage war or to stay aloof from the wars of other states. The
emerging ideologies of shared security and economic interdependence have become
increasingly incompatible with an institution built on routine indifference to the
conflicts and survival of other nations. 3
European Community, 42 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 238,242 (1993) (noting durability ofpermanent
neutrality as an institution of international law).
3 See Detlev F. Vagts, The Traditional Legal Concept of Neutrality in a Changing
Environment, 14 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 83, 84 (1998) (describing tendentiously neutrality
in the face of genocide as indifference, callousness, or a studied calculation of costs and benefits).
Neutrality is a powerful conductor for one of international law's most enduring and roiling
debates-whether its rules emanate from natural law and morality or from political expediency.
For a discussion of the vitality of the debate, see Akira Iriye, The International Order, in THE
COLUMBIA HiSToRY OFTHE 20TH CEmY 229,235 (Richard W. Bulliet ed., 1998) [hereinafter
COLUMBIA HISTORY]. See also Egon Guttman, The Concept ofNeutrality Since the Adoption and
Ratifcation of the Hague Neutrality Convention of 1907, 14 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 55, 58
(1998) (descnbing international law as representing "the accepted moral basis" of civilized nations
and the "common denominator" of morality). The forum for Guttman's moral critique of
international law, a recent American University law school conference on neutrality, morality, and
the Holocaust, dramatized neutrality's difficult modem position as an international legal institution
subject to challenge through state practice. Thus, while we may be aware that international law is
the product ofmany variables besides morality, including the raw power equations of competing
state interests, neutrality has lately provoked polemical arguments that equate international law
with a kind of secular religion. For a more measured view, see Seymour J. Rubin, The Washington
AccordFzfiy Years Later: Neutrality, Morality, and International Law, 14 AM. U. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 61, 80-81 (1998) (noting the quandary of choosing "evident and accepted" standards in
dealing with morally conflicted situations).
The moral attack on neutrality, as is well-known, has been intensified by recent disclosures
concerning the European neutrals' continuing economic relations with the Nazi regime during
World War I. On these topics, see JEAN ZIEGLER, TH1E SWISS, THE GOLD, AND THE DEAD 13, 18,
133 (1997) (asserting defacto integration of Switzerland into the Greater German (Reichsdeutsch)
economic area between the defeat of France in 1940 and 1945). Ziegler's book is a blistering
indictment of his country's government, and of the Swiss banking comaunity, for providing the
[Vol. 61:167
RETHINKING PERMANENTNEUTRALlTY
This Article addresses the fate ofpermanent neutrality in the transformed legal
and political ethos that has prevailed since the dissolution of the Soviet Union.4 It
recognizes that the end of the Cold War accelerated a normative degeneration of the
law of war and neutrality (and hence of permanent neutrality) originally set in
motion by the adoption of the United Nations Charter.5 That degeneration-the
result of the Charter's attempt to suppress war as an aggressive instrument of state
poliy 6-was masked for nearly five decades by the ideological rivalry that blocked
gold-laundering services that helped to finance the Wehrmacht and to give Germany access to
internationally disposable foreign exchange to buy strategic raw materials. See id. at 48-49; see
also Krister Wahlbdck Neutrality and Morality: The Swedish Experience, 14 AM. U. J. INT'L L.
& POL'Y 103, 107 (1998) (discussing inter alia the Swedish supply of iron ore to the German
munitions industry). But, as Wahlbeck is at pains to point out, much ofthis economic activity was
not in technical violation of the international law of neutrality. See id. at 107.
4 The Cold War, which has recently been the subject of renewed popular attention, ended
with the dissolution ofthe Soviet Union in 1991. See JEREMYISAACS & TAYLORDOWNING, COLD
WAR: AN ILLUSIRATED HISTORY 1945-1991, ix (1998). The Isaacs & Downing book was written
to accompany a CNN television series. See id.
5 As one scholar observed in an earlier period: As long as the Community of Nations failed
to develop an effective mechanism for collective security, neither the law of war nor the law of
neutrality could be entirely dispensed with. See Werner Meng, War, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 282,282-90 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1982).
6 The prohibition of the use of force in Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter led a number of
scholars unreservedly to deny the existence of war as a concept ofcontemporary international law.
See Elilhu Lauterpacht, The Legal Irrelevance ofthe 'State of War,' 62 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. POC.
58, 58-68 (1968); Quincy Wright, The Escalation of International Conflicts, 9 J. CONFLICr
RESOL. 434-42 (1965). However, this view overlooks the fact that the Charter itself still admits
certain lawful forms of the use of force-legitimate individual or collective self-defense, and
Security Council enforcement sanctions under Chapter VII. See infra text accompanying note 212.
Indeed, Oppenheim argued that resort to "war' remains lawful in each of these instances. See 2 L.
OPPHMIR-4 INTERNATIONAL LAW (DISPUTES, WAR AND NaTrRALrrY) § 292t at 649-50 (H.
Lauterpacht ed., 7th ed. 1952). It is certainly not impossible, nor is it excluded by the Charter, that
the application of forcible sanctions could escalate into a war in the classical sense. See id.
Moreover, since 1945 war has remained a recurring feature ofinternational affairs, but has been
frequently justified (as in the Falklands conflict in 1982 and the Gulf War in 1991) by reference
to the Article 51 self-defense proviso. See, e.g., U.N. SCOR Res. 661 (Aug. 6, 1990), in United
Nations: Security Council Resolutions Concerning Iraqi Aggression, Aug. 6, 1990, 29 I.L.M.
1325, at 1326 (affirming inherent right of individual or collective self-defense, in response to
armed attack by Iraq against Kuwait, in accordance with Article 51 ofthe U.N. Charter); see also
Patrick M. Norton, Between the Ideology and the Reality: The Shadow ofthe Law ofNeutrality,
17 HARV. INT'LLJ. 249,257 (1976). For a meditation on the historico-philosophical questions
presented by the purported illegality of war, see generally LESLIE C. GREEN, ESSAYS ON THE
MODERN LAW OF WAR 5 (2d ed. 1999).
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the enforcement powers of the U.N. Security CouncilY In the aftermath of the Cold
War, however, collective security and solidarity are becoming once again the
standard for world order and are promising a permanent law of peace that states will
collectively supervise within global and regional frameworks. Adding to this
powerful sense of normative change in international law, intrastate conflicts such
as the Kosovo emergency appear to have superseded great continental or
intercontinental wars, and even regional conflicts, as the predominant form of civic
upheaval. 8
This Article does not, however, repudiate permanent neutrality as an expedient
institution of international law.9 Instead, it calls for a reconceptualization of this
well-credentialed institution in order to preserve its geostrategic appeal in an era
defined by a collectively protected peace and by economic rather than ideological
or military competition. While acknowledging that statecraft now requires a
fundamental reassessment of permanent neutrality, the Article remains keenly
focused on the inconstancy and unpredictability of international relations and the
need to retain directive principles of international law that will instruct states
through periods of transition and reconstruction. 10 The more robust jurisprudential
7 See infra text accompanying note 222.
8 See infra text accompanying note 341.
9 On expediency as a primary catalyst for norms of international law, see Iriye, supra note
3, at 235. As discussed below, the definition of neutrality was laid down over 90 years ago in
circumstances very different from those of the modem geopolitical system. See infra text
accompanying note 13. But the reliability of a precise and unchanging system of rules cannot be
lightly dismissed. Indeed, Swiss political scientist Dr. Daniel Frei proclaimed in a 1983 survey of
Switzerland's permanent neutrality that "there is no real alternative' to the classical basis for
neutrality:
Defined in clear and plain terms, the country's permanent neutrality rests on the
classical definition of neutrality under international law as laid down in the 1907 [Hague
Convention on the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in War on Land]. It is
the only unambiguous legal basis on which neutrality can rest .... Even the advocates of
[nonalignment] have, so far, not been interested in working out a definition of neutrality that
could even approximate the precision of the traditional notion.
DANIELFREI, SwIss FOREIGN POLICY 14-15 (1983) (emphasis in original).
10 The interfusion of state practice and changes in the complexion of the international law of
neutrality should not be in the least surprising. State practice, after all, is one of the generative
premises for international law. Already in 1941, in congressional hearings on modification of the
U.S. neutrality statute, international legal scholar Charles Fenwick condemned neutrality as "a
whole paradoxical system," one which "pretends that a war can go on and [that] the neutrals can
stand on the sidelines and have their rights observed." Full neutrality, Fenwick maintained, was
already a century out-of-date, since in an age of total war it would be impossible to maintain this
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challenge, as it transpires, is not simply to substitute collective security for
permanent neutrality. Rather, it is to remodel permanent neutrality as an institution
that itself functions in the service of the permanent law of peace. In this way, a
status of permanent neutrality will serve as an irenic (and ironic) counterpoint to the
neo-Cold War mentality that focuses on, for example, an enhanced North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) and the common defense and security aspirations of
the European Union (EU).
The Article builds its case for reconceptualization in two discrete phases. In
Parts H-IV, it exposes the incompatibility between permanent neutrality and the
normative premises of the new global political order by examining the existing law
of permanent neutrality, including its derivation from the classical law of war and
neutrality. Part H1 presents the conceptual and substantive framework for the
discussion. Part III sharpens the focus to the models of permanent neutrality
practiced by five of the world's most prominent permanently neutral states-
Austria, Switzerland, Finland, Sweden, and Ireland-all of which are located in the
European theater (to borrow a resonant phrase). Part IV reveals how permanent
neutrality, as manifested by these states, has proven juristically and strategically
incompatible with membership of NATO and the United Nations, as well as with
accession to the EU-a supranational economic syndicate that has lately begun to
display pretensions of becoming a military bloc in its own right.11 Finally, in the
second phase of the argument, Part V synthesizes the limitations and deficiencies
of permanent neutrality in the new global order and offers a reconceptualized, more
politically assertive idea of a new peacetime permanent neutrality. Permanent
neutrality, in this reformed setting, will sever its juristic bond with classical wartime
neutrality and become explicitly an institution in the service of peace.
posture. See Modification of Neutrality Act of 1939: Hearings on H.RJ. Res. 237 Before the
Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 77th Cong. 279 (1941) (statement of Professor Charles G.
Fenwick, member of the Inter-American Neutrality Committee). For a discussion of the fluidity
ofneutrality law and policy in a changing intemational environment, see Franz Vranitzky (former
Prime Minister of Austria), Foreword to THiE EUROPEAN NEUTRALS IN THE 1990s: NEW
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNmES xix, xix (Hanspeter Neuhold ed., 1992) [hereinafter EUROPEAN
NEUTRALs]. On the assertion of a dominant "legalist paradigm" in international relations, see
STANLEY HOFFMANN, WORLD DISORDERS: TROUBLED PEACE IN TIE POST-COLD WAR ERA 22
(1998).
11 See Craig R. Whitney, European Union Vows to Become Military Power, N.Y. TIMES,
June 4, 1999, at Al; see also infra note 331 (discussing new EU defense initiative adopted in
December 1999). With the notable exception of Switzerland, all ofthe European neutrals discussed
here are members of the EU.
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II. THE JURISPRUDENTIAL LIFE OF PERMANENT NEUTRALrrY: THE
PARADOX OF A PEACETIME LAW OF WARTIME BEHAVIOR
A. The Wartime Idea of Classical Neutrality
Permanent neutrality cainot be explained, understood, or sensibly rethought
without first conceptualizing its forebear-the institution of neutrality itself.
Neutrality's long history in international law need not be recapitulated here, and
only some elemental principles need to be restated and clarified before considering
the more modem institution of permanent neutrality.12 Classical wartime neutrality
as crystallized in the Hague Conventions of 190713 is a concept marked by
12 By the time of Grotius in the seventeenth century, neutrality was certainly recognized in
international law, though the evolution of its substantive principles, a rdgime de neutraliti, was
still "in its infancy." OPPENHEIM, supra note 6, § 287, at 625. Toward the close of the eighteenth
century, U.S. foreign policy played a considerable role in raising the standard of impartiality,
particularly in relation to recruitment on neutral territory. See id. § 291, at 631-32. Neutrality had
its apotheosis in the period from 1815 to the outbreak of World War I. In 1815, the Great Powers
at the Congress of Vienna acknowledged the principle of neutrality as expressed through the
permanently neutral status of Switzerland. See REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COUNCIL TO THE FEDERAL
ASSEMBLY, SWITZERLAND WITH THE UNITED NATIONS 25 (1969) [hereinafter Sviss U.N.
REPORT]. It was not until the second half of the nineteenth century, however, that the principles
of custom began to be crystallized in particular binding multilateral conventions.
13 Amidst a welter of neutrality declarations, conventions, and protocols that emerged in the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, special mention should be made of the Hague
Conventions of 1907, the product of the Second Hague Peace Conference of 1907. The
Conventions embodied a concept of absolute neutrality-strict impartiality-in both land and
maritime warfare. See generally 1907 Hague Convention V Respecting the Rights and Duties of
Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land, and 1907 Hague Convention XIII
Concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War, reprinted in ADAM ROBERTS
& RICHARD GUBLFF, DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 61, 109 (Adam Roberts & Richard
Guelffeds., 2d ed. 1989). The rules of neutrality in air warfare were not codified, but have been
derived by analogy from land and naval combat But see Draft Convention on Rights and Duties
of Neutral States in Naval and Aerial War, reprinted in 33 AM. J. INT'L L. 175 (Supp. 1939), and
the earlier Hague Draft Rules on Aerial Warfare (never adopted), reprinted in ROBERTS & GUELFF,
supra, at 123-35. For an updated conspectus of the modem laws of neutrality in air combat, see
GREEN, supra note 6, at 588-90.
As this Article demonstrates, the Hague Conventions are of vital significance to the law of
neutrality (and hence to the law of permanent neutrality). Moreover, they are still in force, as
numerous states have indicated. See Norton, supra note 6, at 256; see also DANIEL WOKER, DIE
SKANDINAVISCHENNE.TRALEN: PRiNZip UND PRAxiS DER SCHWEDmCHENUND DERFINNiscHEN
NEuTRALrrAT [THE SCANDINAVIAN NEuTRALS, PRINCIPLES AND PRACIICE OF THE N-UTRALriY
OF SWEDEN AND FINLAND] 57-58 (1978) (discussing fidelity of postwar Finland to classical
precepts ofthe Hague Convention). The United States still lists the Hague Conventions in the latest
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uniformity, absoluteness, and relative simplicity.14 It is bound inseparably to the law
of war,15 and has been described as a "reflex reaction to war."16 Classical neutrality
is triggered by the outbreak of war between two or more third states, 17 and
extinguished by the termination of that war in accordance with the methods set by
custom. 18 Between the points of its inception and demise, classical neutrality
edition of Treaties in Force (1998). Interestingly, given this Article's attempt to remodel
permanent neutrality for an age of peace, the Hague conferences of 1899 and 1907, despite their
military provenance, are now viewed by some historians as marking "the genesis of modem
pacifism." Robert L. O'Connell, War: Institution Wifthout Portolio, in COLUMBIA HISTORY, supra
note 3, at 248, 248-49.
14 The inflexible and uniform rules of classical neutrality, precisely because they seek to
regulate the conduct of neutral states in many diverse geopolitical conditions, express a minimal
content of normative supervision, and grant broad latitude to the domain of interstate political
relations. See HANS SCHMrIr, DIE RECHTSGRUNDLAGEN DERNEUTRALISATION VON STAABTEN [ME
LEGALFOUNDATIONS FORTHENEUTRALZATIONOF STATES] 55 (1970). Political expediency, the
strategic interplay of military powers, changing techniques of warfare, and economic priorities
have all played a role in evolving the compromise character ofneutrality law. Moreover, because
historically the greatest and strongest powers have been responsible for campaigns of war, while
smaller and weaker states have striven for neutrality, the law of neutrality has been sociologically
predisposed to accommodate the interests of the powerful belligerents and to restrict the freedom
of action of the neutrals. See Hanspeter Neuhold, The European Neutrals Facing the Challenges
of the 1990s, in EUROPEAN NEUTRALS, supra note 10, at 231, 241.
15 Hence, it is sometimes referred to as "the neutrality of war." Yoshitaro Hirano, Address
Before the Intemational Association of Democratic Lawyers (Oct. 1960), in LEGAL ASPECrS OF
NEurRAL : PROCEINGS OF THETHIRD COMMISSION, 1960, at 9 [hereinafter LEGAL ASPECrS
OFNEurRALTY].
16 MICHAEL SCHWErrZER, DAUERNDE NEUrRALrrAT UND EuROPAiscHE INTEGRATION
[PERMANENT NEUTRALITY AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION] 6 (1977); see also JOSEF L. KUNz,
KRiEGSRECHTUNDNEurRALrrATSRECHT [THE LAW OF WARAND THE LAW OF NEUTRALriY] 203
(1935); OPPENHEIM, supra note 6, § 285, at 624; 2 JOHN WESTLAKE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 161
(1907).
17 Conceptually, neutrality is the legal situation that ensues when a state (the neutral state),
as a subject of international law, exercises its sovereign right of self-determination in matters of
war and peace and treats a war which was broken out between third states (the belligerents) as a
res inter adios gesta, opting for a posture of nonparticipation in that war. See Waldemar Hummer,
V6lkerrechtliche Fragen der Neutralitat und der NeutraliDtspolitik [International Law Questions
of Neutrality and Neutrality Policy], in DIE NEUTRALEN IN DER EUROPAiSCHEN INTEGRATION:
KONTROVERSEN, KONFRONTATIONEN, ALTERNATIVEN [THE NEUTRALS IN EUROPEAN
INTEGRATION: CONTROVERSIES, CONFRONTATIONS, ALTERNAnVES] 3, 5 (Hans Mayrzedt & Hans
Christoph Binswanger eds., 1970).
18 Termination is not regulated in any multilateral convention, but customary international
law recognizes at least three procedures for termination of a war (1) the conclusion of a peace
treaty (usually preceded by an armistice), see Meng, supra note 5, at 288-90, (2) the cessation of
hostilities (if accompanied by an intention that the state of war should cease), see generally Sydney
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imposes duties and confers rights on both belligerent and neutral states. Some of
those duties and rights are regulated by custom,19 some (which originated as
custom) have been codified in multilateral legal instruments.20
1. Four Key Wartime Obligations
The wartime duties of neutrals can be compressed into a brief taxonomy. The
cynosure of these obligations is the duty of nonparticipation as a belligerent. This
is a principle of customary international law and is not explicitly implanted in any
of the multilateral conventions that regulate neutrality.21 This transcendent duty of
D. Bailey, Cease Fires, Truces, andArmistices in the Practice of the U.N. Security Council, 71
AM. J. INT'LL. 461 (1977), and the extinction of a belligerent (debellatio), see 2 D.P. O'CONNELL,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 441-42 (1970); see also J.G. STARKE, AN INTRODUCTON TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW 606 (1977). The demise of a status of classical neutrality would also follow
the assumption by either a belligerent or neutral state of an active belligerency toward the other.
See OPPENHEIM, supra note 6, § 312, at 671; Norton, supra note 6, at 250.
19 The entire law of contraband, for example. See infra note 37 and accompanying text.
20 See supra note 13 (discussing Hague Conventions). Here, I am setting aside the difficulty
presented by the definition of war, which is compounded in modem international law by its
supposed unlawfulness---"supposed" in the sense that the long series of efforts since 1919 to
outlaw war have not been reflected in state practice. See Meng, supra note 5, at 285. State practice
has shown little enthusiasm for a definitional stabilizing ofthe concept of war. This reluctance has
been caused by a self-interested awareness that the absence of an international law norm of war
enhances the potential legality of measures short of war, intermediate hostile measures such as
blockade, intervention, or even preventive self-defense. Declarations of war, accordingly, have
become rare, and thejuiistic vocabulary is dominated by the rhetoric of self-defense, reprisal, and
humanitarian intervention. See Hanspeter Neuhold, Permanent Neutrality andNon-Alignment, in
THE AUSTRIAN SOLUTION: INTERNATIONAL CONFLiCT AND COOPERATION 161, 187 (Robert A.
Bauer ed., 1982) [hereinafter THE AUSTRIAN SOLUTION]. Some theorists have continued to seek
a uniform definition of war and base their efforts exclusively on historico-sociological criteria. See
Myres S. McDougal & Florentino P. Feliciano, The Initiation of Coercion, A Multi-temporal
Analysis, 52 AM. J. INT'LL. 241 (1958) (representing the American realist school). Other theorists
pursue a neo-Kelsenian abstraction that will "purify" the law of war of exactly those supposedly
contaminating sociological phenomena. See generally JULIUS STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT: A TREATISE ON THE DYNAMICS OF DISPUTES AND WAR LAW liii (1959)
(criticizing Kelsen for exorcising "the world of existence").
21 According to Schweitzer, "it flows directly from the concept of neutrality in general
international law." SCHWEITZER, supra note 16, at 98. There is, however, a fundamental difference
in the intensity of this duty as it applies to ordinary neutral powers and permanently neutral states.
Ordinary neutrals can abandon their neutrality, either by choosing one of its inferior derivatives
(benevolent or qualified neutrality, or nonbelligerency), or by entering the war as a full participant.
For the permanently neutral state the option of abandonment is foreclosed ab initio by the
assumption of the status of permanent neutrality. The duty of future neutrality "excludes for the
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nonparticipation generates three further collateral duties that constrain the neutral's
wartime behavior in order to keep it outside war. Under the duty of abstention, a
neutral state, which by definition cannot take part in a war, is forbidden to give to
a belligerent power, directly or indirectly, any military assistance that would be of
service in the conduct of a war, including the supply of troop contingents or the
export of war materials.2 Although this duty is absolute in its application to the
neutral government private arms merchants successfuly lobbied the drafters of the
Hague Conventions to exempt them from its reach.23 The duty of impartiality
permanently neutral state the possibility of a choice between war and neutrality." ANrONGREBER,
DME DAUERNDE NEUTRALrrAT UND DAs KOLLEKTIVE SICHERHEIT-SYSTEM DER VEREINTEN
NATIONEN [PERMANENT NEUrRALiy AND THE COLLEcnrvE SEcuRny SYSTEM OF THE UNrrED
NATIONS] 41 (1967); see also KARL STRUPP, NEUTRALISATION, BEFREDUNG,
ENrMILITAPSIERUNG [NEUtRAUZAION, PACIFICATION, DMLIARIZATION] 207 (1933). But this
posture is always subject to the right of the permanently neutral state to its own self-preservation,
which is a right inuring to any state which adopts neutrality in wartime. See GREBER, supra, at 30.
22 Article 6 of Hague Convention XI prohibits "[t]he supply, in any manner, directly or
indirectly, by a neutral Power to a belligerent power, of war-ships, ammunition, or war material
of any kind whatever... ." ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 13, at 111. Custom supplements this
rule of abstention with a prohibition on the grant of credit to a belligerent or the placing of finance
at its disposal for use in waging war. See Neuhold, supra note 20, at 162; see also OPPENHEIM,
supra note 6, § 351, at 743; ALFRED VERDROSS, VOLKERRECHT [INTERNATIONAL LAW] 484
(1964). This prohibition is nevertheless implicit in the word "indirectly" in the text of Article 6.
Rotter, advocating strict compliance with the classical code, ruled out violating the dtify of
abstention even for humanitarian purposes (as when Sweden dispatched volunteers to Finland to
aid in the Winter War against the Soviet Union in 1939). See MANFRED ROTiER, DIE DAUERDNE
NEurRAL1TT [PERMANENTNEurRALry] 248 (1981).
23 "A 'two-faced' form of neutrality consequently developed, making it possible for wars to
be prolonged through supplies from 'neutral persons."' Gyula Hajdu, Address Before the
International Association of Trial Lawyers (Oct. 1960), in LEGALASPECTS OF NUTAL1TY, supra
note 15, at 101, 103. Capitulation to the interests of private armaments manufacturers was more
easily possible in the age of economic liberalism. See ALFRED VERDROsS, THE PERMANENT
NEurRALrY OF AUSTRIA 42 (1978). The result was the almost identical Article 7 in Conventions
V and XI[: "A neutral Power is not called upon to prevent the export or transport, on behalf of one
or other of the belligerents, of arms, munitions of war, or, in general, of anything which can be of
use to an army or fleet" ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 13, at 64. Both Conventions, as noted
in the main text, apply an important qualification to this concession, namely, the principle of
impartiality. See infra note 24 (discussing application of principle of impartiality). What the
Conventions did not anticipate, however, was the later emergence of the state itself as an economic
actor in the armaments industry and the inevitable conflict between Article 6 of Convention XIII
and Article 7 of Conventions V and XIII. Could a state, acting through state-owned enterprises,
circumvent the absolute prohibition of Article 6? Zemanek considered the problem as one of the
international law of state responsibility, affixing liability for breaches of Article 6 only to decisions
to grant military assistance which were indisputably acts of state sovereignty. The award of an
export permit to a state-owned enterprise would not therefore be a violation of Article 6 unless the
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requires neutral powers in wartime to apply the rules of neutrality, where relevant,
equally and without discrimination to all belligerents2 4 Impartiality can only have
meaning outside the catalogue of acts expressly or impliedly prohibited to neutral
states, so that the supply of war materials by a state qua state would not be lawful
even if strictly applied in equal measure to both belligerents. 25 Finally, the duty of
transactions concerned were initiated at the governmental level, for example by meetings of
defense ministers of the neutral and belligerent states. See Karl Zemanek, Wirtschaftliche
Neutralitit [Economic Neutrality], 81 JuRmisH BLATrER [JURISPRUDENTrIAL PAPERS] 249, 250
(1959). Zemanek's proposal would obviously require close scrutiny of each individual case, testing
for the presence of a bad faith scheme such as advance sale by the state of weapons to a private
dealer, who is then granted a license to trade with the belligerents. In fhct, this very strategem was
adopted by the U.S. Department of the Navy in World War Il to supply military aid to the British
and French Governments in the aftermath of the Dunkirk evacuation. See 11 MARJORIE M.
WHiTMAN, DIGESr OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 415 (1963).
24 See Neuhold, supra note 20, at 162-63; see also OPPENHEIM, supra note 6, § 294, at 654
(noting that, "[s]ince neutrality is an attitude of impartiality, it excludes such assistance and
succo[u]r to one of the belligerents as is detrimental to the other, and, further, such injuries to the
one as benefit the other"); SCHVErrzER, supra note 16, at 98-99; VERDROSS, supra note 22, at
493. The duty of impartiality is encoded as a general principle in the Preamble to Hague
Convention XIII: "[lit is, for neutral powers, an admitted duty to apply these rules impartially to
the several belligerents." ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 13, at 110. It appears also in a more
specific context in Article 9 of both Conventions V and XIII, inter alia governing restrictions
placed on the private export or transport of war materials and use of private telecommunications
installations and on admission into neutral territorial waters and ports of belligerent war-ships or
their prizes. Id. at 64 (Convention V) and 111-12 (Convention XIII). These international treaty
rules in effect state what is a precept of customary international law, aequalitas amicitiae. See
Edgar Bonjour, dsterreichische und schweizerische Neutralitat [Austrian and Swiss Neutrality],
60 SCHWEIZERMONATsHEFI E [SWISS MONTHLY MAGAZINE] 829,832 (1980). Thus, if the neutral
power chooses to ease the 24-hour stop/transit rule for belligerent war-ships set forth in Article 12
of Hague Convention XIII, that concession must be granted on precisely equal terms to all
belligerents. For the text of Article 12, see ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 13, at 112.
25 See DEN4isE ROBERT, ETuDE suR LANEurRAL1tr SuiSSE [A STJDY OF Swiss NEurmAurY]
75 (1950). Thus, the illegal sale by an Austrian state firm ofmillions ofdollars worth ofweapons
to Iran during the Gulf War-contravening a law that forbade all private and public arms exports
to theaters of war-might have been construed as a violation of neutrality, and was indeed
prosecuted as such in the Austrian courts. See infra text accompanying note 151 (discussing
Austrian law on arms exports); see also Michael Wise, Austrians Get Partisan About Their
Neutral Status, INDEPENDENT (London), June 20, 1990, at 10. Nevertheless, Iran was not
technically a belligerent, and the Gulf War was not a declared war in a technical sense.
If private trade in arms is permitted, therefore, an arithmetical equality is not required in
international law. The required principle is that of formal equality, by which the neutral state must
apply the same legal provisions (whether a general license to export or a general prohibition from
doing so) to trade with all belligerents. See ERIK CASTR , THE PRESENT LAW OF WAR AND
NEUTRALr 454 (1954) (noting that, in the field of foreign trade, "it is sufficient that prohibitions
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prevention-the only duty that disturbs the fundamental passivity of a neutral
status-requires neutral states to resist, with the means at their disposal, the
conversion of their territory into a base of operations for the belligerents,26 whether
indirectly, by the grant or taking ofrights ofpassage (the transit of troops or war
and restrictions are brought into force (or are removed) simultaneously with respect to both
belligerent sides"). Nevertheless, this principle cannot take account of material imbalances among
belligerents, whose capacity needs and purchasing power, as well as pre-war relations with the
neutral state's arms industry, will inevitably be different These differences, despite a formal legal
equality among the belligerents, may lead to undesirable consequences from the perspective of a
credible neutrality policy. See infra text accompanying note 41 (discussing management of
economic relations with belligerents).
26 Should the neutral state prove, at least over a certain period of time, unable or unwilling
to put an end to unlawful encroachments on its neutrality, the belligerent affected by them is
entitled to do so itself in reliance on its right of self-help--subject at least for member states of the
United Nations, to Article 2(3) of the U.N. Charter which requires all members "to settle their
international disputes by peaceful means," and also to the need to evaluate self-help involving the
use of force in the light of Article 2(4) of the Charter. See supra note 6 and accompanying text
(discussing use of force under the U.N. Charter). The Damocles sword of an affected belligerent's
right of self-help makes compliance with the obligation of prevention in the neutral's own national
interest. A neutral's use of force to repel an attempted violation of its territory cannot, under Article
10 of Hague Convention V, be regarded as a "hostile act." ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 13, at
64. The Convention therefore foresees situations where the most appropriate mode of repulsion
will be armed resistance. In accordance, however, with the doctrine of proportionality in
international law, the neutral's response should never be excessive in relation to the violation
suffered. See D.W. GREIG, ]NTERNATIONAL LAW 886-87 (1976) (noting that legitimate self-
defense may include targeted, smaller-scale strikes such as hampering future attacks by destroying
supply dumps, bases, or training camps used by personnel participating in raids). A diplomatic
protest may well suffice in a case of insignificant airspace infringement. Switzerland experienced
over five thousand violations of its airspace in World War II. See VERDROSS, supra note 23, at 42.
Deployment of the means at the neutral's disposal-ultraposse nemo tenetur-in confortity with
the rule of proportionality, will preclude the commission of an international law delict by the
neutral. See Gustav Ddniker, Swiss Security Policy in a Changing Strategic Environment, in
EUROPEAN NEUTRALS, supra note 10, at3, 6. The diplomatic protest is absolutely the minimum
response that a neutral power is expected to make. As for aircraft armed with nuclear warheads,
recent literature has argued that the duty of repulsion, the duty in this case to prevent or bring an
end to overflight, could threaten the very existence of the neutral, and failure to intercept overflying
missiles could not therefore constitute a breach of the neutral's international law duties. See
DYniker, supra, at 6 (citing ultra posse nemo tenetur in the context of overflight by guided
missiles); see also DIETER KOCH, DAS I MMERwAHREND NEUrRALE OSTERREICH UND SEIN
VERHALTNIS ZU DEN INTERNATIONALEN ORGANISATIONEN [PERMANENTLY NEUTRAL AusTRIA
AND rrs RELATIONSHIP TO THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS] 83 (1966); Kevin J. Madders,
Neutrality in Air Warfare, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 5, at
14, 15.
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materials, for example), or directly, by the establishment on the territory of
communications facilities or recruitment agencies. 27
The Conception officielle suisse de la neutralitg, the Swiss government's
official charter of neutrality, requires-as an additional duty-that a neutral country
must not surrender or transfer any of its sovereign rights to a belligerent.28 Assertion
2 7 See ROBERT, supra note 25, at 75; see also KUNZ, supra note 16, at 226-27. Article I of
Hague Convention V provides that "[tihe territory of neutral Powers is inviolable." ROBERTS &
GUELFF, supra note 13, at 63. Article 1 thereby creates a right of neutral states to have their
sovereign territory respected by belligerent powers. It should neither be pressed into service as a
theater of war, nor should it be used as a base of support for wars taking place outside its borders.
See GREBER, supra note 21, at 23; see also VERDROSS, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 22, at
403. Not only can a neutral power not waive its ight to territorial inviolability, it has a concomitant
duty to prevent its sovereign territory from being dragged directly or indirectly into the war. This
duty springs from the interaction of Articles 2, 3, and 4 of Hague Convention V, listing specific
acts which, if attempted by belligerent powers, would constitute an impermissible violation of
neutral territory, and Article 5, imposing on the neutral state an obligation to 'not allow any of the
acts referred to in Articles 2 to 4 to occur on its territory." ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 13, at
63. Therefore, under these combined provisions, the following acts are prohibited to belligerents
on neutral territory, and the neutral state is required to prevent their occurrence:
(1) the passage through neutral territory of convoys of troops, munitions of war, or
supplies [Article 2]. Convoys of sick or wounded belonging to the belligerent armies are
excepted [Article 14];
(2) the establishment of new, or the use of existing (other than public) communication
centers for the purpose of a connection with the belligerent countries or their forces [Article
3]. A neutral Power is not, on the other hand, obliged to forbid or restrict the use by
belligerents of communication centers owned by the neutral or by private enterprise and
which are open for general public use [Article 8];
(3) the formation of corps of combatants or the opening of recruiting agencies on the
territory of the neutral Power to assist the belligerents [Article 4].
See id. at 63-65. The historical insecurity of neutral powers in naval warfare is reflected in the right
of passage through neutral waters (and limited right to remain in neutral ports) granted to
belligerent warships under Hague Convention XII. ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 13, at 109.
The primary rule in air warfare is that neutral airspace is inviolable, and it was established by the
consistent World War I practice of neutrals. See Oliver J. Lissitzyn, The Treatment of Aerial
Intruders in Recent Practice andInternational Law, 47 AM. J. INT'LL. 559,559-60 (1953). Thus,
the neutrals rejected any extension of the diluted code of sea warfare to the air and preferred the
wider rights of sovereignty derived from land war. According to general international law, the
airspace is part of the sovereign territory of the state lying beneath it. See BRIAN F. HAVEL, IN
SEARCH OF OPEN SKIES: LAWAND POLICY FORANEW ERA IN INTERNATIONALAVIATION 31 (1997)
(discussing the embodiment of this principle in the Paris Convention of 1919 and thereafter).
28 For the text of the Conception, I have consulted the English translation provided in
VERDROSS, PERMANENT NEUTRALITY, supra note 23, at 36-40. Verdross's study, which first
appeared in 1958, has itself become the official vade mecum on the rights and obligations of
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of this further duty may be pleonastic, however, since it appears that all cessions of
sovereignty rights which might contravene the law of classical neutrality must be
excluded by the four duties mentioned. The grant of a right of transit across neutral
territory to a belligerent army, for example, potentially infringes the duties of
nonparticipation, abstention, impartiality, and prevention, and is also an
impermissible, if temporary, cession of a particular sovereign right.29
Austrian permanent neutrality.
29 The Hague Conventions of 1907, see supra note 13, acknowledged only one species of
neutrality, that of classical neutrality, which has been described as strict, absolute, or integral
neutrality when contrasted with relativist variations such as benevolent neutrality and
nonbelligerence. See OPPENHEIM, supra note 6, § 305, at 663. A neutral in wartime is inevitably
subject to stresses and shocks that may cause it to recalibrate its stance of impartiality-if not
ultimately to jettison its primary goal of nonparticipation-in the heat of conflict. See Bennett
Freeman, United States andAllied Efforts to Recover andRestore Gold and Other Assets Stolen
or Hidden by Germany During World War II, 14 AM. U. J. INT'LL. & POL'Y 137, 138 (noting
absence in World War II of any one specific form ofneutrality, "perfect' or otherwise). Neutrality,
after all, is notjus cogens as set forth in Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties. See generally GREIG, supra note 26, at 471-74 (discussingjus cogens and the Vienna
Convention). It can be derogated from, and sometimes public international law has nominalized
and categorized these derogations as components of a more broadly conceived law of neutrality.
See SCHWErr2ER, supra note 16, at 11. Benevolent neutrality applies whenever a state, to preserve
its status of neutrality, unilaterally supports a party to a war. Sweden's "benevolence" during
World War II oscillated between both belligerent alliances according to the fortunes of the war.
See RODERICK OGLEY, THE THEORY AND PRACTCE OF NEurRATY IN THE TWENIErH CENTURY
153-72 (1970). To allow a benevolent neutrality, of course, opens a Pandora's box of variant
nomenclatures. Qualified neutrality refers to the status of benevolent neutrality guaranteed by a
previous international law treaty. See SCHWErzIER, supra note 16, at 18. It has been applied to the
relationship of neutrals to their fellow members of the United Nations. See id. at 21; see also
OPPENHEIM, supra note 6, § 292e, at 648. The literature is sprinkled with references to differential,
flexible, discriminatory, differentiating, limited, relative, imperfect, incomplete, or "demi-"
neutrality. See id. Nonbelligerency is positioned even more distantly from the pure concept of
classical neutrality in that (unlike benevolent neutrality) it pretends no status of impartiality, ready
to be shaded off into degrees of partiality toward one side or the other, or toward both, depending
on the course of the conflict See generally Edwin Borchard, War, Neutrality, and Non-
Belligerency, 35 AM. J. INT'LL. 618 (1941) (analyzing nonbelligerency); Robert R. Wilson, 'Non-
Belligerency' in Relation to the Terminology of Neutrality, 35 AM. . INT'L L. 121 (1941)
(analyzing nonbelligerency). Nonbelligerency describes the posture of a state which on the one
hand renounces any impartiality from the outset and guarantees to one of the belligerents all
political, military, and economic advantages (propagandistic support, economic and financial aid,
war material, access to bases, etc.), but at the same time it avoids the legal status of cobelligerent
and seeks to retain all the advantages of the law of classical neutrality (i.e., its rights, especially
those that involve neutral trade). See SCHWEITZER, supra note 16, at 22; VERDROSs, supra note
22, at 505; Neuhold, Permanent Neutrality, supra note 20, at 162, 195. Nonbelligerency proved
an unstable posture during World War H1. While some states (Spain and Portugal, for instance)
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2. No Obligation ofEconomic (or Ideological) Neutrality
There is a mistaken impression, compounded by new information about the
depth of Swiss and Swedish engagement with the Nazi war economy, that classical
neutrality also entails (or should entail) strict economic neutrality.30 Somewhat
incongruously, in fact, a "total" neutrality, encompassing military, economic, and
even ideological impartiality, was a tenet of Nazi jurisprudential theory, but was
never part ofthe classical law ofneutrality.31 As the foregoing conspectus of duties
makes clear, classical neutrality has always been a strategy of strictly military origin
and consequences.3 2 If a third Hague conference were convened today to refurbish
neutrality's tenets for a post-Cold War age,33 it might consider whether an economic
withdrew more and more into classical neutrality, others (the United States, the states of Central
and South America) were increasingly sucked into the conflict. See generally Rudolf L.
Bindschedler, Neutrality, Concept and General Rules, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 5, at 9, 12 (discussing the pattern of neutral behavior in World
War I]).
30 Thus, Hanspeter Neuhold claimed-wrongly, in my view-that if a neutral plans an
embargo on an agricultural product, it must apply the embargo equally to all belligerent parties.
See Neuhold, supra note 20, at 163. If a state were to adopt such a principle of formal equality, it
would be as a component of its neutrality policy and not because of any international law
obligation. Whether Neuhold might ultimately be justified in his assertion, of course, would
depend on the range of products legally considered to be of use in a war. See infra text
accompanying note 37 (discussing conceptual scope ofmatdriel deguerre).
31 The German Nazijurist, Wilhelm Grewe, writing in 1940, advocated the concept of die
totale Neutralitit [total neutrality], a seamless neutrality embracing military, economic, and
ideological impartiality, and the logical derivative, in Grewe's analysis, of the Nazi doctrine of
Totalitdit des Krieges [total war]. See Wilhelm G. Grewe, Wirtschaftliche Neutralitdt [Economic
Neutraitly], in 7 ZErlSCHRIF DERAKADEMIIE FORDERsC RECHT [JOURNAL OF THEACADEMY
FOR GERMAN LAW] 141 (1940).
32 See Guttman, supra note 3, at 55. Guttman faulted the drafters of the Hague Conventions
for ignoring not only the effects of economic assistance (for example, the governmental interest
in the export of intellectual property involved in the manufacture of weaponry), but also implicated
questions of morality-notably the acceptance by neutral banks of assets obtained in violation of
intemational humanitarian precepts. See id. at 55-56 (considering the moral status ofneutrality).
Guttman would not permit a state to adopt neutrality-and it scarcely matters for his argument
whether neutrality is military, economic, or both--whenever "the maintenance of commercial and
financial relations with a regime [is] conceded to be evil under the moral precepts of countries
claiming a 'neutral' status." Id. at 57. As noted below, however, classical neutrality has never
denied the possibility of ideological opposition directed against one of the belligerents, making it
subject only to the general obligation ofnonparticipation. See infra note 42 and accompanying text
(discussing ideological neutrality).
33 On the agenda for a third Hague Conference, see GREEN, supra note 6, at 29.
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neutrality should also form part of the legal doxology professed by neutral states34
(and whether, at the most notorious intersection of military and economic support,
all arms sales by neutrals to belligerents, including sales by private parties, should
be prohibited).35 After all, materials, including technology, have been acquiring a
proportionately greater importance in the pattern of hostilities than mere troop size.
Moving beyond the consistent military focus of the Hague Conventions, which refer
to the concepts of "arms, munitions of war, or, in general... anything which could
be of use to an army or fleet,"36 it is obvious that most goods-especially food
products-can be useful in some way to the conduct of a war.37 In that sense, as
Greber has argued, "every economic exchange by a neutral with a belligerent is
characterized as a definite act of war assistance. '38
34 See ROBERT, supra note 25,-at 74 (discussing the prominence of military issues at the
Second Hague Peace Conference).
35 See Vagts, supra note 3, at 93.
36 See Common Article 7 of Hague Conventions V and XIII, reprinted in RoBERTS &
GUELFF, supra note 13, at 64, 111.
37 Modem warfare and the extensive requirements of arned forces make such a wide variety
of articles seem useful in the sense in which that term is employed in Hague Conventions V and
XIII, that a broadly-based definition ofmilitary goods would intolerably restrict trading by neutral
powers. Moreover, a broad definition of war material would imply too extensive an interference
with private trade because it would, in practice, expose all neutral private trade to defensive
measures by belligerents under prize law and in the economic realm. See generally D.H.N,
Johnson, Prize Law, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 5, at 154-59
(explaining prize law as the wartime capture of ships and cargo by belligerent powers). State
practice has shown the desire of belligerent powers to bring as many commodities as possible
within the ambit of military goods or war material. The most far-reaching contraband lists, for
example, were declared by the belligerent states in World War II. The lists included arms,
ammunition, explosives, chemicals, fuel, means of transportation, all tools and machine tools, all
means ofcommunication including even paper, and finally coin, bullion, currency, and promissory
notes. See VERDROSS, supra note 22, at 499. By the end of the war, virtually all goods, with the
exception of objets d'art and luxury items, were on the lists. See id. Such lists are only of empirical
value, however, and do not bear directly on the legal scope of the concept of military goods. This
characterization demands objective criteria, especially if neutrals are to be conceded their right to
carry on peaceful trade with belligerents. Zemanek classified as military those articles which "in
their essence" are useable exclusively or predominantly for military purposes. See Zemanek supra
note 23, at 249. Thus, things of daily necessity, such as foodstuffs, could not attract this
designation. ' To be classified as war materials are those goods which by their nature are intended
exclusively or predominantly for military purposes, but not foodstuffs and other things of daily
necessity, that are intended for the population, even though they could also serve military
purposes." Id.
38 GREBER, supra note 21, at 26-27. As Robert expressed it, "[e]very economic relation of
the neutral state with the belligerents is thus ultimately a material aid, a more or less direct taking
of sides in the course of operations. There are no longer any indifferent economic exchanges"
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During the two World Wars, while individual neutral countries, in their own
interest and without compulsion of international law, either forbade entirely or
placed under rigid controls the export ofnonwar materials, Switzerland, in order not
to be deprived of all foreign trade, practiced a restriction of its economic activity
called the courant normal.39 According to this self-adopted yardstick, the average
traffic in goods with belligerents during the three year period prior to the outbreak
of war was taken as the gauge for continued trade in wartime, so far as the
belligerents were in a position to maintain that quota.40
The neutral's discretion in ordering its economic relations with belligerents
must at some point be limited by the primary function of the law of neutrality itsel,
which is to keep the neutral out of the wars of other states. 41 A similar cautionary
ROBERT, supra note 25, at 78. While this view would buttress Guttman's argument that morality
must eventually trump neutrality, see supra note 32, publicists have accepted that the principle of
abstention from military assistance cannot be ofrelevance because this would naturally lead to the
preclusion of all economic exchange between neutral and belligerent (where the neutral state itself
is an economic actor), given that virtually all goods can have significance for a sustained war
campaign. See GREBER, supra note 21, at 26-27 (remarking that no product is completely useless
militarily in a context of "total war"). Some writers, echoing Nazi juristic theory, have even
portrayed the rule of impartiality as one of custom, and accordingly applicable to all areas,
economic and even ideological. This kind of dogmatic universalism was also reflected in modem
Communist theory. See CASTRiN, supra note 25, at 453; KOCH, supra note 26, at 83.
39 See VERDROSS, supra note 23, at 39.
40 See ROBERT, supra note 25, at 79. Trade was conducted, incidentally, on a strictly
noncredit basis. See id. The courant normal was the expression of a national neutrality policy
decision, which proved congenial to Swiss security interests in certain situations, but was not a
legal duty and still today reflects no legal duty. This view is also taken in the Conception officielle
suisse. See VERDROSS, supra note 23, at 39. But see supra note 3 (mentioning recent controversy
concerning Swiss partiality toward the Axis economies during World War II).
4 1 Accordingly, the rule that would allow the limits of a neutral's wartime economic
flexibility to be established is the general duty not to participate as a belligerent in the war and the
specific obligation of abstention. See generally Thomas Oppernaun, Intervention, in 3
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 233, 233-36 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1982)
(discussing reach of rules of abstention for neutral states). If the unilateral economic favor of a
belligerent by a neutral state assumes such a proportion that it is tantamount to an "intervention"
in the war on the side of that belligerent, an infringement of the law of classical neutrality can
surely be asserted. See id. at 233 (describing intervention as interference with the external or
internal affairs of another state in order to induce a certain behavior of the latter, using coercion and
violation of sovereign will). The difficulty is to determine with some degree of objectivity the level
of unilateral discrimination that would constitute an unlawful intervention. Opperman warned that
it is "especially difficult to draw the line between legitimate pursuance ofanation's own economic
interests and inadmissible pressure." Id. at 235. Attempts by modem international law to outlaw
war and the use of force have contributed to great uncertainty in classifying forms of pressure that
continue to be exercised by states, but do not unambiguously amount to vis absoluta or massive
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restriction could be argued in terms of ideological engagement in third state
conflicts, which is also not forbidden to neutral states under classical law.
42
B. The Paradox ofPermanent Neutrality in Peacetime
1. The Paradox and a Resolution
Permanent neutrality is the international law status of a state which is obligated
prospectively to maintain classical neutrality in the wars of other states, and not to
take part in the wars of other states, irrespective of the identity of the belligerents or
the geographical proximity of the conflict.43 Given classical neutrality's intense
coercion by the use or threat of force (intervention properly so-called). See supra note 20.
42 Greber has emphasized that, because the law of peace continues to govern
neutral/belligerent relations to the extent not otherwise determined by the law of neutrality, the
general international law precept of respect for the prestige and dignity of foreign states must
continue to apply, thereby limiting free expression of opinion by the neutral power. See GREBER,
supra note 21, at 31. It is true that the German argument of the National Socialist era prompted the
Swiss-always in the vanguard of protective measures for neutrality--to clamp restrictions on
their press during the Nazi ascendancy, but they had also done so during World War I, and always
as an expression of neutrality "policy" rather than from a sense of legal obligation. See Edgar
Bonjour, Swiss Neutrality During Two World Wars, in MODERN SWNIZERLAND 419, 436 (1978).
Perhaps the most bizarre example of a punctilious moral neutrality from World War II is the
still-controversial gesture of the Irish Prime Minister, amon de Valera, in paying a formal visit
to the German legation in Dublin on April 30, 1945, to express his condolences on the death ofthe
Faihrer, Adolf Hitler. On the death of Roosevelt, just 18 days previously, de Valera had sent a
message to President Truman, mourning "a great man and a noble leader," and therefore, in Robert
Fisk's view, the German legation visit "would naturally have suggested itself to a man who applied
so public-indeed, so balanced-a rigidity to the principles of neutrality." ROBERT FISK, IN TIME
OF WAR: IRELAND, ULSTER AND THE PRICE OF NEUTRALITY 1939-1945, at 461(1983). But the
Prime Minister's conspicuous act ofneutrality was also "extraordinary and shocking," Fisk wrote,
"because the German extermination camps had now been discovered by the advancing Allied
armies and the truth of the Nazi policy of genocide had just been revealed to the world." Id.
43 The law ofneutrality has had its learned exponents from the time of Grotius, while the last
hundred years have seen the emergence of a substantial corpus ofjuristic study concerning the
institution of permanent neutrality. The adoption of permanent neutrality by Austria in 1955 and
Laos in 1962, together with the need to re-evaluate the concept ofneutrality in the era ofthe United
Nations and a nuclear overkill capacity, have combined to sustain academic interest in permanent
neutrality since 1945. See Subedi, note 2, at 249. It is a body of legal scholarship that is written
chiefly by German, Austrian, Swiss, and Scandinavian jurists, and published almost exclusively
in the French and German languages. Apparently, the jurisprudence ofpermanent neutrality has
not sufficiently captured the common law legal imagination to warrant more than the very shortest
translation exercises. The predominance of French and German writing is unsurprising in the
context of the present Article, since only one of the five European neutrals examined here, the
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normative and intuitive attachment to the law of war, however, the purported
adoption of a stance of neutrality in peacetime would seem to be conceptually
incongruous. As shown above, the condition precedent for classical neutrality is the
existence of an armed conflict that can be qualified in international law as a war
involving two or more third states. If a state were to declare its intention to observe
a temporally-unconfined classical neutrality, that intention could not be governed
by the public international law of neutrality, because the object to which the
declaration of the state's will is addressed, classical neutrality, is itself temporally
confined.4 While permanent neutrality requires neutrality in all future wars,
neutrality itself cannot be permanent because it exists only when there is a current
state of war. By definition, permanent neutrality is not analyzable as a constituent
of the international law institution of classical neutrality.
There is, however, an elegant jurisprudential solution to this conceptual
paradox.45 To begin with, the choice between a peacetime behavior ofprospective
neutrality that is circumscribed by international law, and one that is freely-patterned
by the permanently neutral state, has exercised the minds ofjurists since the end of
the last century. Adopting the terminology suggested in a 1981 study by Austrian
scholar Manfred Rotter, these conflicting positions can be respectively designated
the "prophylactic theory" and the "obligation theory." 46 The prophylactic theory,
which restricts permanent neutrality to its "primary" obligation (pro fituro
neutrality in all wars) was first proposed by the Swiss jurist Paul Schweizer, writing
Republic of Ireland, is English-speaking. See Neuhold, supra note 14, at 231 n.1 (noting the
absence of a comprehensive and comparative literature on the European neutrals in English); see
also Vagts, supra note 3, at 84 nA (noting the scarcity ofrecent discussions of neutrality other than
a few articles with a Swiss perspective, which must necessarily be"idiosyncratic," in Vagts's view,
because of Swiss aloofness from the United Nations).
44 Thus, the Hague Conventions, which codify the authoritative models of belligerent and
neutral behavior, have a normative content of rights and duties which is automatically deprived
of meaning and effect once the law ofpeace is restored. The Preambles of Hague Conventions V
and XIII establish that the rules they contain are to be applied respectively to "the rights and duties
of neutral powers in case of war on land," and the harmonizing of rules for "the event ofnaval
war." ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 13, at 63, 110.
457The paradox may explain why international law scholars sometimes mistakenly assume
that permanent neutrality in peacetime is a mere emanation of a state's foreign policy preferences,
rather than being an institution of international law per se that imposes specific normative
conditions. See G6ran Lys6n, Some Views on Neutrality and Membership of the European
Communities: The Case ofSweden, 29 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 229,233 (1992) (commenting that
"the more or less peaceful conditions in intemational affairs do not by themselves affect the legal
requirements relative to the status of neutrality").
46 See RorTR, supra note 22, at 104, 108.
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in 1895.47 For Schweizer, permanent neutrality was merely a form of continually-
repeating classical neutrality, which in peacetime remained essentially latent 48 As
such, this status could not be infringed by the permanently neutral state in
peacetime--unless there were treaty-based or recognition-based obligations.4 9 This
view certainly reduced permanent neutrality to a bloodless formula-prospective
classical neutrality.
The obligation theory-which I adopt in this Article-imposes a legal duty on
the permanently neutral state in peacetime not to compromise its capacity for
unfettered neutrality in wartime.50 The jurist who pioneered the obligation theory
was Karl Strupp.51 Strupp's analysis, which I synopsize here, was based on the
extra-legal perception that the institution of permanent neutrality can only
successfully discharge its intended geopolitical "ordering function" if third states
can confidently plan their foreign policies on the assumption that permanently
neutral states are not only willing, but in fact have the capacity, to adopt neutrality
in the event of future armed conflict.52 It is not therefore sufficient-pace
Schweizer and his successors-that the intemational law delict flowing from breach
of a previous pledge of future neutrality should only come into being at the moment
when that neutrality is formally triggered, i.e., at the commencement of war. By
then it is already too late to demand from the permanently neutral state restitutio in
integrum of the international order that was preconfigured by the original adoption
of its status. Removal of the delict, however, can only happen if the
behavior-alignment of the permanently neutral state toward its future obligation of
neutrality is construed not as a prudent policy of neutrality, but as a genuine
enforceable legal duty. Notwithstanding the classical view that neutrality presumes
a war, permanent neutrality in peacetime produces international law "pre-effects"
that are fully equivalent in their practical impact to the effects of classical neutrality
in wartime.5 3
47 See PAUL SCHWEIZER, GESCHICHTE DER SCHWEIzERISCHEN NEUTRALUAT [HISTORY OF
Swss NEuiRALrrY] 72 (1895).
48 See id. at 87.
49 See infra note 80 (discussing third-party guarantees).
50 See ROTER, supra note 22, at 108.
5 1 See STRUPP, supra note 21, at 214.
52 See id.
53 See id. Strupp's obligation theory has been widely approved. See VERDROSS, supra note
23, at 18-19; Hummer, supra note 17, at 12. Both Austria and Switzerland officially embraced the
obligation theory. Although these statements did not of themselves comprise formal sources of
law, they represented, as Schweitzer stated, "expressions of the opiniojuris, starting-points for the
building-up of rules ofcustomary international law." SCHWErrzER, supra note 16, at 90; see also
Conception officielle suisse de la neutraliti, reprinted in VERDROSS, supra note 23, at 36-37;
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A permanent neutrality, therefore, seeks to perpetuate the reciprocal rights and
duties which classical neutrality postulates for wartime, in other words to
"overstretch" the temporal and factual fields of validity of the norms of behavior of
classical neutrality.54 Moreover, unlike permanent neutrality as a mere unilateral
political maxim of desired neutrality in all future wars, the overstretching of
neutrality which flows from the juridical institution of permanent neutrality
introduces a separate normative content for permanent neutrality, so that its cardinal
purpose--4o ensure in peacetime that the adhering state will adopt classical
neutrality in wartime-can be achieved. The normative instruments that allow
permanently neutral states to perpetuate or overstretch the norms of classical
neutrality are called the secondary or derived duties (known in German
jurisprudence as Vorwirkungen-literally, "pre-effects") of permanent neutrality.55
More specifically, the primary duties of wartime neutrality, overstretched into the
law of peace, allow a kind of anticipatory projection of a core of secondary
peacetime duties of permanent neutral states derived by one-to-one correspondence
from the wartime obligations of neutrals.
2. Deriving Permanent Neutrality 's Key Obligations
The paramount obligation of permanent neutrality is the renunciation of any
action in peacetime that would jeopardize or render impossible the fulfillment of the
mandates of classical neutrality in wartime.5 6 The obligation not to conclude in
peacetime any treaties of mutual military assistance (whether defensive and
offensive, or only defensive) is derived from the overarching wartime obligation of
nonparticipation in the wars of other states.57
The primary duty of abstention projects an anterior peacetime duty of
permanently neutral states to eschew treaties and conventions which would obligate
Bruno Kreisky, Austria Draws the Balance, 37 FoREiGN AFF. 269,275 (1959).
54 See Hummer, supra note 17, at 4; see also Subedi, supra note 2, at 241.
55 See Hummer, supra note 17, at 7.
56 See ROTER, supra note 22, at 108; see also the words of the Conception officielle suisse,
admonishing permanently neutral states that they should "not vis-d-vis other countries enter into
any obligations which in case of war would commit [them] to conduct contrary to neutrality."
VERDROSS, supra note 23, at 38.
57 See STRUPP, supra note 21, at 234; see also RoTrER, supra note 22, at 163; VERDROSS,
supra note 22, at 198. There is no objection, however, to purely passive treaties of assistance-in
other words, defensive alliances which do not bind the permanently neutral state to reciprocal
obligations. Such an arrangement, which is in effect a guarantee, can be of immense value in
securing future respect for its chosen status. The concept of the alliance is confined to stating the
duty of the other contracting powers to assist the permanently neutral state in its self-defense. See
infra note 80 (discussing guarantees by third states).
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them in wartime to channel war materials or troop contingents to one or more
belligerent powers.58 The duty of impartiality, which has a weak normative
projection into peacetime in the absence of a wartime duty of economic neutrality,
implies only a general obligation not to undertake legal commitments in peacetime
that will jeopardize the future observance of classical neutrality, including the duty
of impartiality.59 Finally, in peacetime, the neutral duty of prevention projects an
antecedent obligation to conclude no transit treaties which would bind the
pernanently neutral state to allow wartime transit of a belligerent's armed forces or
munitions. More generally, the permanent neutral in peacetime should refrain from
the toleration of foreign power military bases in the widest sense.6° Because the
neutral's wartime duty of prevention requires it only to use the means at its disposal
to repel violators, 61 it might be thought that there is no derived peacetime duty to
maintain a defense capacity or to take specific measures aimed at repulsing future
attempted violations of its neutrality. The better view, however, is that only the level
58 Although the modem position is indisputable, during the eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries it was not considered a violation of neutrality for a neutral to make troops available on
the basis of treaties which were concluded prior to the outbreak of war. See OPPENHEIM, supra
note 6, § 316, at 675; see also SCHWErrZEP, supra note 16, at 115. Bonjour, in his history of Swiss
neutrality, mentioned the former practice of the Swiss cantons of supplying mercenaries for
compensation. See EDGARBoNJOUR, LANEurRALrT SUISSE: SYNTHEsDE SONHISTOIRE [Swiss
NEuTRALriy: A SYNTHESIS OF ITS HISTORY] 13 (1978).
59 As a guiding tenet of neutrality policy in peacetime, however, the principle of impartial
treatment has obvious application to the behavior of a permanently neutral state. During the Cold
War, for example, Finland's weapons importation policy deliberately struck a balance between
East and West. See WOKER, supra note 13, at 42.
60 The prohibition on military bases can be extrapolated from the proscriptions in Article 3
of Hague Convention V relating to nonuse by belligerent powers of telecommunications
installations on neutral territory, and in Article 4 against the formation of corps of combatants or
the opening ofrecruitment offices by the belligerents on neutral territory. See ROBERTS & GIELFF,
supra note 13, at 63. This obligation can also be derived from the more specific language of Article
5 of Hague Convention XIII, enjoining belligerents not "to use neutral ports and waters as a base
of naval operations against their adversaries," in tandem with Article 25, the catch-all provision
imposing a general duty of prevention on neutral powers. See id at 111, 114. The obligation can
also be deduced from the provisions in Articles 4 and 5 of Convention XIII that limit the stay of
warships in neutral ports and prohibit the fitting out or arming in neutral ports of vessels intended
for use in hostile operations against a power with which the neutral is at peace. See id. at 111-12.
For Austria, however, the anterior obligation of prevention flows directly from its instrument of
permanent neutrality, the Constitutional Law on Neutrality, which declares in Article 1(2) that
"Austria will never in the fiture... permit the establishment of military bases of foreigu states on
her territory." See AUSTRIAN FEDERAL MnISRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE AUSTRIAN FEDERAL
CONSTrUrION 143 (Charles Kessler tars., 1983) [hereinafter AUSTRIAN CONSTITUTION (1983)];
see also ScHwrIZER, supra note 16, at 113.
61 See infra note 62 (discussing the principle of ultraposse nemo tenetur).
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of defense preparations, rather than the initial duty to make them, is optional for the
permanently neutral state-and therefore is a component of a general neutrality
policy.62
62 See infra text accompanying notes 65,344 (discussing optional foreign policy measures
to enhance status of neutrality, collectively described as a neutrality policy). The most frequent
view is that although the duty of prevention does not in itself give rise to an obligation in
peacetime to prepare for the defense of wartime neutrality, it does give rise to a duty to repel
violations of that neutrality, and such a duty, amplified by the obligation to remain outside all
future wars, makes it imperative for permanently neutral states to prepare in peacetime for the
future defense of their neutrality in wartime. See VERDROSS, supra note 23, at 44; see also
SCHWEnz supra note 16, at 138; STRUPP, supra note 21, at 215. The alternative, minority view
insists upon a strict application of the obligation theory. See supra text accompanying note 50. It
holds that because the wartime duty of prevention is governed by a requirement only to use all the
means at the neutral's disposal--which may in a given situation be no means other than diplomatic
protest-there is no wartime duty which can generate a coordinate peacetime responsibility. See
RoTrER, supra note 22, at 158-59 (articulating a right, rather than a duty, of armed neutrality).
Even if the majority view is accepted, the general legal principle ultra posse nemo tenetur still
holds good. As Verdross maintained, the choice of measures for an armed neutrality in peacetime
must be left to the discretion of the permanently neutral state, but "[i]n any case its duty ends at the
same point as does its material capacity." VERDROSS, supra note 23, at 45. As the main text
suggests, the better view is to regard the level of defense preparedness (as opposed to the initial
existence of a duty of preparedness) as a product of each permanently neutral state's neutrality
policy. Austria, Sweden, and Switzerland, for example, have embraced the concept of armed
neutrality. See RiCHARD A. Brr'INGER, NEuTRALriY FOR EASTERN EUROPE? AN EXAMINATION
OF POSSIBLE WESTERN ROLE MODELS 5 (RAND Security Symposium Paper, Feb. 1990) (on file
with author) (discussing extensive defense preparations of all three neutrals). But see Article 13
of the Austrian State Treaty, infra note 129 and accompanying text, which is one of the basic
instruments of Austrian neutrality and prohibits Austria from possessing, constructing, or
experimenting with any nuclear weapons or guided missiles; see also AuSTRIAN CONSTMIUON
(1983), supra note 60, at 103. Official Swedish defense policy, for example, has adopted the
"entrance price strategy," which was usefully summarized by former Foreign Minister Nils
Andrdn: "[Tlhe defense must have such a strength and composition that a prospective aggressor
cannot because of any Swedish shortcomings in this respect misunderstand the seriousness behind
our political declarations." Nils Andn, Sweden's Security Policy, in JJ. HOLST, FRvE ROADS TO
NORDIc SEcURITY 123, 144 (1973). For Austria, Article I(1) of the Constitutional Law on
Neutrality provided that "Austria of her own free will declares herewith her permanent neutrality
which she is resolved to maintain and defend with all the means at her disposal." AUSTRIAN
CONSTrIUTON (1983), supra note 60, at 143. The states which have recognized Austrian
neutrality, see infra text accompanying note 136, could not allege an international law delict on
the basis of failure to plan for specific military-strategic contingencies, but they presumably could
hold Austria responsible in international law for failure to take any preparations to assure the future
maintenance and defense of its permanent neutrality.
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3. Again, No Economic or Ideological Obligations
As I have shown, classical neutrality entails no duties of economic or
ideological neutrality.63 A duty of wartime economic neutrality, if it existed and
were projected into an antecedent obligation of permanently neutral states, would
impose an extraordinary burden of impartiality in an era of complex economic
interdependence. It is reasonable to assume that permanently neutral states, in that
context, should not have to practice a form of commercial even-handedness that
could only truly succeed by requiring autarky, an obligation that encumbers no other
sovereigns as a matter of international law.64
Ideological neutrality, moreover, has had a rather different implication for
permanently neutral states. Beyond the core legal obligations of their status, 65 these
states have tended to adopt prophylactic measures of foreign policy, loosely
described as a "neutrality policy," to promote confidence in and respect for
permanent neutrality. While not amounting to ideological impartiality, these
measures of conflict reduction-at least in the Cold War era-served a useful
buffering function between antagonistic blocs. Neutrality policy also kept Austria,
Sweden, and Finland out of the EU until quite recently,66 although I will argue in
Part IV that membership of the EU, even before its ambition to transform itself into
a military syndicate as well as an economic one, was always incompatible with the
law of permanent neutrality.
HI. THE EMPiICAL LIFE OF PERMANENT NEUTRALrrY: FE STATES IN
SEARCH OF A RECONCEPTUALIZATION
In this Part, I will investigate the permanent neutrality of five European states
and classify the kind of permanent neutrality (factual, legal, or mixed factual and
legal) practiced by each. I will also weigh what each state's experience contributes
to the task of reconceptualizing permanent neutrality, in preparation for an
integrated discussion in Part IV of the legal and political challenges that the
63 See supra text accompanying note 30.
64 See Neuhold, supra note 14, at 255 (describing the tendency by some Austrian advocates
of EU membership to discount the economic dimension of neutrality, on the ground that neutral
states must not be required to maintain a higher degree of economic autonomy than "normal" (i.e.,
non-neutral) states, in a world where international economic interdependence is endemic).
65 This is not to preempt the discussion of legal and factual permanent neutrality in Part III.
Of the five European neutrals discussed in this Article, only Austria and Switzerland have
practiced permanent neutrality unequivocally as a matter of legal duty. See infra Parts II.B.1-2.
66 Switzerland has never joined the EU; Ireland, however, joined in 1973. See infra text
accompanying note 265.
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European Union now represents for all of them. First, however, I briefly analyze
how states, if they choose to assume a legal as opposed to a factual status of
permanent neutrality, may use instruments of international law to do so. Through
this analysis, I show that well-tried mechanisms of international law can be flexibly
adapted to serve a reworked code of permanent neutrality.
A. The International Law Instrumentsfor Adopting Permanent Neutrality
1. Introducing a New Term ofArt-Neutralitization
States must choose to become permanently neutral, and only exceptionally is
permanent neutrality thrust upon them.67 While permanent neutrality shares with
classical neutrality the quality of possessing a corpus of duties (and sometimes
rights) established by international convention and by custom, unlike classical
neutrality it is not an automatic, self-generating legal condition.68 In fact, the idea
that a state during peacetime would be assumed to be permanently neutral unless it
expressly uttered to the contrary is a manifest absurdity, because permanent
neutrality lacks a correlative and opposite status (other than mere nonpermanent
neutrality) which would give meaning to a duty to Utter.69 Classical neutrality, on
the other hand, is in enduring tension with a correlative and opposite status of
belligerency.70 Moreover, and again in contradistinction to classical neutrality, it
appears that-apart from any instruments of adoption-permanent neutrality as an
institution imposes duties, but confers no rights, on the adopting states.71 It would
not therefore be in harmony with the sovereign right of self-detennination of states
67 See infra text accompanying note 133 (discussing alleged imposition of permanent
neutrality on Austria as the price of release from a four-power occupation).
68 Classical neutrality is an automatic status between its poles of temporal validity-the
commencement and termination of a lawful state of war-and does not even require an express
declaration or manifesto by nonbelligerent states. See SCHMrIlT, supra note 14, at 72. Schmitt
expressed the difference in the following terms: "At the commencement of war all nonparticipating
states are, it is true, automatically neutral, but they are not 'made neutral."' Id.
69 See ScwErITzER, supra note 16, at 42,
70 See GREBER, supra note 21, at 16.
71 The rights of a permanently neutral state comprise a brief catalogue when compared with
its duties. Its wartime "right" to repel violations of its neutrality is in truth a duty, see supra text
accompanying note 26, but in war and peace it does have the right to have its neutrality respected
by the appropriate circle of recognizing states. See infra text accompanying note 80 (discussing
guarantees by third states).
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to impose upon them a catalogue of duties that they could only renounce by express
public utterance.2
In traditional international law parlance, the process by which a state becomes
permanently neutral (as a binding obligation of international law) is called
"neutralization." Politically, this would not be the happiest term for a putative
permanent neutral, since it obviously connotes that the state has become the object
of the action, rather than the subject actor.73 And, in common parlance, to be
"neutralized" carries a connotation of weakness, enervation, and elimination from
contention, and sovereign states usually do not like to think of themselves as
political eunuchs.74Neutralization is also a term used in the literature to describe an
72 Classical neutrality, in contrast, is renounced by a specific declaration of intention to
assume the status of a cobelligerent. See OPPENHEIM, supra note 6, § 293, at 653-54. The precise
formula of words by which a status ofpermanent neutrality is established is not predetermined by
international law. The term neutralitJ permanente first entered the technical vocabulary of
intemational law with the Peace Treaty of Amiens of 1802, which inter alia proclaimed that status
for the island of Malta. See Hummer, supra note 17, at 9. At the Congress of Vienna 13 years later,
the future international status of Switzerland was designated neutralitiperpituelle, or in German
immenv.hrende Neutralitiat (translatable, in both instances, as "permanent" neutrality). Since then,
virtually all treaties adopting permanent neutrality have included a formula of words modeled on
one or other of these precedents. For an example, see the permanent neutrality instruments for
Belgium and Luxembourg, reprinted in I A COLLECrION OF NEUrRALrrY LAWS, REGULATIONS
AND TREATIES OF VARIOUS COUNTRiEs 51, 757 (Francis De6k & Philip C. Jessup eds., 1939).
Nevertheless, even if the expression "permanent neutrality" does not appear in an intenational
instrument, as for example in the case of Laos in 1962, it may still be possible, by assembling the
obligations assumed by the candidate state and by scrutinizing the language used in the instrument,
to conclude that a status of permanent neutrality has indeed been adopted. See generally
Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos, July 23, 1962, 14 U.S.T. 1104,456 U.N.T.S. 301; John J.
Czyzak & Carl F. Salans, The International Conference on the Settlement of the Laotian Question
and the Geneva Agreements of 1962, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 300 (1963).
73 Permanent neutrality is sometimes adopted by a state in such a manner that it appears to
have been imposed by the will of other states (who may even act as guarantors of its observance).
That state, in other words, appears to have been "neutralized." This was certainly what happened
to Laos in 1962. See BLACKETAL., NEUrRALIZATIONAND WORLD POLMCS 29-30 (1968). It was
probably the case with Austria in 1955, despite occasional suggestions to the contrary. See id. at
29 (commenting that "Austria was free... only to choose between continued occupation and
permanent neutrality"). For a recent official concession that Austria's permanent neutrality was
imposed from outside, see infra note 134.
74 In its extreme form, this view ofneutral states leads to the kind of assertion quoted by Jean
Ziegler in his indictment of Swiss relations with the Nazi Reich: 'Switzerland does not exist.' By
this, Andr6 Gorz implies that a country which constantly avoids adopting an international position,
which refuses to take sides and sometimes goes so far as to deny the existence of conflicts that are
tearing people and nations apart, possesses no international existence." ZIEGLER, supra note 3, at
168. Ziegler himself, it must be added, disagreed with Gorz's assessment, since Switzerland, in
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entirely distinct institution--4he creation of an internationalized, demilitarized
cordon sanitaire.75 To overcome both the political connotations and the
terminological confusion, I will substitute a neologism, "neutralitization," to
describe the code of general international principles by which a state adopts the
legal status of permanent neutrality in accordance with international law.76 Unlike
the ambiguity in the root of the word "neutralization," the new coinage is a perfect
semantic match with the doctrine of neutrality.
2. Four Archetypes ofNeutralitization
Surveying state practice, neutralitization as an operation of international law
occurs using one or more of four basic legal archetypes: international treaty, the
dual processes of notification and recognition, unilateral declaration (a method that
I derive from the controversial Nuclear Tests opinion of the International Court of
Justice), and crystallization of custom.
a. International Treaty
International treaty is the most common method of neutralitization, as in the
case of Switzerland in 1815 (between the Swiss and a coalition of great powers)77
and Laos in 1962 (involving a mixed group of small and great powers).78 The
precise constellation of participating powers should be incidental. A bilateral
agreement with a neighbor, for example, would probably suffice.7 9 It is always
Ziegler's thesis, is a financial and economic "great power." Id.
75 While permanent neutrality governs the entire state territory of the permanently neutral
country, the second meaning of neutralization in public international law is the establishment of
an international status pertaining only to portions of state territory (inclusive of rivers, canals, and
straits), to portions of the high seas, or exclusively to particular installations or facilities (such as
an international waterway), all of which are protected by this status against becoming a "region
of war." Stephan Verosta, Neutralization, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PuBC INTERNATIONAL LAW,
supra note 5, at 31, 33. On the related-and neoteric-institution of "zones of peace," see infra
note 368.
76 As used in this Article, neutralitization describes all instances of the adoption ofpermanent
neutrality, whether the element of imposition is plausibly present or not. This is the usage preferred
in BLACK ET AL., supra note 73, at vi, for the proto-term neutralization.
77 See infra text accompanying note 113 (discussing Swiss instruments ofneutralitization).
78 See BLACK ET AL., supra note 73, at xii. The multilateral neutralitization guarantee to Laos
proved ephemeral. After an eventual Communist takeover, a Laos/Vietnam treaty in 1977 formally
ended Laotian neutrality. See SuRYA P. SUBEDI, LAND AND MARrIME ZONES OF PEACE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 148 (1996).
79 Indeed, analogously with the former bilateral treaties of classical neutrality, see
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politically expedient, however, for the neutralitizing state to include a cluster of
major military-strategic powers among the contracting parties, because as a matter
of general international law only states that are parties to an international law treaty
have a right during the currency of the treaty to bring a legally-cognizable claim for
its enforcement.80
b. A Contract Simulacrum: Unilateral Promise, Notification, and
Recognition
Austria's 1955 declaration of permanent neutrality, accomplished through a
domestic constitutional law,81 raised the possibility of an alternative to
neutralitization by international treaty.82 Thus, Austria accompanied its changed
status by a request for, and receipt of, international recognition of that status. This
process-a unilateral promise, notification of the promise to third states, and receipt
of recognition from third states-is a kind of simulacrum of the domestic contract
formation paradigm. 83 Unlike municipal contract law, however, by the very fact of
OPPENHEIM, supra note 6, § 306, at 665, even a bilateral international agreement can establish
permanent neutrality-although, like the classical neutrality precedents, such a bilateral system
would be open to the criticism of approximating to an alliance. Bindschedler, for example, thought
that such a treaty would be aimed at support for or preference of the treaty partner. See Rudolf L.
Bindschedler, Die Neutralitit im Modernen Vd1kerrecht [Neutrality in Modern International Law],
17 ZErrSCHRIFrFORAUSLANDISHCHES OFFENTIICHES RECHT UND VOLKEnacHT [JOURNAL OF
FOREIGNPUBLICLAWANDINTERNATIONALLAW] 1,3 (1956-57).ButseeMalta's 1981 treatywith
Italy, infra note 104, under which Italy recognized and undertook to respect the sovereignty,
independence, neutrality, and territorial integrity of Malta. See 5 ITALIAN Y.B. INT'L L. 353-55
(1983) (setting forth the relevant text of Exchange of Notes).
80 See Hummer, supra note 17, at 13. The cosignatories which have undertaken to respect-
and occasionally also to guarantee-the status ofrpermanent neutrality, have the right to treat any
infringement of a legal duty by the permanently neutral state (whether set by the particular
instrument of neutralitization or by the rules of the international law institution of permanent
neutrality, or both) as an intemational delict which gives rise to a claim for reparation. See ROBERT,
supra note 25, at 42. In exchange for this circumscription of its freedom, the neutral state may gain
not only respect for its status but a guarantee of intervention on its behalf. The wider and more
powerful the circle of contracting states, the more valuable that guarantee.
An infringement by the permanently neutral state during wartime of any of the duties of
classical neutrality that it is bound by its status to observe, will confer upon all aggrieved
belligerents the standing ofpetitioners for reparation-irrespective of whether or not they are also
cosignatories of the treaty ofneutralitization. See id.
81 See infra text accompanying note 127 (discussing Austrian instruments ofneutralitization).
82 But see infra text accompanying note 139 (discussing possible treaty dimension to
Austrian neutralitization).
83 This process is a simulacrum (in addition to the reasons given in the main text) because the
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notification--provided there is such notification-legal consequences for the
notifying state are instantly produced. As an autonomous operation of international
law, however, a notified unilateral promise can only produce unilateral legal
consequences. It can only impose duties upon, but accord no rights to, the promisor
state.84 Those rights can flow only from the coordination of the autonomous
operation of "promise and notification" with a separate and equally autonomous
international law operation, which also issues unilaterally, that of recognition.
Recognition in this sense should not be confused with the similarly-named concept
that denotes the granting or withholding of approval with respect to emergent state
entities.8 5 That kind of recognition can indeed be a political acknowledgment of a
pre-existing dejure situation, but recognition in the present context is a unilateral
independent legal transaction applied to a particularclaim or state of affairs which
may, at the time it is made, be only de facto. The conversion of the claim or state of
affairs into an internationally binding obligation does not therefore precede the act
of recognition, it is the consequence of that act.86 As with international treaties,
neutralitization by notification and recognition also creates a closed circle of states
which are granted a legally-enforceable claim for reparation if the permanently
neutral state commits a transgression of the applicable law of permanent
neutrality. 87 Thus, the original promise may only be a unilateral transaction, but
recognition might only be a rough facsimile of domestic contract acceptance. Although the
notification invited acceptance of the unilateral promise, and presumably sought an express and
formal recognition of the new status, the responses have included a recognition by taking note
without objection, or the mere confirmation of receipt of the notification. See Hummer, supra note
17, at 6-7; see also ROBERT, supra note 25, at 32; Josef L. Kunz, Austria's Pennanent Neutrality,
50 AM. J. INT'L L. 418, 421 (1956); Karl Zemanek, NeutralAustria in the United Nations, 15
INT'L ORG. 408,409 (1961).
84 See Hummer, supra note 17, at 8.
85 See GREIG, supra note 26, at 120.
86 See ERIK SUY, LEs AcrEs JURIDIQUES UNILATtRAUX EN DRorr INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC
[UNILATERAL LEGAL Acrs IN PUBLic INTERNATIONAL LAW] 203 (1962). But see infra text
accompanying note 89 (discussing unilateral permanent neutrality).
87 See also ROBERT, supra note 25, at 43-44. Once the status of classical neutrality has been
engaged, the circle correspondingly widens to embrace belligerents not already participants in the
neutralitization. See id. In fact, although this sequence does not constitute a treaty in the sense
intended by Article 2(l)(a) ofthe Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, because it requires
no "written form," it nevertheless produces legal rights and duties exactly corresponding to those
which an international law treaty is competent to produce. For the text of Article 2 of the Vienna
Convention, see 8 I.L.M. 679, 680-81 (1969); see also BARRY E. CARTER & PHM R. TIIMBLE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW: SELECr DOCmE 1999-2000, at 50 (1999). Consequently, the same
conditions for termination that govern intemational law treaties will regulate the cessation of the
status of permanent neutrality when it is created by the triple sequence-the promisor state will
similarly be precluded from unilateral revocation of its international law undertakings. See
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when augmented by notification and recognition it carries the same legal force as
a duty undertaken by international treaty, and will therefore be governed by the
same basic principles of good faith and mutual trust applicable to treaties.88
c. Unilateral Permanent Neutrality (Te "Nuclear Tests " Method)
Although Joseph L. Kunz wrote in 1955 that a "[s]tate cannot become
permanently neutral in international law by its own unilateral declaration," 89 the
International Court of Justice opinion in the Nuclear Tests cases in 197490 suggested
that, in some circumstances, unilateral expressions of sovereign intent may create
international law obligations.91 Under this much-debated jurisprudence, 92 a state
VERDROSS, supra note 23, at 30. But seenfra note 145 (discussing how Austria might unilaterally
renounce its neutralitization).
88 See Kunz, supra note 83, at 423-24.
89 Id. at 418.
90 Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.CJ 253 (Dec. 20); Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974
I.C.J. 457 (Dec. 20). The two cases followed identical tracks:
As is shown by the texts of the two judgements, one in the Australian and the other in
the New Zealand case, one is modeled on the other, the cases were examined, pleaded and
deliberated upon together, the Applications initiating proceedings were filed on the same day
and the steps preparatory to the judicial proceeding [have] been exactly parallel.
Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 I.CJ. at 480 (separate opinion of Judge Gros). All references in
this Article, therefore, are to the judgment of Dec. 20, 1974 (Austl. v. Fr.).
9 1 Australia and New Zealand sought a nling ofthe International Court that French tests of
nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, then being conducted in the South Pacific area, were in
violation of international law. The French Government had refused to comply with the court's
interim order requiring that France refrain from commencing further tests until the court reached
a decision in the case. However, in a series of public pronouncements, the French Ministers of
Defense and Foreign Affairs had stated that France was in a position to proceed to underground
testing in the following year, and the President of the Republic had announced at a press
conference that he had "made it clear that this round of atmospheric tests would be the last." The
International Court concluded that, because these utterances should be construed as legally binding
upon the French Republic, erga omnes, the Applicants had accordingly achieved their object in
commencing the proceedings, namely, the cessation of atmospheric tests for the future, and that
therefore the dispute between the parties no longer existed and a declaratory judgment need not
be issued. See Nuclear Tests, (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.CJ. at 269-70.
92 See infra note 98. For a recent analysis, written after New Zealand unsuccessfully sought
a re-examination of the 1974 judgment in light of France's commencement of underground
nuclear testing, see Barbara Kwiatkowska, New Zealand v. France Nuclear Tests: The Dismissed
Case ofLasting Significance, 37 VA. J. IN'L L. 107 (1996). See also Request for an Examination
of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of the Court's Judgment of 20 December 1974
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must intend to become bound by the terms of its declaration. Breaking from the
quasi-contractual model of notification coupled with recognition, the court detected
no need for a quidpro quo nor any subsequent acceptance of the declaration, nor
even any reply or reaction from other states.93 Once such a statement is properly
deemed to exist, it will be assumed that the declarant state did not utter its
declaration in "implicit relianc6 on an arbitrary power of reconsideration."
Moreover, unlike the first two modes of neutralitization, such a declaration would
seem capable ipso facto of possessing binding force with respect to the whole
community of states, and not solely in relation to a closed circle of participating
states.95
By holding that unilateral promisesper se can have binding legal effects, and
that incidents such as notification and acceptance were optional, the majority
confirmed indirectly the legality of the more involved process of unilateral promise,
notification, and recognition. 96 If legal security is indeed the shared desideratum of
the entire court in the Nuclear Tests decision, the only secure method for
guaranteeing it, if an international treaty is not used, is the coupling of a state's
unilateral undertaking with a requirement to notify third states and to request an
acceptance by recognition. Otherwise, with only a unilateral promise, or a unilateral
promise which has been notified but so far unrecognized, the promisor state is made
subject to obligations but given no rights in international law, and there is
consequently no guarantee that the promise will not be retracted in the future-as
in the Nuclear Tests Case (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1995 I.CJ. 288 (Sept. 22) [hereinafter Request for an
Examination Case]. The 1974 judgment concerned atmospheric testing, but the International Court
declined in 1995 to accept a teleological reading of its prior opinion that would have applied it to
the reduction of nuclear contamination through all forms of testing. See Kwiatkowska, supra, at
179. The 1995 judgment, while refusing to re-examine French nuclear testing policy, nonetheless
stood by the jurisprudential principles discussed in the present Article. See Request for an
Examination Case, supra 1995 I.C.J. at 289.
93 In the court's view, such a requirement:
would be inconsistent with the strictly unilateral nature of the juridical act by which the
pronouncement by the State was made... this is not a domain in which international law
imposes any special or strict requirements. Whether a statement is made orally or in writing
makes no essential difference .... Thus the question of form is not decisive.
Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. at 267-68.
94 d at 270.
95 The same caveat must be entered here, however, as I made in discussing the legal effect
of a unilateral promise with notification. Lacking any marks ofreciprocity or mutuality, a unilateral
declaration standing alone can serve only to impose duties upon, and accord no rights to, the
declarant state. See supra text accompanying note 84.
96 See Nuclear Tests (Austrl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.. at 270.
[Vol. 61:167
RETHINKING PERMANENTNEUTRAL1TY
dissenting judge De Castro postulated.97 Despite these juridical shortcomings, the
Nuclear Tets juisprudence nevertheless suggests a third process of neutralitization
which I will call unilateral permanent neutrality. It may be a helpful juristic tool to
dispel some of the juridical cloudiness of Finnish permanent neutrality, and also in
understanding the empirical ambivalence of the factual permanent neutrality
practiced by Sweden and Ireland.98
d. Neutralitization by Custom
Finally, Swiss neutrality is said to enjoy the additional status of reflecting
customary international law.99 Switzerland, animated by this amour-propre, looks
97 See infra note 98.
98 For an unsparing critique of the Nuclear Tests opinion, see Alfred P. Rubin, The
International Legal Effects of Unilateral Declarations, 71 AM. J. INT'LL. 1,28 (1977) (arguing
that the opinion lacked support in state practice and writings of publicists, and that France
"intended not to be bound to anything more than a short-term self-abstinence from atmospheric
testing"). Yet the most comprehensive attack on the majority's insouciant approach to the question
of legal security--"[o]nce the Court has found that a state has entered into a commitment
concerning its future conduct it is not the Court's function to contemplate that it will not comply
with it," Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. at 272-was contained in the dissenting opinion
of Judge De Castro. See id at 372. Judge De Castro asked whether, assuming that the French
authorities who made the statements had the power to bind the Republic of France (a question of
internal constitutional law and international law) was it their intention to place the French state
under obligation to renounce all possibility of resuming atmospheric nuclear tests, "even in the
event that such tests should again prove necessary for the sake of national defen[s]e"? See id. at
374. That obligation, the judge concluded, could not"be presumed and must be clearly manifested
if it is to be reliable in law." Id. In his view, the French declaration was strictly in the realm of
politics, not legal obligation. Id. at 375. Judge De Castro's skepticism, it must be conceded, merits
a strong measure of realpolitik respect. After all, if the French authorities had finally resolved to
discontinue atmospheric tests, one would have supposed that the French would have acceded to
the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Under the Treaty, withdrawal is possible if a party "decides that
extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this treaty, have jeopardi[z]ed the supreme
interests of its country." GREIG, supra note 26, at 455. Because France elected to express its
intentions by unilateral declaration, one implication ofthe court's decision was that France thereby
assumed a more onerous obligation than the Treaty itself required.
99 The following concisely expresses the dual requirement for the crystallization of
customary international law:
[A]Imost all the doctrine on the subject is limited to the statement that international custom
results from similar and repeated acts by states-repeated with the conscious conviction of
the parties that they are acting in conformity with law. Thus there would be two factors in the
formation of custom: (1) a material fact-the repetition of similar acts by states, and (2) a
psychological element usually called the opiniojuris sive necessitads-the feeling on the part
of the states that in acting as they act they are fulfilling a legal obligation.
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upon latter-day recognitions of its permanent neutrality as declaratory of existing
international law.100 In contrast, many statements by the governments of Sweden
and Ireland, insisting on a so-called "free hand" policy,1 1 have seemed calculated
to inhibit the crystallization of customary international law.102
B. Neutralitization: A Spectrum of State Practice
Neutralitization as a significant means of managing power in the international
Lazare Kopelmanas, Custom as a Means of the Creation of International Law, in 18 BR. Y.B.
INT'L L. 127, 129 (1937). To establish that a neutralitization by custom had evolved, therefore, it
would have to be shown not only that state practice, including that of states whose interests are
specially affected, had been so extensive and uniform, and of sufficiently long duration, that a
consensus had developed which recognized the permanent neutrality of a particular state, but also
that the states concerned believed themselves legally obliged to observe that status. See North Sea
Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.CJ. 3, 43 (Feb. 20) ("Only if such
[recognition] were based on their being conscious of having a duty to [recognize] would it be
possible to speak of an international custom.") (citation omitted). Dahm supposed, for example,
that the permanent neutrality of Switzerland--apart fiom its instrments ofneutralitization--rested
on custom as part of what he called the "European order." GEORG DAHM, I VOLKERRECHr
[INTERNATIONAL LAW] 175 (1958).
100 See ROBERT, supra note 25, at 42.
101 The expression Polit'kderfreien Hand [the policy of the free hand], with its connotation
of discretion rather than obligation, was Schweitzer's. See ScHwErrzER supra note 16, at 43. For
its application to the neutrality experiences of Sweden, see infra text accompanying note 180.
102 See SCHWETZER, supra note 16, at 43. Dahm in fact sought to sweep all the permanently
neutral states, European and non-European, and irrespective of their variant modes of
neutralitization, into a universal precept of customary international law: "[l]f the special legal
position of the neutrals in the international community is generally recognized, neutrality can
develop as part of the general objective order of international law, taking shape as a permanent
status of the neutralized [sic] states, which must then be respected by all the other states." DA-M,
supra note 99, at 175. Hummer rejected Dahm's analysis on the ground that it made no attempt
to discriminate between neutralitization properly so-called and its inferior empirical variants,
including not only the status of unilateral permanent neutrality but, even more tellingly, permanent
neutrality as a discretionary mannerism of foreign policy. See Hummer, supra note 17, at 8-9. In
Hummer's view, it would be impermissible to observe a series of existing political facts, namely,
the adoption of permanent neutrality as a maxim of the foreign policy of certain states, and to seek
inductively to assign to that collection of political "concretes" a "load-bearing capacity" sufficient
to allow it to act as an institution ofinternational law. See id. at 8. According to Hummer's critique,
which offers a helpful jurisprudential referent in the present discussion, Dahm confused the Sein--
the "is"-of subjective and unstable foreign policy maxims with the Sollen--the "ought"--of the
objective modes of neutralitization known to the international law institution of permanent
neutrality. See id. at 9. This trenchant criticism might also be directed against the majority opinion
in the Nuclear Tests decision. See supra note 90 and accompanying text The issue, after all, is one
of legal security. See Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.CJ. at 320 (joint dissenting opinion).
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system1 03 has recurred frequently in state practice. 104 The examples of Austria in
1955105 and Laos in 1962106 were rigorously dissected by the United States Foreign
Relations Committee when it examined the applicability of the law of permanent
neutrality to the conflict in Southeast Asia, especially Vietnam, in 1966.107 More
recently, following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, the then
British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington proposed the neutralitization of that
country as a compromise which would calm Soviet fears that the territory of
Afghanistan would be used for hostile attacks on the Soviet Union.10 8 In 1997,
Hungary briefly flirted with a unilateral assumption of permanent neutrality as an
alternative to membership in the newly-ascendant NATO.' 09 In this Section, I
examine the plenary legal neutralitizations of Austria and Switzerland, the more
legally opaque neutralitization of Finland, and the self-consciously "political"
neutralitizations of Sweden and Ireland. The cases of Austria, Switzerland, and
Finland, in particular, show features of the modes of neutralitization identified in the
last section, but the cadences of diplomatic practice prevented any one of them from
becoming the exemplar of a single mode.
103 See BLACKEAL., supra note 73, at v.
104 Malta is considered the first example of a permanently neutral state. Its neutralitization
dates from the Peace of Amiens between France and Great Britain in 1802, 13 years before the
Swiss confederation was neutralitized. Piccioni commented that, although the British broke the
Peace of Amiens and occupied the island of Malta, thereby preventing its permanent neutrality
from taking effect, European diplomacy nevertheless had a conception of neutrality from then on.
See C. PiccioNI, EssAI suR LA NaUTRALrr PERPtuEIL [ESSAY ON PERMANENT NEUTRALrrY]
28 (1902). In 1981, Malta again adopted permanent neutrality through an Exchange ofNotes with
Italy. See generally Natalino Ronzitti, Malta 's Permanent Neutrality, in 5 ITALIAN Y.B. INT'L L.
171 (1983); see also SUBEDI, supra note 78, at 145-46 (emphasizing the unilateral nature of
Malta's declaration, followed by recognition by Italy).
105 See infra text accompanying note 124.
106 See supra note 72.
107 See SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN REL., 89TH CONG., NEUTRALIZATION IN SOUTHEAST
ASIA: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS (Comm. Print 1966).
108 See Clear Your Throats for a Ninefold Mumble [sic], ECONOMIST, May 17, 1980, at 44.
Had this occurred, it would have strongly resembled the Austrian interaction with the Great
Powers in 1955 and, in that sense, have the imprint of an imposed status. See infra text
accompanying note 133.
109 Permanent neutrality, in fact, was widely anticipated to be a potential solution to the
security vacuum in Eastem Europe after the 1989 revolutions. See Bitzinger, supra note 62, at 1;
see also Gerhard Haffier, The Impact ofDevelopments in the East European 'Socialist'States on
Austria's Neutrality, in EUROPFAN NEUTRALS, supra note 10, at 181.
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1. A Tr-Form Neutralitization: Switzerland
The emergence of a prototypical permanent neutrality for Switzerland can only
be understood within the historical experience of an unstable, heterogeneous
cantonal federation in the vortex of the recurring wars of the European balance of
power system. Permanent neutrality evolved as an inner compulsion of the Swiss
state, indispensable to its federal structure. A posture of unalterable indifference to
the shifting hegemonies of the surrounding powers.prevented the Swiss federation's
inherent geographical, ethnic, linguistic, and confessional diversity from causing a
centrifugal destruction of state unity as these disparate elements pulled toward
support for opposite sides in foreign conflicts.1 10 To some extent, neutrality for the
Swiss became a kind of mythic national symbol. i11
Swiss permanent neutrality has a long historical pedigree, which as noted above
has allowed Switzerland to invoke for its neutral status the prerogative of custom.1 12
But Switzerland can also claim a treaty-based neutralitization, arising out of the
Great Power conclave at Vienna in 1815.113 At the Congress of Vienna, the Great
Powers issued a Declaration conditioning recognition of Swiss neutrality (which
was expressed to be in the "general interest") on agreement of the Swiss Parliament
to a Convention resettling national frontiers, and both the Declaration and the
Convention became part of the Final Act of the Congress. 114 At Paris, on November
1 10 Thus, Denis de Rougemont's undoubtedly sardonic comment that "Switzerland is not a
country-it is a defensive alliance." ZIEGLER, supra note 3, at 16 (quoting de Rougemont). Jean
Ziegler's own view was no more kind to his native country: 'To the Swiss, xenophobia is not only
historically logical; it is an inherent necessity." Id. at 17. For the fullest modem account of the
emergence of Swiss neutrality, see generally BONJOUR, supra note 58.
111 It is not difficult to think of neutrality for the Swiss as a surrogate for the absence of a
national Sprachdenken (literally, "speech-thinking"), since they lack a common speech community
(four national languages coexist in the state) and a shared national spirit See Hummer, supra note
17, at 15; see also Ddniker, supra note 26, at 5 (observing that a status based originally on "rational
calculations" gradually assumed the status of mythology. But see supra note 3 (discussing the
moral compromise of Swiss neutrality caused by revelations of economic collaboration with the
Nazi regime).
1 12 See supra text accompanying note 99.
113 The Powers were Austria, France, Great Britain, Portugal, Prussia, Russia, Spain, and
Sweden-Norway.
114 They are contained in Articles 74 and 84 respectively. See ROTrER, supra note 22, at 57.
In any event, the Swiss Diet acceded on May 27, 1815, to the conditions stipulated in the
Declaration and thanked the Great Powers for their willingness to recognize Switzerland's
permanent neutrality. For the text of the Declaration, see ROBERT, supra note 25, at 55. The
frontier resettlement granted the Swiss three additional cantons-Geneva, Neufchatel, and
Valois-in order to make Swiss borders easier to defend and thereby to implement the
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20, 1815, the Powers responded with an "Act of recognition and guarantee of the
permanent neutrality of Switzerland and of the inviolability of its territory."1 15 As
a technical matter, therefore, Swiss neutralitization is predominantly a matter of
treaty-and, more precisely, a triptych of treaties. The first treaty was between the
Great Powers and the Swiss Parliament the second treaty was among the Great
Powers inter se (when they incorporated their Declaration into the Final Act of the
Congress); the third treaty was, again, among the Great Powers inter se (the Act of
recognition). 116 To an extent, therefore, Switzerland was neutralitized by the
agreement of third parties, but the sovereign participation of the Swiss Parliament
in the interval between the Great Power agreements makes it possible to interpret
Declaration's commitment'to furnish [to Switzerland] the means of ensuring its independence and
neutrality" by a favorable territorial realignment. See id.
115
.Acteportant reconnaissance et garantie de la neutralitdperpdtuelle de la Suisse et de
l'inviolabiliti de son territoire. The Acte did not include Switzerland itself as a cosignatory,
although its reference to Swiss neutrality as being "in the genuine interest of European politics as
a whole" had been advocated by the Swiss delegate to the Paris Conference, Pictet de Rochement.
See SwIss U.N. REPORT, supra note 12, at 27; see also ZIEGLER, supra note 3, at 167-68. De
Rochemont, in fact, drafted the text oftheActe. See ROBERT, supra note 25, at-56.
116 Support for the three-treaty conception appears in Article 435 of the Treaty of Versailles
of June 28, 1919. See Stephan Verosta, Peace Treaties After World War!, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PUBLiC INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 5, at 110, 113-15. France had proposed the inclusion
in the Treaty of Peace with Germany of a provision abolishing the neutrality of Upper Savoy that
had been established by the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna in favor of Swvitzerland. See
Swiss U.N. REPORT, supra note 12, at 28. After negotiations, the Swiss conceded the abolition of
Savoyan neutrality and, in return, received confirmation of the guarantees conceded to Switzerland
by the 1815 transactions. Note now the precise manner in which Article 435 of the Treaty of
Versailles reasserts these guarantees:
Les Hautes Parties Contractantes, tout en reconnaissant les garanties stipules en
faveur de la Suisse par les Traitdr de 1815, et notaminent l'acte du 20 novembre 1815,
garanties qui constituent des engagements internationauxpour le maintien de lapaix. [The
High Contracting Parties, while recognizing the guarantees stipulated in favor of Switzerland
by the Treaties of 1815 and particularly the Act of November 20, 1815, guarantees which
comprise international undertakings for the maintenance of peace].
SCHWEITZER, supra note 16, at 55. The word Traitd [Treaties] clearly caries a plural denotation.
Since the Article refers expressly to only one international law treaty, the Acte portant
reconnaissance, the only other international transactions which would meet both requirements of
having been concluded in 1815, and having been designed to offer a guarantee of a specific kind
to Switzerland, would be the Declaration of Vienna coupled with the Swiss Diet's accession to the
Convention on the one hand, and the Declaration of Vienna as embedded in the Final Act of the
Congress of Vienna on the other. See ROBERT, supra note 25, at 63.
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each inter-power concordat-the Declaration and the Act of recognition-as a
pactum infavorem terti. 1 17
Finally, while some scholars have analogized the interactive swapping of
undertakings and understandings to the notification/recognition model of
neutralitization, 18 1 suspect that too much Procrustean manipulation is demanded
by the view that a unilateral Swiss neutrality was "notified" to the Great Powers at
Vienna. The Swiss delegation was conmmunicating a continuously-articulated
traditional policy rather than a single publicly-uttered promissory declaration ofpro
futuro permanent neutrality, addressed to specific states and requesting a form of
specific recognition. 119 Moreover, the response of the Powers to the delegation's
representations was not to approve a provisional recognition among themselves, but
to make a full recognition conditional upon the agreement of Switzerland to a
realignment of frontiers. In other words, the Great Powers arrogated to themselves
the roles of counter-promisors and recognizers, thereby scrambling the sequence of
unilateral promise, notification, and unconditional recognition.120
The Swiss people, using the instrument of popular referendum, have regularly
117 Literally, a "pact in favor of a third party." See STRUPP, supra note 21, at 24. Treaties
which stipulate rights for third parties are, however, controversial in international law because of
the uncertainty of enforcement by the would-be beneficiary state. See O'CONNELL, supra note 18,
at 247-48. One effect of the acceptance by the third party would be to deprive the contracting
states of the power to renege on the granted privilege. See id. at 247. The disputed status of third-
party treaties probably accounts for the use of other forms of neutralitization-for example,
custom-to confirm Switzerland's status. The Swiss govemment itself, however, has ernbraced
the Act of recognition as the legal fountainhead of neutrality. See infra note 120.
118 Thus, the instruments of 1815 did not purport to create the status ofpernanent neutrality
for Switzerland, but arguably sought only to grant a recognition and a guarantee to what was
obviously assumed to be an existing concept (none of the documents offered any definitional
criteria of Swiss permanent neutrality). See Claudio Caratsch, The Permanent Neutrality of
Switzerland, in NEUIRALr1Y AND NON-ALIGNMENT IN EUROPE 13, 14 (Karl E. Bimbaum &
Hanspeter Neuhold eds., 1982). It could be hypothesized, therefore, that Switzerland's unilateral
declaration of permanent neutrality had been expressly notified to the Great Powers gathered at
Vienna by the Swiss delegation, and that the Declaration of Vienna and the Acte portant
reconnaissance represented multilateral recognition by the Great Powers of the Swiss unilateral
position. See id; see also Hummer, supra note 17, at 17.
119 But see infra text accompanying note 161 (discussing how multiple declarations
contributed to a thin legal premise for Finnish neutrality).
120 As already observed, the Swiss are prone to thinking that their permanent neutrality, at
least since 1815, has the authority of custom. See supra text accompanying note 99. The official
Swiss government view of the country's neutralitization, however, is that the elevation of
pennanent neutrality to an intemational status, where previously it had been unilaterally declared,
is based upon the Act of November 20, 1815. See BLACK ET AL., supra note 73, at 22 (citing the
Conception offlicielle suisse); see also Caratsch, supra note 118, at 14.
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rebuffed the trend toward international solidarity and confederation in the postwar
era.121 The Economist magazine referred to the Swiss experience as a "driven-snow
variety" of neutrality which has even foreclosed membership of the United
Nations. 122 A recent Swiss government report on the future of neutrality, however,
acknowledged the attenuation of Switzerland's geostrategic role after the Cold War,
as well as the powerful commercial seduction of the EU. The report included the
remarkable concession, unprecedented in Swiss neutrality practice, that "[t]here is
no room for neutrality where the world is faced with a state guilty of breaching the
peace and seriously violating international law."123
2. A Mixed-Form Neutralitization: Austria
The political determinant of Austrian permanent neutrality was the struggle of
Austria's postwar leaders to find a plausible means of restoring and preserving the
country's independence even as it was being "sucked into the 'strudel' of growing
East-West conflict," to use Gerald Stourzh's graphic description.124 Stalin's death
in 1953 brought to power in the Soviet Union a collective leadership under Nikita
Khrushchev which signaled its desire to improve contacts with the West through the
policy it labeled "peaceful coexistence."'125 Although Moscow had tied the status of
Austria to the fate of a peace treaty with Germany, the Soviets in 1955 announced
that, provided effective safeguards against a future Anschluss could be devised, and
that Austria complied with the obligations of a military neutrality, the Soviet Union
stood willing to conclude a "state treaty" restoring Austrian sovereignty and to
withdraw its troops from Austria without delay.126
121 See David Marsh, Swiss Stop the Clock on Euro Integration, FIN. TIMEs, Dec. 7, 1992,
at 2 (discussing Swiss rejection of free trade area linldng Alpine and Nordic countries to the EU).
122 See At the EEC's Door, ECONOMIST, Mar. 26, 1989, at 16, 16. The metaphor, while
accurate in a technical sense, has unfortunate connotations ten years later in light of new
revelations of Swiss complicity with the Nazi war economy. See supra note 3.
123 Switzerland and Europe: "une to Join Others?, ECONOMIST, Nov. 28, 1992, at 51, 52.
124 See GERALD STOuRZH, KLEINE GEscHICHTE DES OSrERREICHISCHEN STAATSVERTRAGES
[A SHORT HISTORY OF THE AUSTRIAN STATETREATY] 9 (1975).
12 5 See KONRAD GINTHER, NEUrRALITAT UND NEUTRALITATSPOLnrIK [NEuTRALIY AND
NEtUrALrrY POLICY] 95 (1975) (defining peaceful coexistence as "an ideological struggle with
nonmilitary means, but moreover also through cooperation").
126 Here is one author's perception of Molotov's gesture:
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The instruments of Austrian neutralitization are messy and somewhat
ambiguous, characteristics which undoubtedly helped the Austrian government in
its post-1991 reassessment of the durability of its neutrality obligations. As in the
case of Switzerland, Austria's permanent neutrality rests on a documentary trinity-
a bilateral agreement, the Moscow Memorandum, signed in April 1955 between an
Austrian government delegation and the Soviet Union;127 the state treaty itself,
ratified in 1955, among the four occupying Powers 128 and the Republic of
Austria; 129 and a self-styled Constitutional Law on the Neutrality of Austria,
adopted internally by the Austrian Parliament in October 1955, after the last foreign
There were strategic as well as diplomatic advantages for the Soviets in conceding
Austria's neutrali[tijzation at this time. For as well as conforming with the post-Stalin 'new
look'--a diplomacy which was seeking a ddtente with Tito and improved relations with the
Asian neutralists-there were strategic advantages for the Soviet Union in thus separating
two NATO powers (Italy and West Germany) and seeing the Swiss-Austrian wedge of
neutral territory hindering the logistic consolidation of NATO. And Austria's
neutrali[tifzation entailed the transfer of 5,000 American troops from Salzburg to south ofthe
Brenner.
PETERLYON, NEUTRAL1SM 168 (1963). Confirming Lyons's precognition, a 1982 studynoted how
"the Austrian prohibition of military overflights during the 1958 Lebanon crisis and the 1973
Middle East war [were] examples of the problems created for the West by Austria's strategic
position:' William B. Bader, Austria, the U.S. and the Path to Neutrality, in THE AusrRIAN
SOLUTION, supra note 20, at 85, 95. The Soviet renversement, which by October 1955 had led to
the departure of the last foreign soldier from Austrian soil, was so startling that a January 1984
Time magazine review of the state of current East-West relations cited it as the most auspicious
signal displayed by the Soviet Union during the era of "peaceful coexistence." John Kohan, The
Vocabulay of Confrontation, TIME, Jan. 2, 1984, at 42; see also Curt Gasteyger, The Soviet Union
and Swiss Neutrality, in EUROPEAN NEUTRALS, supra note 10, at 156-57 (noting that Austrian
neutrality advanced Soviet geopolitical objectives both in its early years, by "neutralizing" a
potentially hostile neighbor, and later on, by keeping Austria out of a strengthening Western
alliance).
127 Memorandum fiber die Ergebnisse der Besprechungen Zwischen der
Regierungsdelegation der Republik Osterreich und der Regierungsdelegation der Sowietunion
[Memorandum on the Conclusions of the Meetings Between The Government Delegation of the
Republic of Austria and the Govemrnment Delegation of the Soviet Union], Apr. 15,1955, reprinted
in STOURZH, supra note 124, at 164-67. The designation Moscow Memorandum was an invention
of the Soviet news agency TASS. See Kunz, supra note 83, at 420 n.7.
128 The Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland, and France.
129The Staatsvertrag betreffend die Wiederherstellung eines unabhdngigen und
demokratischen Osterreich [State Treaty for the Re-establishment of an Independent and




soldier had departed Austrian territory.130 Under the Memorandum, the Austrian
delegation undertook to ensure that the Austrian government would make a
declaration in a form that would oblige Austria-internationally and in perpetuity-
to practice a neutrality of the type maintained by Switzerland.1 31 The declaration
would be submitted to the Austrian parliament and international recognition of the
declaration would be sought.' 32 Austrian diplomacy successfully excised all
references to neutrality from the state treaty, evidently in order to avoid the
impression of a "neutralization" in its more pejorative meaning of an imposed
condition,133 even though adoption of neutrality was patently the political price of
securing Great Power unanimity on the long-deferred treaty to restore the
independence of the Republic. 134 The later domestic law of neutrality comprised
130 The Bundesverfassungsgesetz fiber die Neutralitat Osterreichs [Federal Constitutional
Law on the Neutrality of Austria], Oct. 26, 1955, translated in AUSTRIAN CONSTITUTION (1983),
supra note 60, at 143. See Hanspeter Neuhold, Background Factors of Austria's Neutrality, in
NEUrRALrrY AND NON-ALIGNMENT, supra note 118, at 44,47.
131 Josef Kunz, writing in 1956, believed it was a legal solecism forAustriato comply with
its Moscow Memorandum commitment to "make a unilateral declaration which will bind it
internationally." Kunz, supra note 83, at 421. But Kunz himself went on to attribute the
international legality of the declaration to the "series of steps" taken by Austria pursuant to the
Memorandum, including the pledge to "obtain international recognition" ofthe declaration. Thus,
the framers of the Memorandum must have contemplated the insufficiency of unperfected
unilateral utterances. See id. In 1980, in his standard work on Austrian neutrality, Alfred Verdross
discarded as "a moot point' the issue of whether Austria's unilateral promise ofneutralityper se
could engage an international obligation. Verdoss stated that although "in principle unilateral
promises are indeed binding under international law, as the International Court of Justice
pronounced in the two Nuclear Tests cases," nevertheless, "[a]s... notification in the actual
instance of the neutrality law was linked with the request for recognition, the assumption must be
that Austria's engagement under international law arose only from the acceptance of, or
acquiescence in, the notification." VERDROSS, supra note 23, at 30.
132 See id at 29; see also Kunz, supra note 83, at 420. The Austrians also called for a
"guarantee" by the occupying Powers of "the inviolability and integrity of the Austrian state
territory." VERDROSS, supra note 23, at 27. Responding, the Soviet Government expressed its
willingness to "recognize the declaration concerning the neutrality of Austria," and "to take part
in a guarantee of the integrity and inviolability of the Austrian [s]tate territory by the four Powers."
Id at 26-27.
133 See supra note 73 (discussing "neutralization" as imposed status); see also Neuhold,
supra note 130, at 47. The state treaty was prepared by a Conference ofAmbassadors at Vienna
in early May 1955, and signed at the Belvedere Palace in Vienna on May 15, 1955, by the
Republic of Austria and by the Foreign Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, and
France-descibed collectively in the Treaty as the "Allied and Associated Powers." See id.
134 Austrian sensitivity to this question seemed to abate, however, after the fall of the Soviet
Union. In 1995, Foreign Minister Wolfgang Schflssel warned that "Austria must stop being a
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two brief articles, the first asserting that Austria declared permanent neutrality "of
its own free will" and "[f]or the purpose of the permanent maintenance of external
independence and... the inviolability of its territory," and the second an
undertaking by Austria "never in the future [to] accede to any military alliances nor
permit the establishment of military bases of foreign [s]tates on its territory. '135 The
text of the law was notified to foreign governments with a request for
recognition. 136
Austrian neutralitization, therefore, could be plausibly analyzed as a purely
unilateral (and revocable) act of municipal law,137 as treaty-based, or as an example
of the notification/recognition paradigm.138 The treaty argument gains force from
passive spectator hiding behind neutrality imposed after the second World War." GORDON BROOK-
SHEPHERD, THE AUsTRIANS: A THOUsAND-YEAR ODYSSEY 448 (1997) (emphasis added).
Schfissel, leader of the pro-NATO People's Party, became Prime Minister of Austria in February
2000. See infra note 152 (discussing the Schtissel govemment's security policy).
135 AuSTRAN CONSTITION (1983), supra note 60, at 143.
136 By the end of 1955, 37 states-including the four Allied and Associated Powers which
had cosigned the state treaty-had complied with the Austrian government's request for
recognition, whether expressly (in the case of the four occupying Powers), or by taking note
without objection, or by simply confirming receipt of the declaration of constitutional neutrality.
See VERDROSS, supra note 23, at 31. By the time ofthe 20th anniversary celebrations of permanent
neutrality in 1975, the Govemment had received recognition from over 75 states. See AUSTRIAN
FEDERAL PRESS SERvIcE: AUSTRIA TODAY AND TOMORROW 28 (1975). Further, it has been
suggested that Austria's unopposed admission to the United Nations in December 1955,
encumbered by the status ofpermanent neutrality, amounted to a recognition by acquiescence on
the part of the member states of the General Assembly, and created an implied compatibility
between the Austrian status and the enforcement procedures of the world organization. See
VERDROSS, supra note 23, at 33 (noting that the four Powers had consented in the preamble to the
state treaty to support Austria's application to the United Nations, creating an implied obligation
not to draw Austria into compulsory enforcement measures that would violate neutrality). But the
four Powers did not formally offer a guarantee of Austria's neutrality, evidently for the precise
reason that such a guarantee might conflict with their obligations under the U.N. Charter. See
SUBEDI, supra note 78, at 145.
137 See At the EEC's Door, supra note 122, at 16 ("Austria is under no international
obligation to remain neutral.").
138 A weakness of the notification/recognition paradigm is that the recognition element, in
particular, is dependent on the form selected by recognizing third states, and there is no dominant
form of recognition. Such indeed was the gravamen of a memorandum entitled The Nature of
Austria's Neutrality and Legal Implications of the United States Response to the Neutrality
Declaration, which was dated November 16,1955, and which was prepared by the Office of the
Legal Adviser to the U.S. Department of State. The memorandum found that "a non-participating
state may recognize a treaty of neutrali[ti]zation or a declaration of self-neutrali[ti]zation [sic] in
the sense of declaring that as a matter ofpolicy it will not violate the neutrality," but that it had "no
commitment to defend such neutrali[ti]zation unless it has explicitly agreed to guarantee it." See
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the possible rule-generation power of the Moscow Memorandum. 39 The
Memorandum was explicitly referred to in an annex to the state treaty, which notes
the "arrangements" (the German text refers to Vereinbarungen, "agreements') made
in Moscow.140 Moreover, Article 22(13) of the state treaty equates the Moscow
Memorandum with an international treaty when it speaks of "rights and
properties... which will be transferred to Austria by the Soviet Union in
accordance with the Austro-Soviet Memorandum [sic] of April 15, 1955." 141 At the
time when Austria declared its permanent neutrality by a constitutional law,
therefore, it surely was not acting upon a purely unilateral impulse, with exclusively
internal domestic law effects, but in accordance with a binding obligation which, as
Kunz argued, "could not be changed or revoked, except with the consent of the
Soviet Union,"142 and whose accomplishment would impose a collateral obligation
on the Soviet Union to recognize Austrian permanent neutrality at the level of
international law. 143 With respect to the Soviet Union, therefore, the neutralitization
of Austria occurred by international law treaty. Respecting all other states, it
occurred by the sequence of unilateral declaration, notification, and recognition.144
BLACK Er AL., supra note 73, at 49 (discussing memorandum). According to Cyril Black of
Princeton University, the State Department was taking the view that "when the United States
informed Austria in a Note dated December 6,1955, that it 'recognizes the perpetual neutrality of
Austria,' it was simply announcing its intention to refrain from taking actions that might violate
Austria's neutrality." Id. at 49-50. In other words, the Note did not confer a legal recognition per
se of the Austrian "self-neutrali[ti]zation," an unusual terminology that in fact may have
encouraged an impression of unilateral revocability.
139 Some scholars, in fact, have argued that only an intemational treaty can accomplish an
intemational law neutralitization. See PICCIONI, supra note 104, at 7 (stating unequivocally that
permanent neutrality is "necessarily treaty-based"); STRUPP, supra note 21, at 61.
140 See AUSTRiAN CoNsTrrlUON (1983), supra note 60, at 142. Technically, the reference
to the Memorandum appears in an annex to the state treaty, but Article 36 ofthe treaty provided
that the annexes were explicitly to have "force and effect as integral parts of [t]he state treaty." Id.
at 137. Nor should the reference to "arrangements" (or even "agreements") be seen as negating the
existence of a valid treaty: Article 2(lXa) ofthe Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties regards
the precise designation of an international instrument as inconsequential to its validity as an
intemational law treaty. For the text of Article 2 of the Vienna Convention, see 8 I.LM. 679, 680-
81 (1969); CARTER& TPvmLE, supra note 87, at 50-51.
141 AUSTRIAN CONSTTUON (1983), supra note 60, at 112.
142 Kumz, supranote 83, at 421.
143 "Only the Soviet Union is, by the Moscow Memorandum, legally bound to grant this
recognition." Id.
144 Ermacora, while agreeing that the state treaty removed doubt as to the legal character of
the Memorandum, nevertheless believed that by the time the treaty was signed the rule-creating
power of the Memorandum had been exhausted, Austria having taken the necessary steps to
declare, notify, and obtain "recognitions" of its permanent neutrality. See FELIx ERMACORA,
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Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Austrian government leaders have self-
consciously cultivated doubt as to Austria's fidelity to the instruments of
neutralitization. The principal legal argument has been one of redundancy: German
unity and the Soviet implosion stripped meaning from most of the state treaty's
provisions (and abrogated any lingering effect of the Moscow Memorandum). 45
But the primary discourse has been one of political expediency rather than legal
necessity. Former Foreign Minister, Peter Jankovitsch, spoke in mid-1992 of
neutrality as a "flexible" concept that had to be adapted to political and military
circumstances in Europe. 46 And when Federal President Thomas Klestil took office
in July 1992, he justified departures from strict neutrality in the Gulf War by
insisting that neutrality was not "an end in itself."147
The end of Austria's bloc neutrality would inevitably have compelled either a
fresh security premise for permanently neutral status or eventual abandonment of
neutrality.' 48 In the absence of pervasive security concerns, and under some
OSERREFCHS STAATSVERTRAG UNDNEUTRALITAT [AusTRIA's STATETREATYANDNEU-RALIY]
108 (1957). While it is true that the obligations in the strict sense had been fulfilled, reference to
the Memorandum is still demanded by the very fact that, rather than constituting merely "the first
link in a chain of measures and resolutions which culminated in the recognition of Austria's
permanent neutrality," as Verdross has maintained, the principles set forth at Moscow formed part
ofthe normative foundation ofAustrian permanent neutrality, and (even after the Soviet Union's
demise) could still contribute to interpretation of that neutrality. See VERDRoss, supra note 23, at
29. Only the Memorandum expressly cited the Swiss model as a precedent, for example. See
Article I(1) of the Moscow Memorandum, reprinted in STOURZH, supra note 124, at 164; see also
Hummer, supra note 17, at 24.
145 See Ian Traynor, Austrians Ponder Neutrality's Role in a World Turned Upside Down,
GUARDIAN (Manchester), Oct. 23, 1990, at 10. Hanspeter Neuhold has proposed clausula rebus
sic stantibus as the appropriate premise for Austria's withdrawal from its neutralitization
commitments. See Neuhold, supra note 14, at 254. The changed circumstances, in Neuhold's
view, flowed from the "withering away" of the East-West conflict since the fall of the Soviet
Union. See id. Neuhold relied also on a teleological reading of the instruments ofneutralitization.
The purpose of supporting national security and independence was explicitly stated in the
establishing constitutional law, see supra text accompanying note 135. See Neuhold, supra note
14, at 254.
146 See EC: Austria Believes That Accession Negotiations 0ll Last Nine Months Maximum,
REUTER TEXTLNE, July 3, 1992, at 1 (on file with author).
147 See Otmar Lahodnysky, The Changing Face of Austian Neutrality, NATO REVIEW,
Dec. 1992, at 24, 24. Moreover, the Russian government indicated early in 1995, after Austria
formally acceded to the EU treaties, that it would respect any decision Austria made about its
defense, regardless of the terms of the 1955 State Treaty. See Denis Staunton, Issue ofAustria's
Neutrality Again to the Forefront, IRIsH TIMES, Aug. 12, 1996, at 13, available in LEXIS, News,
By Individual Publication, Irish Times File.
148 "[Tjhe dissolution of the Soviet Union and of the Warsaw Pact system destroyed the
political basis of neutrality Austria style.' Frank Cede, Does Europe End at the Urals?: The
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economic pressure, Austria joined the EU in 1995, liberated from earlier Soviet
objections-premised on the state treaty-that permanent neutrality and EU
membership were legally and politically incompatible.1 49 By 1996, on the eve of an
EU intergovernmental conference to consider further political integration, the
Austrian government called for intensification of the EU's common foreign and
security policy, including closer cooperation between the EU and its military
adjunct, the Western European Union.150 Moreover, as the Gulf War sparked a
renaissance of collective security, the Austrian Parliament amended a statute that
banned, in time of war, the import, export, and transport of military equipment,
ammunition, and all types of weapons into or out of the region of combat
operations; under the amendment, the ban would be lifted in order to implement
decisions of the U.N. Security Council, and now remains in force only for nuclear,
bacteriological, and chemical weapons.151 One writer, sympathetic to Austrian
Future ofEuropean Integration, Remarks by the Legal Advisor of the Austrian Federal Ministry
for Foreign Affairs (Oct. 30, 1997), available in Austria, Austrian Press & Information Service,
(last modified Nov. 4, 1997) <http//www.austria.org/press/38.html> [hereinafter European
Integration].
149 See Austria and the EEC: Another Ireland?, ECONOMIST, June 4, 1988, at 47.
150 See Austrian Press & Information Service, Austrian Thoughts on the 1996
Intergovernmental Conference of the European Union, (visited Apr. 23, 2000) <http'v/www.
austria.org/press/lolicyl.hn>; see also Austrian Foreign Minister Wolfgang Schiissel, Europe's
Security and the New NA TO, Address to the XVth International NATO Workshop (June, 1998)
in XVth International Workshop On Political-Military Decision Making in the Atlantic Alliance
(visited Apr. 23, 2000) <http'/www.csdr.org/98Book/workshop98litn> (making the remarkable
statement that "obligations of international solidarity ... take precedence over obligations of
classical neutrality"). Foreign Minister Schiissel indicated Austria's support for integrating the
Western European Union (WEU), a military organization, into the EU. Id. The WEU is considered
further in Part IV, see infra text accompanying note 286.
151 The original ban had been legitimate under Hague Convention rules, even though it
obviously affected private as well as state import and export, because it was intended to apply
impartially to all future belligerents and theaters of war. See supra notes 23-24. Acting on the
amendments without delay, the Austrian authorities authorized the passage of several trainloads
of U.S. military equipment through Austrian territory. See 43 CURRENT DIGEST SOVIET PRESS,
May 8, 1991 (No. 14), at 24. The Soviet press digest also conveyed official Soviet disapproval of
this overturning of "rilitary-strategic stereotypes," which occurred without any Security Council
decision requiring Austrian cooperation. On the duty of cooperation with the U.N. Security
Council, see infra text accompanying note 218; see also BROOK-SHEPHERD, supra note 134, at
445. The Austrian government had previously permitted overflights of American and British
transport aircraft (without troops) prior to the Gulf War in 1991 en route to Saudi Arabia. See
Traynor, supra note 145, at 10. All of these permissive interventions were in technical violation
of classical neutrality rules on impartiality and prevention. See supra text accompanying notes 24,
26.
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history, wrote of Austrian permanent neutrality in 1997 as having become "as
impermanent as the Soviet Communism which had imposed it"152
3. A Unilateral Form ofNeutralitization: Finland
None of the small European neutrals has been more geopolitically favored by
the collapse of the Communist Bloc than Finland. The origin of Finnish neutrality
is explicitly tied to management of relations with its immense and threatening
neighbor to the east, the Soviet Union.153 Thus, the sole formal instrument of
Finnish neutralitization was a preambular reference in a treaty of mutual assistance
that the Finns signed with the Soviets in 1948 as their price for continued
sovereignty.lM5 Nevertheless, by applying the Nuclear Tests model of unilateral
neutralitization, Finnish permanent neutrality, at least until Finland's absorption into
the EU in 1995, acquires a plausible (if concededly thin) foundation in international
law.
15 2 BROOK-SHEPBERD, supra note 134, at 448. The new Austrian Federal Government which
took office in February 2000 is a pro-NATO coalition of the People's Party and the far-right
Freedom Party. The coalition's joint manifesto commits the new government to adopting a
guarantee of mutual assistance among the EU member states, to redrafting the federal
constitutional law on neutrality, see supra text accompanying notes 130-31, and to removing any
obstacle to full participation in the evolving EU common security and defense arrangements. See
Austrian Press & Information Service, Austria: Foreign and Secuity Policy, (visited Apr. 23,
2000) <http://www.austria.org/newgovt2.html>. NATO membership is also explicitly noted as a
future option. See id. It appears, therefore, that the government envisages a "split personality" for
Austrian security: At least until the achievement of full NATO membership, Austria would
abandon permanent neutrality within the EU and maintain it vis-i-vis all non-EU members. One
caveat, however, is that the new government pledges to hold a national referendum before
implementing these sweeping changes in Austria's security profile. See id.
153 Urho Kekkonen described the policy in his book, A President's View:
During his term as Prime Minister after the war, Paasikivi [former President of Finland] had
to endure a speech in which a certain member of parliament sharply criticized the
Government's foreign policy. When Paasikivi finally managed to get a word in, he urged the
deputy to go home, take out a map and look where Finland was situated. That advice remains
useful to one and all to this very day.
URHO KEKKONEN, A PREsIDENT's Vmw 16 (1982). Urho Kekkonen was President of Finland
from 1965 to 1981. His subject here was the foreign policy of his predecessor and mentor, former
President J.K. Paasikivi, a policy adhered to with such constancy by Kekkonen that it became
known as the "Paasildvi Kekkonen Line." See WOKER, supra note 13, at 29.
154 See Treaty of Friendship, Co-Operation and Mutual Assistance Between the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics and the Republic of Finland, Apr. 6, 1948, U.S.S.R.-Fin., 48 U.N.T.S.
156 [hereinafter 1948 Treaty Between the U.S.S.R. and Finland].
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In the immediate postwar period, Finns would hardly have been surprised had
their country found itself dragooned into the Soviet Union's ring of satellites. In the
icy climate of geopolitics that prevailed, Stalin conveyed his request that a
reciprocal defensive treaty, similar to those contracted by the Soviets with other
states on its Western approaches, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania, should be
concluded between Finland and the Soviet Union.155 The 1948 treaty-eventually
denounced by Finland in 1992--cast a long postwar shadow on Finland's
pretensions to authentic neutrality. The terms of the treaty were simply not
compatible with an unfettered sovereign right to choose classical neutrality in the
wars of other states. Article 1 required Finland, if the Soviet Union were attacked
through Finland by Germany or a German ally, to repel the aggression with all of
the forces at its disposal, "with the help, if necessary, of the Soviet Union or
together with the Soviet Union." 156 Article 2 required peacetime consultations
between the parties if a military threat were identified.157 Permanent neutrality
keeps its adherents out of wars; under this treaty, Finland would have been coerced
to the Soviet side of a Soviet-German conflict from the outset. Apologists for the
treaty portrayed it as a "prop" for the primary duty of prevention, with which all
neutral states must comply.158 In reality, however, the treaty was more correctly a
155 See D.G. KIRBY, FmAND IN THE ThiE Tm CENTURY 165-66 (1979). The typical
postwar security treaties imposed by the Soviet Union on its satellites would apply in a general
state of hostilities with Germany. Thus, if the Soviet Union were invaded by Germany through,
say, Poland, Romania would be automatically involved in the conflict. The NATO and Warsaw
Pact alliances both contained these features of"automaticity" that Finland was anxious to avoid.
See infra text accompanying note 217 (discussing assistance obligations ofthe NATO partners).
156 1948 Treaty Between the U.S.S.R. and Finland, Apr. 6,1948, U.S.S.R-Fin., 48 U.N.T.S.
156, 158.
157Id.
158 See supra text accompanying note 26 (discussing duty of prevention); see also MAX
JAKOBSON, A STUDY OF FwNISH FORE GN POLICY SINCE THE SECOND WORLD WAR 91 (1968). In
Jakobson's analysis, affirmed by Kekkonen, the treaty only committed Finland to the defense of
its own territory, which the duty of prevention would require a neutral to undertake in any event.
See id. at 49; URHO KEKKONEN, NEurRALrrY: THE FINNSH POsrrON 184 (1973). The question
of obtaining Soviet military assistance would only arise after Finland had been attacked, and
consequently only if the Finnish effort to stay out of the war had collapsed and its neutrality had
been violated. In those circumstances a neutral state would have the right to receive assistance
from such powers as are willing to grant it, and the treaty provided a guarantee in extremis of
military reinforcement by the Soviet Union of Finland's defense of its neutrality. See JAKOBSON,
supra, at 49; see also KEKKONEN, supra, at 185. If the Soviet Union became involved in a war that
did not touch the territory of Finland, the Finnish commitment under the 1948 treaty would have
been limited to the usual neutral obligation (recognized in the treaty) of staying out of alliances
directed against the Soviet Union. See JAKOBsON, supra, at 49. George Maude, in his definitive
study of Finnish neutrality, referred to the "strange obligation" for a neutral to defend a great
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documentary reflection of Finlandization, the posture of supine submission that
Max Jakobson and others regarded as a "character assassination" of the Finns in the
postwar era.159
As a matter of procedural neutralitization, however, the 1948 treaty did offer a
fragile legal underpinning to Finnish permanent neutrality through its preambular
reference to "Finland's endeavo[u]rs not to be involved in clashes between the
interests of the [G]reat Powers."160 The mere mention in an international treaty of
the substance of Finland's purported new foreign policy orientation, in fact; always
distinguished the Finnish status of neutrality from the self-anointed experience of
Sweden. In addition, and despite the burden of the treaty, former Finnish president
Urho Kekkonen embarked on an international explanatory mission from 1959 to
1962 to collect endorsements of Finnish neutrality from the governments of Britain,
Austria, the United States, and France.161 Professor Jan-Magnus Jansson of the
University of Helsinki argued that the string of declarations accumulated by
Kekkonen in these explanatory missions of 1961-62 had "no legal force," 162 and
indeed the phraseology used did seem to reveal a studied political, rather than legal,
tone. The British government, for example, expressed its "understanding" of the
Finns' policy, while the United States issued a communiqu6 undertaking to
"scrupulously respect Finland's chosen course." 163 Nevertheless, the fusion of a
specific treaty-based declaration of future neutrality with statements of
understanding by foreign powers allowed Kekkonen to achieve at least a
hybridization of unilateral permanent neutrality (as derived from the Nuclear Tests
decisions), and the notification/recognition model adopted by Austria. 164 Although
power, and was unpersuaded by Jakobson's careful apologetics. See GEORGE MAUDE, THE
FINNISH DILEMMA: NEurRALrrYiNTHE SHADOW OF POWER 67 (1976);see also LYON, supranote
126, at 97-98 (expressing a similar sentiment).
159 See Max Jakobson, Substance and Appearance: Finland, 58 FOREIGN AFF. 1034, 1035
(1980).
160 1948 Treaty Between the U.S.SJR and Finland, Apr. 6,1948, US.S.R.-Fin., 48 U.N.T.S.
156,156. See STEPHAN VEROSTA, DIEDAUERNDENEurRALrrAT [PERMANENT NEurRALrrY] 35
(1967); see also ScHwErrzER, supra note 16, at 40; Hummer, supra note 17, at 8-9.
161 In this way, Kekkonen hoped to convert what Finnish security commentator Harto
Hakovirta described as an "asymmetrical" neutrality into a "symmetrical" neutrality accepted by
East and West. See MAUDE, supra note 158, at 64-65.
162 See Jan-Magnus Jansson, Preface to KEKKONEN, supra note 158, at 9, 16.
163 KEKKONEN, supra note 158, at 89.
164 This would be a curious hybridization, since unilateral permanent neutrality seems to
tolerate an open-ended circle of recognizing-and, hence, enforcing-states, while neutralitization
by the Austrian model limits the circle to states which expressly participate in the neutralitization
sequence. Further, because unilateral permanent neutrality does appear to entertain the possibility
of future revocability, that option will have been closed out for Finland by the receipt of
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Finland never issued a specific unilateral declaration of the kind that served as a
catalyst for the Austrian procedure, Finland's adherence to permanent neutrality
developed through a succession of foreign policy pronouncements by incumbent
presidents, efforts to secure a reliable armed neutrality, and nonparticipation in
military alliances (a duty originally based on the preambular formula of the 1948
Treaty).165 And, unlike Sweden, the Finnish government actively sought to convince
international opinion that its policy of neutrality was not subject to unilateral
reassessment or abandonment. 166
Finnish permanent neutrality in the 1990s is no longer hard-wired to the Fenno-
Soviet assistance treaty, which was abrogated in November 1991.167 Russia has not
insisted upon any conditions of neutrality or military assistance in considering its
future relations with its smaller neighbor.168 Thus, having long professed that it
could never join the EU because of its neutrality,169 Finland did so in 1995. Eventual
international law recognitions. If the objection is raised that the states which responded to
Kekkonen's notification did not intend their recognitions to carry legal consequences, as Professor
Jansson contended, but without argument, see Jansson, supra note 162, at 16, the point can be
made with equal force that in the case of the Austrian neutralitization only the Soviet act of
recognition was unequivocally traceable to a binding obligation in international law, namely, the
terms of the Moscow Memorandum. See Kunz, supra note 83, at 421 (asserting that only the
Soviet Union, through the Memorandum, was legally bound to grant this recognition). In any
event, the recognition received by Finland from the two Germanies was securely enclosed within
mutually binding international instruments. See MAUDE, supra note 158, at 81.
165 See KIRBY, supra note 155, at 208-09.
166 An international law anchoring of Finnish neutrality has been a persistent problem for
scholars. See Peter Bruckner, Finland's Neutrality and the Economic Integration ofEurope, 83
AM. J. INT'L L.447, 448 (1989) (reviewing TONI MuosER, FINNLANDs NEUTRALrrAT UND DIE
EUROP.ISCHE WRTscHAFrsnEGRATiON [FINLAND'S NEurRALrrY AND EUROPEAN ECONOMIC
INTEGRATION] (1986)) (noting ironic centrality of Fenno-Soviet treaty to international acceptance
of Finnish neutrality).
167 See Subedi, supra note 2, at 248.
168 See id. A new agreement with the Russian Federation, signed on January 20, 1992,
contained none of the threatening security provisions of its predecessor. See Treaty Between the
Republic of Finland and the Russian Federation Concerning Basic Relations, U.N. Doc.
TR/201092/I-29173 (1992) (copy on file with UN. Treaties Office). Article 4 of the treaty, dealing
with security provisions, did contain a commitment to assist a party which became the object of
armed aggression, but only in accordance with "the principles and provisions" of the U.N. Charter.
See id.
169 See Esko Antola, Finland and West European Economic Integration, in EUROPEAN
NEUtrRAs, supra note 10, at 89, 94 (citing official Finnish government statements that explicitly
ruled out EU membership as incompatible with neutrality); see also Colin McIntyre, Austria Faces
Neutrality Obstacle to ECEntry, REIrlMLIBR. REP. May 4, 1989, at I (reporting similar comment
by former Finnish President Mauno Koivisto) (on file with author).
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Finnish participation in NATO-and the formal end of its neutrality policy-were
predicted by a U.S. congressional security analysis in 1996.170
4. Political Neutralitization: Sweden and Ireland
a. The Policy of the Free Hand: Sweden
Sweden's neutrality has no formal instruments of neutralitization, but a long
chain of historical evidence connects Swedish neutrality to the time of the Congress
of Vienna in 1815, and in particular to a letter of King Karl Johan XIV to British
Prime Minister Lord Palmerston, in which the King made the following seminal
declaration: 'My policy will be strict neutrality as long as I can preserve it.' '171
Sweden has entertained vociferous internal debate on the ramifications of that
constantly reiterated policy for such issues as entry to the League of Nations, 172
membership of the United Nations, 173 the paradox of possessing and developing
nuclear weapons while preaching international peace,174 the defense spending
cutbacks of the early 1970s, 175 and recently the highly-charged question of the
intensity of relations to be developed with the EU.176 And the direction of Sweden's
170 See Stanley R. Sloan, Congressional Res. Serv. Rep., NATO Enlargement and the
Former European Neutrals (visited Apr. 25, 2000) <www.fas.org/man/crs/crs2.htn>.
17 1 JERRY WILON RALSTON, THE DEFENSE OF SMALL STATES IN THE NUCLEAR AGE: THE
CASE OF SWEDEN AND SWITZERLAND 49 (1969).
172 See Ian Ronald Barnes, Swedish Foreign Policy, A Response to Geopolitical Factors, 4
COOPERATION & CONFLiCT 243, 259 (1974). On Swedish support for the League of Nations
system of collective security, and preparedness to move from a posture of neutrality to participate
in that system, see Wahlbdck, supra note 3, at 117-18.
173 In the context of U.N. participation, former Swedish foreign minister Osten Undin made
a frank statement to the Riksdag: "We are willing to join in a common security organization and
in the case of a future conflict to relinquish our neutrality to the extent demanded by the statutes
of the organization." RALSTON, supra note 171, at 72.
174 Legally neutralitized states are under no specific obligation in peacetime to refrain from
supplying war materials to third countries. Their peacetime duty is to refrain from entering into
agreements that will require them to fumish this kind of assistance in future wars. See supra text
accompanying note 58.
175 Barnes noted that Sweden eventually came to rely on the so-called NATO nuclear
umbrella as a critical element of its defense preparations. See Barnes, supra note 172, at 258-59.
176 See generally MARGARETHA LISEN-NORMAN, LA SUrDE FACE A L'INTtGRATION
EuROPENNE [SWEDEN CONFRONTS EUROPEAN INTEGRATION] (1978) (presenting a comprehensive
study of Sweden's application to join the EU).
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economic relations with Nazi Germany has recently resurfaced as a matter of
national discomposure. 177
There has been, in sum, a motif of neutrality in Swedish history since the
Congress of Vienna. The golden thread of this motif is a formula that has acquired
almost an incantatory value in Swedish foreign policy: 'It is normally said that
Sweden is not allied in peace, in order to remain neutral in war."178 And yet, unlike
the Swiss and Austrian (and to some extent Finnish) experiences, there is no single
point along that continuum of history-early or late-when the mannerisms of
neutrality were suddenly held in check, pulled together, and formally captured in a
binding instrument of international law. In other words, Sweden's pretension to a
status of permanent neutrality-if that indeed is the country's political condition-
has never been formalized by the reciprocity and mutuality that typifies
neutralitization by treaty or by notification and recognition. Moreover, since the
time of the Congress of Vienna, the Swedish government has officially regarded
international law recognition as both unnecessary and undesirable. 179 Michael
Schweitzer has described Swedish neutrality using the cogent expression, Politik
derfreien Hand, "the policy of the free hand."180 Schweitzer drew the logical
conclusion that such a policy could only have been deliberately calculated to stifle
a potential opiniojuris among the international community of states regarding the
status in international law of Swedish neutral behavior.181 A free hand policy not
only sabotaged the possibility of a neutralitization by custom,1 82 it also prevented
177 See Wahlback, supra note 3, at 120-21.
178 Nils Andr6n, The Neutrality of Sweden, in NEUmaLnY AND NON-ALIGNMENT, supra
note 118, at 111, 113.
17 9 The motivation for this unequivocal stance was explained by foreign minister Osten
Und&n in a speech to the Swedish parliament in 1964, which included the following key passage:
[I] can recall a stand taken in the [parliament] several years ago when it was proposed
that negotiations should be opened with certain countries with a view to having them
'guarantee and respect' Swedish neutrality. To this the [parliament] declared with the backing
of the votes of all the democratic parties that acceptance of the proposal would permanently
fetter Sweden's foreign policy, and would moreover put it under the guarantee of several
other powers. The [parliament] did not want to have anything to do with the proposal because
in particular it would have meant putting ourselves under the protection of other powers and
inviting them to judge how we implement our own foreign policy.
RALSTON, supra note 171, at 69.
180 SCHwErrZER, supra note 16, at 43.
18 1 See id.
182 Hummer suggested that Swedish neutrality was the archetypal example of the SeinlSollen
(is/ought) confiusion, which brackets subjective and unstable foreign policy maxims-what
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an ascription to Sweden of the kind of unilateral manifesto that could create legal
effects under the Nuclear Tests doctrine.1 83
Sweden's policy ofneutrality, then, appears to be entirely a flexible expression
of an opportunistic state policy, which could be dispensed with or curtailed if a
different option, or modulation, would better guarantee Sweden's national
security.184 No foreign power could object-at least not on any foundation of
international law-to such a bouleversement depolitique.185 In the words of former
Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme in March 1972, as the debate on relations with
the (then) European Communities reached fever pitch, "neutrality should not be
considered as an ideology, but as a means for attaining certain objectives." 186
Sweden, in other words, always espoused the pragmatic, discretionary approach
Hummer called "factual" permanent neutrality-with the objective modes of neutralitization of
the international law institution ofpermanent neutrality. See Hurmer, supra note 17, at 9; see also
supra note 102.
183 See supra Part I.A.2.c (discussing Nuclear Tests jurisprudence).
184 See Penny-Marie Kartos, Sweden-Application for European CommunityMembership-
Sweden Fears Loss ofPolicy ofNeutrality with Community Memberhip, 22 GA. J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 673, 674 (1992); see also John Redmond, The Wider Europe: Extending the Membership ofthe
EC, in 2 THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNrIY: THE MAASTRICHT DEBATES AND BEYOND
209, 215 (Alan W. Cafruny & Glenda G. Rosenthal eds., 1993) [hereinafter TiE STATE OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNrrY]; Carl-Einar Stilvant, A Swedish View of 1992 and Swedish Neutrality
Policy in a Changing Europe, in EUROPEAN NEUTRALS, supra note 10, at 109, 124 (noting that
Swedish thinking on neutrality has rarely taken account of the international law dimension, and
has been primarily a deeply rooted mannerism of foreign policy).
185 In fact, the Swedes showed little compunction about tampering with their "alliance-free"
neutrality when in 1948 they floated the idea of a pan-Scandinavian military compact, which
would have involved defensive commitments by the participating states inter se, while preserving
a comprehensive neutrality vis-A-vis all nonparticipating states. See infra note 368, discussing
"zones of peace." The plan collapsed when the Norwegians began to tilt toward the emerging
NATO alliance system, and to press for the Scandinavian model to become more
Western-oriented. See WOKER, supra note 13, at 85. In his concluding remark about the ill-fated
project, Woker caught the distinction between the legally conditioned behavior of the neutralitized
states, and the flexible politically conditioned behavior of Sweden's policy ofneutrality:
It was a question of... an attempt made in the context of the then prevailing
circumstances to give greater range to [Sweden's] neutral behavior, which certainly
contradicted the letter of strict neutrality, but not the rationale underlying the Swedish policy.
In that regard it should not be forgotten, that Sweden has resisted an international law fixation
of its neutrality.
Id. at 85.
18 6 LIEIN-NORMAN, supra note 176, at 7. For an account of Sweden's latest (successful)
application to join the EU, see Kartos, supra note 184, at 679.
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to neutrality that appears to have galvanized the Austrian government in the wake
of the 1989-91 revolutions. It was unsurprising that Sweden offered to modify its
neutrality policy in its latest negotiations with the EU.187 The policy of the free
hand, by definition, permits tacking to the prevailing political winds. It is a matter
of no little irony, therefore, that by the time of the 1996 intergovernmental
conference on the future of the Union, Sweden broke ranks with its fellow member
neutrals and retrenched into opposition to the Western European Union and to a
common EU defense. The Swedish government in its preconference submission,
asserted the country's traditional neutrality and its intention to stay out of all
military alliances. 188
b. A Contingent, Negotiable, and Reactive Neutrality: Ireland
Ireland's neutrality has had few moments of high clarity, but they are
conspicuous in Irish history and they accord it whatever margin of political
coherence it may still claim. Although intimations of future neutrality are found as
early as the Boer War, when Irish nationalists opposed Ireland's participation in a
"British" war and campaigned against recruitment to the British army,189 its
187 See Roger J. Goebel, The European Union Grows: The Constitutional Impact of the
Accession ofAuria, Finland and Sweden, 18 FoRDHAMINT'LLJ. 1092,1161 (1995) (noting the
concern of the European Commission, the EU's executive body, that "specific and binding
assurances" might be needed to ensure Sweden's participation in the common foreign and security
policy).
188 See EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR RESEARCH, POLITCAL &
INsirTTONAL AFFAiRS DivIsIo N (INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE TASK FORCE), 2
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE TASK FORCE, WHrrE PAPER ON THE
1996 INTERGOvERNMENTAL CONFERENCE: SUMMARY OF POSMONS OF THE MEMBER STATES OF
THE EUROPEAN UNION WrIH A VIEW TO THE 1996 INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE 150-56
(J. Xavier Fernandez ed., 1996), available in <http://www.europa.eu.int/en/agenda/igc-home.
htm#al> (visited Mar. 25,2000) [hereinafter 1996 EU WHrIE PAPER]. The complex demands of
EU membership have created a ficturing of domestic consensus on neutrality within each of the
EU member neutrals. In Sweden, for example, the govemment's assertiveness on neutrality in its
1996 submission was not shared by the main opposition party, which called for eventual NATO
membership. See Bertrand Benoit, Objections to NATO Links Weaken in New EU States, IRiSH
TIMES, Aug. 29, 1997, at 14, available in LEXIS, News Library, Irish Times File. It would be
premature, therefore, to interpret the 1996 Swedish position as the inaugural moment of a new
unilateral permanent neutrality.
189 See Fz, supra note 42, at 64. In fact, the neutralitization of a future independent Ireland
had been intermittently supported by nationalist leaders from Sir Roger Casement in 1913 to
tamon de Valera in 1920 and 1927. See PATRICKKEATNGE, A PLACEAMONG THENATIONS 38
(1978). Keatinge described "an instinctive Irish predilection for neutrality" that severely
constrained the choices open to later leaders. See id.
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projection as formal policy had to await Irish independence and a sovereign choice
of neutrality in World War II. In 1939, following the effective collapse of the
League of Nations, Irish Prime Minister Earon de Valera redefined the national
interest unilaterally to provide for independence of action.190 'The small states in
Europe have begun to provide for their own defen[s]es," de Valera announced in
June 1936, adding 'We must be neutral." 191 Ireland's neutrality was formally
declared by de Valera in parliament on September 2, 1939, the day before
Chamberlain announced Britain's declaration of war against Nazi Germany.192
If wartime Irish neutrality had an undertone of anti-British nationalism, as some
have alleged,193 that animus became pronounced in the aftermath of the conflict.
The establishment of NATO was the occasion for a tart exchange ofnotes between
the United States and Ireland. Responding to the U.S. aide-mimoire soliciting
Ireland as an original signatory to the North Atlantic Treaty, the Irish foreign
minister, Sen MacBride, drew a sharp distinction between the laudable aims of the
proposed treaty and the military means it envisaged. MacBride's distinction did not
focus on any perceived legal impediment to Irish adhesion to a military alliance. His
premise was resolutely parochial:
190 De Valera was bitterly disappointed by the failure ofthe League, which he characterized
as "debris" when its sanctions policy against Italy failed in 1939. See T. RYLE DwYER, IRISH
NEUTRALITY AND THE U.SA. 1939-47 23 (1977). Ireland had played a significant role in the
League, as a small postcolonial nation supporting the multilateral security framework that was the
League's signature. The presidency of the League passed by rotation to Ireland in 1932, and de
Valera seized the opportunity of his inaugural address to dispense with the customary anodyne
exhortations, and to spotlight what he called the "lip service" being paid to "the fundamental
principles on which the League is founded." NORMAN MAcQUEEN, IRISH NEurRAxrT : THE
UN1TEDNATIONS AND THE PEACEKEEPING EXPERIENCE 1945-1969, at 8 (1981).
191 Conor Cruise O'Brien, Ireland in International Affairs, in CONOR CRUISE O'BRIEN
INTRODUCES IRELAND 104, 115 (Owen Dudley Edwards ed., 1969). According to Robert Fisk, in
his definitive study of Irish wartime neutrality published in 1983, "[t]he failure of collective
security brought about an introverted perspective which defined [Ireland's] continued
independence-and the future unity of Ireland-as the goveming principles in all matters of
foreign affairs." FISK, supra note 42, at 59.
192 See id. at 89-90.
193 Irish historian F.S.L. Lyons commented wryly that "to be free to choose between peace
and a British war demonstrated to all the world just how complete [Irish] independence really
was." F.S.L. LYONS, IRELAND SINCETHEFAMINE 548 (1971). De Valera tenaciously declined the
implorations of the British during the war for access to the former British naval facilities that had
been transferred to Irish control in 1938. In the Irish Government's aide-nnoire on the ports (and
on British air force sorties in Irish airspace), specific reference was made to the terms of the various
Hague Conventions. See FISK, supra note 42, at 91; see also Bitzinger, supra note 62, at 2
(describing Irish neutrality in a recent survey as "almost totally reactive and anti-British').
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[A]ny military alliance with, or commitment involving military action jointly with,
the State that is responsible for the unnatural division of Ireland, which occupies a
portion of our country with its armed forces, and which supports undemocratic
institutions in the north-eastern comer of Ireland, would be entirely repugnant and
unacceptable to the Irish people.1 94
The unspoken postulate ofMacBride's reply, therefore, was that Ireland had no
political objection, and anticipated no legal obstacle, to Irish participation in a
military alliance that was explicitly dedicated to the defense of Western democracy,
but only if the "undemocratic" occupation of Ireland were terminated.
1 95
Ireland's peripheral strategic value, and its secure place within the Western
democratic bloc, 196 meant that it did not become involved in the postwar political
194 Aide-mdnoire of the Government of Ireland to the Government of the United States, Feb.
8, 1949, reprinted in GOVERNMENT OF IRELAND, TEXTS CONCERNING IRELAND'S POSmON IN
RELATION TO THENORTH ATLANTIC TREATY (Pub. L. No. 9934), Apr. 26,1950, at 5 [hereinafter
IRMSH NATO TEXTS].
'95 Resisting MacBride's transparent linkage of the NATO and partition questions, the U.S.
State Department verbally informed the Irish Ambassador in Washington that the North Atlantic
Treaty "vas not a suitable framework within which to discuss problems which were 'entirely the
concern of the Governments of Ireland and of the United Kingdom."' Verbal Communication
from the U.S. State Department to the Irish Ambassador, Mar. 31,1949, reprinted in IRISH NATO
TEXTS, supra note 194, at 7. This view was repeated in a State Department aide-mnmoire of June
3, 1949, see id. at 10-11, that replied to a further note from MacBride dated May 25, 1949, in
which he referred to reunification as "the sole obstacle to Ireland's participation in the Atlantic
Pact." IRISH NATO TExMs, supra note 194, at 10. On returning to power in 1953, de Valera had
endorsed the MacBride strategy on NATO, noting that "so long as [p]artition exists it would not
be possible for an Irish Government to enter into the Atlantic Pact." MACQUEEN, supra note 190,
at 51. Curiously, the architect of Irish neutrality then allowed that partition was "a fundamental
disturbing factor and it has to be put out of the way before we can get the normal reaction here."
Id. The "normal reaction" for Ireland, the Prime Minister implied, would have been to accede to
NATO.
196 See Brian Lenihan, Ireland and Neutrality, Address by the Irish Minister for Foreign
Affairs, in IRIS NA ROINNE GN6THAi EACHTRACHA [BULLETIN OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS] No. 972 (Dec. 1980/Jan. 1981) (noting that Ireland shared "the basic democratic,
political and economic values with our neighbo[u]rs in Europe'). As Ireland would later make
clear at the United Nations, the countlry was ideologically committed to strengthening the influence
of "the group comprising the United States of America, Canada, and Western Europe." Liam
Cosgrave, Address by the Irish Minister for External Affairs, in 159 DAM DEB., col. 144 (July 3,
1956). Irish support of anticolonialism, for example, stopped well short of automatic endorsement
of Soviet-backed liberation movements. See MACQUEEN, supra note 190, at 97. In the later 1960s,
the Irish government drew much domestic criticism for its silence on the Vietnam War, in marked
contrast to Sweden's stridency. See PATRICK KEATNGE, A SING LAR STANCE: IRISH NEUrRALITY
INTHE 1980s, at 96 (1984).
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restructuring that produced the neutralitizations of Austria and Finland. As with all
of its fellow European neutrals, the decisive postwar compass point for Ireland's
neutrality was the emergent European Economic Community (EEC).197 Unlike the
other neutrals, however, Ireland's initial application to the EEC (in 1961), and its
later successful application a decade later, were each premised on full membership.
According to political scientist Trevor Salmon (writing in 1982), Ireland's courtship
with the EEC "demonstrat[ed] the restrictions which economic dependence upon
Britain placed upon Ireland, and the economic Achilles heel of an independent
neutral foreign policy."'198 De Valera's successor, technocrat SeAn Lemass, told
parliament in a cryptic statement in January 1962 that Ireland's United Nations role
"may be affected in some degree following on our membership of the European
Community."'199 Lemass was telegraphing the close of the period of neutrality as
probably the major definitional component of Irish foreign policy-its
desanctification, according to Salmon.2°° Irish government leaders after de Valera
197 See infra note 228 (explaining the EU's institutional evolution and treaty nomenclature).
Ireland, however, had been admitted to the United Nations in 1955, ironically as part of a package
deal which grouped Ireland with other pro-Westem applicants. See MACQUEEN, supra note 190,
at 91. The Irish Government did not explain the inconsistency of its readiness to join Britain in
adherence to the U.N. Charter, which has a collective security system that arguably amounts to a
global military alliance, in contrast to its partitionist justification for staying outside NATO six
years earlier. See infra text accompanying note 223 (discussing alliance features of the United
Nations). Moreover, at the time of Ireland's first application in 1946, there had been some
parliamentary unease about the viability of Irish neutrality inside the new world organization. See
MACQUEEN, supra note 190, at 84. By 1955, the failure of the second experiment in collective
security was painfully obvious, and recently neutralitized Austria was admitted simultaneously
with Ireland. See supra note 136. The world organization gave Ireland once again the kind of
multilateral platform that inevitably allows small nations to showcase geopolitical opinions that
otherwise would be ignored. See Tribute to Frank Aiken, in IRIS NA ROINNE GNOTHAI
EACHTRACHA [BULLETIN OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS] No. 970 (Oct. 1980)
(discussing Irish disarmament proposals). Ireland also was among the so-called middle powers
which were invited to support Secretary General Dag Hammarskj6ld's "blue helmet' alternative
to collective security, the U.N. interpository peacekeeping missions that evolved after the Suez
crisis. See generally Erik Suy, United Nations Peacekeeping System, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PUBLic INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 5, at 258, 264 (discussing origin and history of U.N.
peacekeeping).
198 Trevor C. Salmon, Ireland: A Neutral in the Community?, 20 J. COMMON MKT. STUD.
205,209-10 (1982).
199 MACQUEEN, supra note 190, at 149. As MacQueen concluded from his scrutiny of Irish
parliamentary debates in the immediate aftermath of Ireland's first EU application in 1962, "[i]t
was evident.., that [Prime Minister Lemass] wished to avoid any binding commitment to the
continuation of formal neutrality." Id. at 60.
200 See Salmon, supra note 198, at 210.
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have consistently been quite candid in conceding that if the political union of the
European communities were ultimately achieved, Ireland "would accept the
obligations, even if these included defen[s]e."20' This trend became especially
pronounced as the EU intensified its plans for a common foreign and security
policy-and potentially a common defense arrangement-in the early 1990s.202
The contingent negotiable, and reactive profile of postwar Irish neutrality has
been shaped by the issues of Northern Ireland sovereignty and EU membership.
Ireland would have joined NATO if its territorial partition had been ended, and did
join the EU in full awareness of the prospective defense and security implications.
In March 1996, however, Ireland's neutrality profile was unexpectedly hardened by
a government encyclical which sought for the first time to state authoritatively the
place ofneutrality in Irish foreign policy.2 3 The so-called White Paper on foreign
policy conceded the obvious--that neutrality has been an honored, but not
201 Charles J. Haughey, Debate on Defense Policy, Remarks by the Prime Minister, in 327
DAILDEB., col. 1396 (Mar. 11, 1981). Haughey quotedhis predecessor, JackLynch, who declared
in 1969 that "[b]eing members of [the EU], we would naturally be interested in the defen[s]e of
the territories embraced by the [EU] .... [t]here is no question ofneutrality there." 241 DAiL DEB.,
col. 1157 (July 23, 1969). Lynch's predecessor, Sen Lemass, went further than any of his
successors in this regard. He spoke of "the inevitable consequence" of a military commitment
within the EU, and predicted that "ultimately we would be prepared to yield even the technical
label of neutrality." Salmon, supra note 198, at 210. During a later parliamentary debate on EU
membership, Prime Minister Lynch argued that "we have no traditional policy ofneutrality in this
country .... like Sweden, Switzerland and Austria," and construed the Irish Constitution (which
has no specific neutrality provision) to mean that "we can make up our minds as to our
neutrality .... in the light of the circumstances prevailing.' Jack Lynch, Debate on EEC
Membership, Reply to Parliamentary Question by the Prime Minister, in 241 DAIL DEB., col. 631
(July 16, 1969) (in an example of technical mislabeling, Prime Minister Lynch had referred to the
"permanent policies ofneutrality" of Switzerland and Austria; see id.). According to a senior Irish
political analyst, "[EU] membership is the cornerstone of Irish foreign policy, not neutrality."
Dennis Kennedy, Why Fuss over Neutrality?, IRISH TIMES, May 11, 1983, at 10, available in
LEXIS.
202 See Loma Siggins, Ireland May Sign NATO Agreement, Says Spring, IRISH TMES, Feb.
17, 1995, at 5, available in LEXIS, News, By Individual Publication, Irish Times File (quoting
statement of former Irish Deputy Prime Minister Dick Spring in early 1995 that "neutrality could
no longer define Irish foreign policy in a changing Europe").
203 GOVERMENT OF IRELAND, DEPARTMENT OF FOREiGN AFFAiRS, CHALLENGES AND
OPPORTUNrHEs ABROAD: THE WHITE PAPER ON FOREIGN POLIcY (1996) [hereinafter IRisH
GOVERNMENT WHrrE PAPER]. The White Paper was a long-delayed--and only partial-response
to a call by former Labor party parliamentarian Michael D. Higgins: "I would urge [the minister
for foreign affairs] to prepare a paper on neutrality.... I wish him well in salvaging, out of the
mish-mash of confusion we have created over the years, a meaningful concept ofneutrality... '
Michael D. Higgins, Debate on the Nomination ofthe Ministerfor Foreign Affairs, Speech, in 330
DAIL DEB., col. 139 (Oct. 20, 1981).
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necessarily indispensable element of Irish foreign policy. It also clarified that
Ireland's policy of neutrality has been characterized primarily by nonmembership
of military alliances.2°4 Incongruously, however, the document also committed the
government to hold a national referendum before neutrality could be dropped from
the canons of Ireland's foreign policy.205 This commitment was not only unexpected
but unnecessary. Ireland's neutrality, as shown above, has had no normative
foundation in municipal or in international law. Curiously, the government's pledge
of a referendum could, if translated into binding municipal law,206 herald an
elevation to constitutional magnitude of a principle that is not contained in the Irish
Constitution. The commitment, at the very least, has given neutrality a political
significance in Ireland that it has not been assured recently in any of the other EU
member neutrals. 207 But it also raises the potential for conflict with Ireland's
constitutional obligation to accept the treaty-based mandates of EU membership.2 08
204 See IRISH GOVERNMENT WH=T PAPER, supra note 203, IM 2.26, 4.3. Indeed, Irish
government leaders have often referred expressly to this policy ofnonmembership, rather than to
the concept of neutrality itself. See Lenihan, supra note 196. In Trevor Salmon's view, Ireland
could claim to be neutral "only in the very narrow, legalistic interpretation ofnonmembership of
a military alliance." Salmon, supra note 198, at 209. The British newspaper, The Economist,
notorious for its sardonic view of Irish public affairs, referred in a 1988 piece on Austrian
neutrality to the studied vagueness of Irish concerns about security and neutrality, which it
attributed primarily to Ireland's peripheral geographical placement. Such "mistiness," the writer
asserted, could not suffice for Austria's security concerns. SeeAt the EECs Door, supra note 122,
at 16. Nonetheless, official Irish opinion seems to have shared the view that neutrality and
geographical isolation were closely linked. See IRISH GOVERNMENT WHITEPAPER, supra note 203,
2.25.
205 See IRISH GOVERNMENT WHITE PAPER, supra note 203, T 4.9.
206 A government White Paper, under Irish administrative or constitutional practice, does not
technically bind either the promulgating administration or its successors. See E-mail from Dermot
Cahill, Professor, Faculty of Law, University College Dublin, to Brian F. Havel, Professor of Law,
DePaul University College of Law (Aug. 16, 1999) (on file with author).
207 Although Austria has a separate constitutional law on neutrality, see supra note 130,
Article 44 of its constitution provides that "[c]onstitutional laws or constitutional provisions
contained in simple laws" can be amended by the popular assemblies, without recourse to a
referendum. See Conctitution ofAustria, in GIsBERT H. FLANZ, CONSTIUTONS OF THE COUNTRIES
OF THE WORLD 32 (Gisbert H. Flanz ed. & trans., 1998) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
WORLD].
208 For example, Article 29.4.5 of the Irish Constitution provides as follows:
No provision of this Constitution invalidates laws enacted, acts done or measures
adopted by the State... necessitated by the obligations of membership of the [EU]
or... prevents laws enacted, acts done or measures adopted by the [EU] ... or by the
institutions thereof, or by bodies competent under the [EU treaties], from having the force of
law in the State.
[Vol. 61:167
RETHINKING PERMANENTNEUTRALITY
C. Permanent Neutrality in the Shadow of the EU's Military Complex
Responding to the EU's military transformation, the two legally permanently
neutral member states, Austria and Finland,209 have begun a tentative embrace of
the rhetoric of the free hand-aiming, perhaps, to self-convert from a de jure to a
de facto permanent neutrality.210 Conversely, Sweden and Ireland, the two factually
(i.e., politically, not legally) neutralitized member states, have allowed a weak
revival of the idea of neutrality as mythos, but notably have not tried to sanctify the
myth at a higher constitutional level than mere current government policy. All four
of the EU permanent neutrals have recently practiced a kind of diplomatic
retrenchment, seeking to parry the EU's deepening security integration by
essentializing their neutrality as a doctrine of nonparticipation in military
alliances. 211 Under cover of this essentialism, the EU neutrals can participate in
economic sanctions, permit troop and equipment movements within their territories,
and allow warplane overflight, without necessarily observing the full panoply of
secondary duties entailed by a legal status of permanent neutrality.212
This study of state practice, therefore, has exposed the EU's pivotal significance
in remodeling the law of permanent neutrality. My final analytical task, before
reaching reconstruction of the law, is to examine the compatibility of EU
membership-considered both diachronically and synchronically-with a status of
permanent neutrality as that status is substantively configured in existing
BUNREACHT NAH IEANN [CONsTrruON OF IRE ], art. 29A.5, reprinted in CONSTrrurzONs
OF THE WORLD, supra note 207, at 53. If the Irish electorate refused to renounce neutrality, the
government would find itself in an interesting normative dilemma. The Constitution explicitly
provides for the supremacy of EU obligations. But a binding referendum of the people would
dictate a policy ofneutrality--dehors the Constitution-that would likely conflict with some of
Ireland's defense obligations under future stages of the EU common foreign and security policy.
See infra text accompanying note 274 (discussing implications of these common policies for a
status of neutrality).
209 Finland's classification as a legal permanent neutral, as discussed earlier, rests on
conceptual assumptions that have been the subject of considerable dispute. See supra notes 165-66
and accompanying text.
210 As I have shown earlier, this process ofdenormativization was the outcome of fortuitous
geopolitical events-the Soviet collapse and the reunification of Germany-which allowed a legal
rhetoric of changed circumstances to soften existing international law commitments. See supra text
accompanying note 145.
2 1 1 See Paul Luif, The Evolution ofEC-EFT"A Relations and Austria 's Integration Policy, in
EUROPFAN NEYTRALS, supra note 10, at 55, 82.
212 Thus, only Switzerland appears to have maintained fidelity to the full conspectus of
secondary duties. Austria, despite its constitutional law on neutrality, has modified its domestic
laws to permit limited interventions on behalf of U.N. Security Council enforcement. See supra
text accompanying note 151.
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international law. Through this process, and a deeper study of the reactive
diplomacy of the neutrals operating inside the EU's common foreign and security
policy, I introduce the jurisprudential and political premises for the reformed
institution of permanent neutrality presented in Part V.
IV. JURISPRUDENTIAL AND EMPIRICAL CHALLENGES IN A DYNAmIC
EUROPEAN UNION
There has been frequent analysis of the conditionality of a status of permanent
neutrality within the global security system of the United Nations.213 But the recent
regionalization of collective enforcement in Bosnia and Kosovo, and the political
momentum to perfect a common EU foreign and security policy, strongly suggest
that regional containment pursuant to U.N. Security Council mandate and regional
solidarity in reaction to extra-regional events will occupy a more significant role in
the next generation of collective action in Europe. At the beginning of the twenty-
first century, the dominant regional security institution in Europe is what Stanley
Hoffman has aptly styled the "baroque" coalition of administrative and political
elements comprising the EU.214 At present, and for the imaginable future, it has
become the chosen public policy instrument for economic and military/defense
cohesion in the post-Cold War European continent. It is time to situate permanent
neutrality, as law and policy, within this dominant EU setting. I begin with brief
treatments of two organizations-NATO and the United Nations-that were the
primary normative counterweights to neutrality before recent efforts to reconfigure
the EU as a military power.
A. Neutralitization and Static Multilateralism: NATO and the United
Nations
The common link that connects all the peacetime secondary duties of
permanently neutral states is the general rule with which the Conception officielle
suisse closes its enumeration of the secondary duties: "[T]he permanently neutral
country may not vis-ti-vis other countries enter into any obligations which in case
of war would commit it to conduct contrary to neutrality, i.e., conduct against the
rules of ordinary neutrality law which comes into effect only in wartime.'a 15
This rule assumes that permanent neutrality as an institution of public
2 13 See infra note 218.
214 See HOFFMAN, supra note 10, at 9 (depicting EU as "tis halfway house that is far less
than a federation and far more than a collection of states").
215 See VERDROSS, supra note 23, at 38.
[Vol. 61:167
RETHINKING PERMANENTNEUTRALITY
international law commits its adherents, above all, to nonparticipation in the future
wars of third states.216 As a matter of positive law, therefore, the institution of
permanent neutrality projects an emphatic military profile and its normative
compatibility with various types of international organizations can be checked
relatively quickly. A reciprocal defensive military alliance with automatic mutual
assistance provisions-the NATO organization is now the preeminent post-Cold
War example-demonstrably excludes states that proclaim enduring and
comprehensive neutrality.217 The United Nations collective security system, in
effect a grand military alliance that can proceed militarily against its own members
if they breach their Charter obligations, is also a threat to a fixed posture of
neutrality in future conflicts to the extent that permanently neutral states may be
216 See supra text accompanying note 56 (discussing norms of permanent neutrality).
217 In the event of an offensive armed attack against a contracting party, Article 5 of the
NATO Treaty obliges every other signatory party, in the framework of a system of collective
self-defense, to render assistance to the victimized party. North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, art.
5, 63 Stat. 2241, 2244,34 U.N.T.S. 243, 246. If the conflict escalates into a declared war, or has
already done so (contingencies which are nowhere explicitly excluded by the terms of the U.N.
Charter, see Jost Delbriick, Collective Self-Defence, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 41, at 114, 116), the assisting parties may adopt the status of
cobelligerents of their aggrieved ally. See id. Membership of NATO is inconceivable for a
permanently neutral state, which could no longer guarantee its observance of classical neutrality
in all future wars. See supra text accompanying note 56. It is true that neither the range nor the
intensity of assistance measures is prescribed in advance, and their scope could conceivably cover
the spectrum from outright armed force to mere benevolent neutrality. This responsive flexibility
was confirmed in the Secretary of State's message to the President that accompanied submission
of the NATO Treaty to the Senate. See 1949 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2493, 2496-97 (noting that the duty
of assistance did not necessarily extend to a declaration of war). Other measures, from diplomatic
protest to much stronger forms of pressure, could suffice. See SCHWEWrZER, supra note 16, at 167-
68. But even a benevolent neutrality would, according to the strict law of permanent neutrality, be
impermissible, and a permanently neutral state is excluded from membership of NATO even by
this most feeble measure of inter-ally assistance. Moreover, it would obviously be unsafe to
attempt to predict in advance the probable intensity of a required measure of assistance. Article 5
of the founding treaty, which appears to allow discretion to the alliance parties to take such
measures "as [they] deem necessary" is cast in the most pliant terms for that very reason. See North
Atlantic Treaty, supra, 63 Stat. at 2244, 34 U.N.T.S. at 246; Torsten E. Stein, Remarks on
Structuring a New Security Regime in Europe, 85 PROC. AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 277, 298 (1991)
(commenting that, under the NATO Treaty, "you can send an army corps or atelegrar"). Finally,
the coordination of defensive capacities that is involved in the NATO system presents a further
obstacle to a future posture of classical neutrality, and thus to membership by a neutralitized state.
For example, it commits its members to furnishing troops, to supplying war material, and to
making available supply depots and communications facilities on their territory, all of which would
be in breach of specific norms of wartime neutrality, and of the derived secondary duties of
permanent neutrality in peacetime. See supra text accompanying notes 22, 27, 58, 60.
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unable to obtain exemptions from collective enforcement.218 In a purely legal
analysis, after all, the contemplated operation of the U.N. enforcement system
cannot be discounted, and it is sophistic tojustify permanently neutral membership
of the United Nations on the ground that these states can claim (or be granted) an
exemption from collective security at the very moment when the organization
begins to operate in its intended capacity.2 19
Throughout their existence, however, neither NATO nor the United Nations has
2 18 Under the U.N. Charter, once the Security Council engages the collective security system,
which may include the use of force in response to armed aggression, each member state is
technically obligated to give the organization every assistance in whatever measures it adopts. See
U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para 5; see also OPPENHEIM supra note 6, § 292d, at 647. Under this system,
therefore, a discretionary posture ofnonparticipation, abstention, and strict impartiality (the juristic
marks of classical neutrality) would appear to be impermissible. But the Charter allows the
Security Council to adopt measures not involving armed force, such as economic sanctions, as well
as measures that do involve military force. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 41-42. In the former case, if
there is a declared war-but not otherwise-compulsory economic sanctions against the aggressor
belligerent, if extended to include the private supply of military goods, would violate Articles 7
and 9 of the Hague Convention V and XIII. See supra note 23. As to nonmilitary goods, I have
shown that there is no general duty of econornic neutrality in wartime, but policy options such as
the Swiss courant nonnal would be closed offto would-be neutrals. See supra text accompanying
note 39 (discussing courant normal). In the case of armed force, the duty to participate is made
conditional on special agreements with the United Nations to supply military units and ancillary
rights such as rights of passage. See U.N. CHARTER art. 43, para 1. Technically, neutrality remains
possible while such agreements remain pending-and indeed none has ever been concluded. See
Swiss U.N. REPORT, supra note 12, at 104; see also HOFFMAN, supra note 10, at 82. The debate
on whether assistance treaties must be concluded is unresolved. See HANS BLIX, SOVEREIGNTY,
AGGREssION AND NEurRALrrY 46 (1970) (dismissing compulsory participation in military action
as "a remote possibility"); HANS KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNrrED NATIONs: A CRrITCAL
ANALYSIS OF ITS FuNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS 756 (1950) (denying such a duty); Paul Fr&lric,
Address, in LEGAL ASPECTS OFNEUTRALITY, supra note 15, at 70, 74 (describing a "generali[z]ed"
obligation to give aid). But see ROTTER, supra note 22, at 173-74 (noting that proportionate
financial liability of a neutral state for U.N. enforcement operations could constitute a grant of
financial assistance for military purposes to the state being assisted by sanctions, violating the
classical neutrality duties of nonparticipation and abstention).
2 19 The United States, in the Gulf War in 1991, took the position that all states, irrespective
of intended neutrality, were obliged to provide assistance in support of the Gulf operation in
response to collective action authorized by the Security Council. See SuBEDI, supra note 78, at
155-56. Unlike its mandatory resolution on economic sanctions against Iraq, however, the U.N.
Security Council's resolution on force was not mandatory. See U.N. Security Council Resolutions
661 (Aug. 6, 1990) and 670 (Sept. 25, 1990) (applying economic sanctions), available in United
Nations: Security Council Resolutions Concerning Iraqi Aggression, 29 I.L.M. 1323, 1325, 1334
(1990); Resolution 678 (Nov. 29, 1990) (authorizing force), available in United Nations: Security
Council Resolutions Concerning Iraqi Aggression, 29 I.L.M. 1560, 1565 (1990); see also Subedi,
supra note 2, at 254.
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altered its founding constitutive treaty. Accordingly, the likely incompatibility
between the law and policy of permanent neutrality on the one hand, and NATO or
the United Nations (in the plenary reach of its powers) on the other, has been an
enduring-and normatively static-fact of empirical and jurisprudential life for the
European neutrals220 Through individual but similar expressions of law and policy,
the neutrals have evolved a predictable response to the quite distinct challenges that
these two organizations have posed to their status. All five have remained out of
NATO, which has developed beyond a parchment promise of defensive assistance
into a full military organization.221 And all of the European neutrals except
220 Even as NATO attempts to reinvent itself as a crisis management infrastructure, its core
mission remains expressed in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the enduring Atlanticist
promise of mutual defense. See North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 217, 63 Stat. at 2244, 34
U.N.T.S. at 246. This automatic reciprocal assistance pledge is carefully modeled on the language
of Article 51 ofthe U.N. Charter, which preserves the "inherent' right of individual or collective
self-defense by the victims of unlawful aggression. Nevertheless, self-defense was envisaged as
an interim measure to occupy the time lag until the U.N.'s collective security system could be
activated. See Hirano, supra note 15, at 13. If the U.N. system could not work, NATO's self-
defense mechanism would prevail and endure by default. While the Charter does permit regional
security arrangements, see U.N. CHARTER, art. 52, it is specious to argue that NATO, in its original
incamation as a "closed, exclusive and hostile" counterweight to the Warsaw Pact, complied with
the demands of a collective security system that requires the Security Council to judge aposteriori,
rather than a priori, whether a country is an aggressor. See Hirano, supra note 15, at 13. Even
more at odds with the U.N. blueprint for regional security, Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty
completely ignores the clear precondition set in the Charter that "no enforcement action shall be
taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the
Security Council ... :" U.N. CHARTER art. 53, para 1. The Kosovo crisis in 1999 lends weight to
the suspicion that this reservation of autonomy was no mere technical omission. See Lawyer Sam's
War, ECONOMIsT, Apr. 24, 1999, at 30 (noting that NATO neither sought nor obtained a U.N.
Security Council mandate to intervene in Kosovo); see also HOFFMAN, supra note 10, at 128
(discounting the possibility that the Security Council would ever repudiate the actions of a major
power).
221 NATO today has an integrated military force under a single supreme commander
supported by an international staff. Its members have a common infiastructure of airfields,
communications, and pipelines, without which a modem army cannot fimction, as well as joint
management of defense production and the standardization of hardware, agreement on the
reconciliation of the allies' defense programs with their national resources, and regular and highly
visible joint war exercises. Yet NATO's founding treaty was laconic on the subject ofinternational
machinery. Article 9 mentions a council, authorized to set up such subsidiary bodies as may be
necessary, and a defense committee to design measures to implement the collective self-defense
system. Nothing is said about ajoint intemational staff or combined military forces under ajoint
command, or indeed about the many other committees, military and civil, all of which developed
later. North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 217, 63 Stat. at 2245, 34 U.N.T.S. at 247. See A.H.
ROBERTSON, EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS, COOPERATION, INrEGRATION, UNIFICATION 90 (2d ed.
1966); see also Jane Stromseth, Remarks on Structuring a New Security Regime in Europe, 85
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Switzerland have accepted membership of the United Nations Organization,
emboldened originally by the cold war deadlock that made it virtually impotent for
most of its history.222 The neutrals probably would not share-or would choose not
to share-my characterization of the United Nations as a grand reciprocal military
alliance. 223 Nevertheless, its enforcement system, if fully deployed, is nothing
less 224 In any event, the neutrals (with the exception of Switzerland) have evidently
been prepared to discount the legal and political cost to neutrality of infrequent
PROC. AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 277, 281 (1991). For a recent appraisal of NATO's post-Cold War
strategic evolution and logistical endowment, published to honor the organization's 50th
anniversary, see generally Knights in ShiningArmor?: A Survey ofNA TO, ECONOMIsT, Apr. 24,
1999.
222 The legal impact of the political stalemate on the U.N. Security Council was that the law
of classical neutrality, as Norton has shown, was invoked in a wide range of armed conflicts after
1945. See Norton, supra note 6, at 257; see also Lys~n, supra note 45, at 235-36; Subedi, supra
note 2, at 250; Detlev Vagts & Patrick M. Norton, Neutrality: Changing Concepts and Practices,
83 AM. J. INT'L L. 647, 648 (1989) (book review). But, in the shadow of the nonaggression
ideology of the U.N. Charter, postwar manifestations of classical neutrality have been piecemeal,
ambivalent, and inconsistent. See GREEN, supra note 6, at 80: Norton, supra note 6, at 276
(discussing diminished significance of terminology, in light of widespread state practice against
specific declarations of war). See also supra note 6 (discussing status of war under the U.N.
Charter).
223 Nevertheless, while not stipulating that the United Nations is a military alliance, in the
wake of communism the Austrian govemment has acknowledged a more candidly interdependent
view of its U.N. obligations. See Lahodynsky, supra note 147, at 24 (quoting former Austrian
President Klestil's view that "[w]hen the members of the United Nations act against an aggressor,
there can be no question of neutrality, only of solidarity"). If one shifts the ideological compass
only slightly, one encounters Gustav Ddniker's thesis that neutrality and solidarity are in fact
inseparable, on the premise that a neutral state's behavior is beneficial to the political calculations
and expectations of its neighbors. This forced union of two geopolitically distinct ideas, however,
smacks of neutrality apologetics. See Daniker, supra note 26, at 6.
224 See Rudolf L. Bindschedler, Das Problem der Beteiligung der Schweiz an Sanktionen der
Vereinigten Nationen, Besonders im Falle Rhodesiens [The Problem of Switzerland's
Participation in UnitedNations Sanctions, Especially in the Case ofRhodesia], 28 ZErrSCHRIFT
FOR AUSLANDiSCHES OFFENTICHES RECHT UND VOLKERREcHT [JOURNAL OF FOREiGN PUBLIC
LAW AD INTERNATIONAL LAW] 1 (1968). In principle, no member ofthe United Nations would
be entitled, at its mere discretion, to remain neutral in a war in which the Security Council has
identified a particular state as guilty of a breach of the peace or an act of aggression, and in which
the Council has called on the member concerned either to declare war on that state or to take
military action indistinguishable from war. This is the cumulative effect of Article 2(5) of the U.N.
Charter (in which members undertake to give the United Nations every assistance in any Charter-
based action), of Article 25 (in which members undertake to accept and to comply with decisions
of the Security Council), and Chapter VII of the Charter (dealing with enforcement action). See
OPPENHEIM, supra note 6, § 292d, at 647. But see supra note 218 (discussing disputed-and still
conjectural-question of Council waivers for neutralitized states).
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collective action in order to participate in a forum that is without peer in allowing
them to transform official reticence into a positive asset to the world community.
They have participated, for example, in U.N. peacekeeping operations, an extra-
Charter activity invented by former Secretary General Dag Hammarskj61d. 26
B. Neutralitization and Dynamic Multilateralism: The European Union
When four European neutrals (Austria, Finland, Ireland, and Sweden) acceded
to the EU, they were aware of an institutional disjunction-absent from NATO and
the United Nations-between what it had already become as a supranational
organization of sovereign states, and what it might become in the future. Thus, one
of the most potent political arguments directed against compatibility between
permanent neutrality and the EUI has been that economic integration is merely a
prelude to the eventual full political union of its member states. Indeed, as
Lisein-Norman has noted, a clear separation of the political and economic aspects
of membership of the EEC "can scarcely be made."2 27 While, as I discuss below,
the configuration of a future military/defense union is already becoming apparent,
I will focus initially on aspects of the EU's existing economic integration, apparent
textually from the earliest founding treaty, that could have been in normative
conflict with the law of permanent neutrality. I will also demonstrate how the
restricted escape clauses in the EU treaty structure would not have availed
225 Immediately prior to the Gulf War in 1991, the U.. Security Council under Resolution
661, Aug. 6, 1990, and Resolution 670, Sept. 25, 1990, mandated"all [s]tates" (not only member
states) to impose economic sanctions on Iraq. Paragraph 5 of Resolution 661 (1990) called upon
"all [s]tates, including [s]tates non-members of the United Nations, to act strictly in accordance
with the provisions of the present resolution notwithstanding any contract entered into or licence
granted before the date of the present resolution." United Nations: Security Council Resolutions
Concerning Iraqi Aggression, 29 I.L.M. 1325, 1334 (1990). Austria and Switzerland complied
with the resolution, although each insisted that it was doing so autonomously (and, in
Switzerland's case, without any legally binding condition of U.N. membership). See SuBEDI,
supra note 78, at 155 n.76. Austria even allowed Allied overflights. See supra note 151; see also
Subedi, supra note 2, at 252.
226 Though peacekeeping (as opposed to enforcement) is unmentioned in the U.N. Charter,
it has become the predominant form of U.N. military activity. It presents no legal impediment to
permanent neutrality, however, because neither the Security Council nor the Secretary General has
the capacity directly to deploy, command, or control troops for enforcement purposes. See IRISH
GOVERNMENT WHIrE PAPER, supra note 203, 7.29. Moreover, all but two of the over 20 U.N.
peacekeeping operations established between 1992 and 1999 related to intrastate conflicts, see id.
at 7.8, and the law of permanent neutrality technically has never been applicable to these
conflicts. See infra text accompanying note 341. See generally Suy, supra note 197, at 258-65
(discussing U.N. peacekeeping operations).
227 See LISEIN-NORMAN, supra note 176, at 114.
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neutralitized states against the supremacy of their EU obligations.228 Thereafter, I
will examine how the EU's evolving common foreign and security-and defense-
policies have affected the potential incompatibility of the EU's economic
obligations; while recent rounds of treaty-making diplomacy have hardly produced
models of textual transparency, there appears to have been a marginal narrowing in
incompatibility in favor of the neutral members, but at the greater eventual cost of
a military superstructure that could overwhelm the legal, political, and strategic
coherence of their neutralitized status.
1. A Normative Clash: Permanent Neutrality and the EU's Existing
Economic System
Two features of the European Community (EC) Treaty, the EU's principal
economic treaty,229 directly threaten future compliance by neutral members with the
wartime duty of impartiality, specifically with respect to the private supply of war
materials. The first feature is the customs union which, according to Article 23 of
228 A brief explanatory comment is needed here on the thicket of EU treaty nomenclature.
The European Union, as such, was formed by the Treaty on European Union (referred to in this
Article by its popular name, 'Maastricht Treaty), Feb. 7, 1992, OJ. (C 224/1), in effect since Nov.
1, 1993. Article A of the Maastricht Treaty establishes the EU as "founded on" the European
Economic Community (retitled the "European Community" by Article G(1)), the European Coal
and Steel Community, and the European Atomic Energy Community, as well as a formal process
of intergovernmental cooperation in the fields of foreign and security policy (Title V of the
Maastricht Treaty) and justice and home affairs (Title VI). The Maastricht Treaty has been
amended by the new Treaty of Amsterdam (referred to in this Article as the "Amsterdam Treaty"),
Oct 2,1997, OJ. (C 340/1), in effect since July 1, 1999. See generall, Symposium, The European
Union and the Treaty of Amsterdam, 22 FORDHAM INr'LLJ. Sl (1999) (offering a timely analysis
of recent changes in the EU treaty structure). The "European Community" (EC) is the creation of
the Treaty of Rome (referred to in this Article as the "EC Treaty"), in effect since Jan. 1, 1958 (as
amended by the Maastricht Treaty and most recently by the Amsterdam Treaty). The original text
of the Treaty of Rome appears at 298 U.N.T.S. 11. In this Article, I use the most recent
consolidated version of the Maastricht Treaty and the EC Treaty. Both of these treaties have
reconfigured numbering systems that reflect revisions made by the Amsterdam Treaty, and
(despite great reluctance to depart from the familiar) I use the new numbering in the main text; with
footnoted cross-references to the old system. See Consolidated Version of the EC Treaty, 1997
O.J. (340/1), 37 I.L.M. 79 (1998); Consolidated Version of the Maastricht Treaty, 1997 OJ.
(340/1), 37 I.L.M. 67 (1998). For an insightful panorama of the EU treaty superstructure after
Amsterdam, see generally Roger J Goebel, The Treaty of Amsterdam in Historical Perspective,
22 FORDHAM INT'LLJ. S7 (1999). Goebel notes how the renumbering ofthe treaties will create
"considerable confusion for practitioners, academics, and students in the short term." Id. at S31.
229 See supra note 228 (explaining EU treaty structure).
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the EC Treaty,23° is the basis of the European common market It prohibits customs
duties and charges of equivalent effect on imports and exports between member
states, and adopts a common customs tariff for their relations with third counries.231
Competence to alter or suspend the duties in the common customs tariff is reposed
by Article 26 of the EC Treaty232 in the Council of Ministers, the EU's principal
legislative body, acting by a weighted majority called a qualified majority.233 In
international law, considerations of neutrality apply only to the imposition of export
duties.234 The duty of impartiality with respect to the private export of war
materials23 5 could be seriously affected by the EU's trade policy on exports, because
the competence to regulate export duties has obviously been transferred to the
Brussels machinery. This competence could, in the event of a neutralitized member
state declaring classical neutrality, lead against the neutral's will to such an
imbalanced imposition of duties as to amount in practical terms to the prevention
of private export to one belligerent and the encouragement of such exports to its
adversary.23 6
23 0 TREATY ESrABLISHNGTHE EUROPEAN COMMUNrY, Feb. 7,1992, OJ. (C 224) 1 (1992),
[1992] 1 C.M.L.R 573 art. 23 (formerly art. 9) 1992 [hereinafter EC TREATY]. As previously
explained, this Article uses a new consolidated numbering system for the EU treaties adopted in
the Amsterdam Treaty. See supra note 228. When the new numbering system is cited, as in the
present note, I include a parenthetical reference to the former-and more familiar-number.
231 Customs duties and charges of equivalent effect were removed during the transition
period to July 1, 1968. The common customs tariffwas in place by decision ofthe EU's principal
legislative body, the Council of Ministers, from June 28, 1968. See Council Decision 66/532/EEC,
1966 OJ. SPEC. ED. 2971.
232 EC TREATY art. 26 (formerly art. 28).
233 EC TREATY art. 205(2) (formerly art. 148(2)). Each member state receives a weighted
vote fraction from a total of 82 (for example, Germany has 10 votes, the Netherlands, 5). For a
qualified majority, there must be 62 votes in favor. Sometimes, this rule is doubled-locked by a
requirement that there must be at least 10 members in favor. See id. See TREVORC. HARTLEY, TE
FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNIY LAW 19-21 (4th ed. 1998).
234 The law of neutrality imposes no duty of equal treatment between belligerents when a
neutral is deciding its policy of importation in wartime. Indeed, no objections were raised against
the participation ofneutralitized states in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATI).
Because, according to Article I(1) of the GATT, each country's negotiated concessions apply
equally to all signatories (the "most-favored nation" clause (MFN), see General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. I(1), 61 Stat. A3, A12, 55 U.N.T.S. 187, 196, 198), in the
event of neutrality there would beno guarantee of equal treatment for a belligerent which stayed
outside the GAIT system. See SCHWEITZER, supra note 16, at 220.
235 See supra text accompanying note 23 (discussing private trade in matdriel de guerre).
236 These actions would probably violate Articles 7 and 9(1) of Hague Conventions V and
XIII. See supra note 23 (discussing conventions).
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A second problematic feature of the EC Treaty is Article 133,23 7 which ordains
a common commercial policy that gives the Council of Ministers power, again
acting by a weighted majority, to conclude tariff and trade agreements with
nonmember states and generally to set the EU's export policy.238 In the event of a
conflict where classical neutrality might be invoked, the Council could act by a
weighted majority, overriding the objection of neutral members, to adopt a
unilateral prohibition on exports, or to take foreign economic measures of a political
character which could place restrictions on the export of arms and other matiriel de
guerre, but would exempt EU member state belligerents 23 9 A neutralitized member
would be obligated not to all6w private trade with a common extra-Union enemy.
Although there is no generalized economic neutrality in wartime,240 provisions for
trade in military goods properly so-called are firmly entrenched in the law of
neutrality, and the neutralitized state must not abandon its duty to ensure that private
trade in arms and matiriel de guerre takes place impartially between the
belligerents. 241 It would not be hard to see Article 133 being used also to approve,
237 EC TREATY art. 133 (formerly art. 113).
238 For example, Kartos mentioned the EU's common market in nuclear fuels and ore.
Sweden's large nuclear industry might be obligated, within the EU, to export these dual-use
materials to a belligerent member state, while being prohibited from supplying a nonmember
belligerent-a violation of the duty of impartiality with respect to private manufacturers, and of
the duty of abstention to the extent that the Swedish state were involved as a producer and
exporter. See Kartos, supra note 184, at 680; see also Lys6n, supra note 45, at 248 (noting that EU
member states have lost the power to pursue independent foreign trade policies).
239 The EU regularly applies economic sanctions as a weapon of foreign policy (for example,
against the Soviet Union following the invasion of Afghanistan, against Argentina during the
Falklands conflict with an EU member, the United Kingdom, and against Syria for terrorist
activities). Austria, in fact, amended its Constitution as of January 1, 1995, to authorize
"participation in measures with which the economic relations with one or more third countries are
suspended, restricted or entirely terminated." See CONSTuITIoNS OF THE WORLD, supra note 207,
at 24 (reprinting text of Article 23f of the revised Austrian Constitution, which also authorizes
Austria's participation in the EU's common foreign and security policy). The amendment appears
to be facultative; presumably the Austrian government is not precluded from taking account of the
special conditions that attach to trade in arms. See also Robert . McCartney, NeutralAustria Seeks
Political, Economic Balance in Weighing Decision to Join Economic Community, WASH. POST,
July 22, 1988, at B2.
240 See supra text accompanying note 30 (discussing wartime economic neutrality).
241 Military goods, in the context of common Article 7 of Hague Conventions V and XIII,
include "arms, munitions of war, or, in general ... anything which can be of use to an army or a
fleet." ROBERTS & GtJEFF, supra note 13, at 64; see supra text accompanying note 37. Council
Regulation 2603/69, 1969 O.J. SPEC. ED. (L 324/25) 590, on the creation of a common scheme
of exports, includes in its Annex certain goods (petroleum, crude aluminum, parts for railway
vehicles, airships, certain types of watercraft, etc.) which would certainly be embraced by common
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by weighted majority, public (i.e., state) military assistance to a preferred
belligerent, either on behalf of the EU as a whole or selected members. In either
case, a neutralitized state would have its wartime obligation of abstention
compromised, at least indirectly, by the binding effect of the Council's decision.2 42
2. No Avenue ofEscape: The EU's Narrow Exceptions Provisions
Faced with specific incompatibilities between the EU and the law ofpermanent
neutrality, the Austrian government pursued a typical prophylactic strategy of
permanently neutral states contemplating membership of international
organizations, namely, the escape clauses.243 The remedy of ultimate withdrawal,
a staple of arguments rationalizing neutral membership of the United Nations,244
was not available. The EC Treaty, by its own terms, is concluded "for an unlimited
period. 245 That means, according to Dieter Koch, that "the Treaty continues to have
validity even in the case of war." 46Nevertheless, the EU treaty system is not yet a
reciprocal defensive military alliance, where a provision allowing a signatory to
suspend treaty obligations in the event of war or armed conflict would subvert the
very purpose of the alliance.2 47 It remains, strictly speaking, an economic union with
specific military/defense aspirations and some infratructure supporting those
aspirations already in place, and special arrangements for the event of war might
seem desirable even from the perspective ofnonneutralitized members. A loosening
of the EC Treaty would certainly be possible under the general conditions laid down
in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, including by agreement of the
Article 7, and for which quantitative restrictions will apply. See SCHWErrzER, supra note 16, at
249. Because the common policy permits unilateral restrictions on exports of these products to
third countries, and allows a concomitant liberalization of intra-Union trade, the Regulation is
patently in breach of the impartiality nile encoded in common Article 9(1) of Hague Conventions
V and XIII, and therefore of the laws of classical and permanent neutrality. The Regulations
goveming imports are not relevant, because the provisions of Hague Conventions V and XHI do
not apply to imports. See supra note 234.
2 42 Seesupra text accompanying note 22 (discussing duty of abstention).
243 It is not clear that the Austrian government was focused on the specific incompatibilities
identified in the preceding section. More likely, Austria had in mind the likely incompatibilities
that would be caused by deepening common defense arrangements.
244 On the issue of withdrawal from the United Nations, see LELAND M. GOODRICH Er AL.,
CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: COMMENTARY AND DOCUMENTS 12-13,74-76 (3rd rev. ed.
1969).
245 EC TREATY art. 312 (formerly art. 240).
246 See KOCH, supra note 26, at 129; see also Lys~n, supra note 45, at 245.
247 See supra text accompanying note 217 (discussing the paradigmatic NATO alliance).
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member states or using the doctrine of clausula rebus sic stantibus.248 But these
contingencies of suspension would be too speculative for a legally permanently
neutral state seeking to measure the prospective reach of its commitment upon
accession.
Article 297, a specific safeguard provision that occurs late in the EC Treaty,249
served as the premise for Austria's plea of compatibility. Built into this Article is
an assumption that a member state may take measures "in the event of serious
internal disturbances affecting the maintenance of law and order, in the event of
war, serious international tension constituting a threat of war, or in order to carry out
obligations it has accepted for the purpose of maintaining peace and international
security."250 I use the guarded word "assumption" because the Article's chief goal
is plainly to provide for consultation between member states to prevent competitive
distortions caused by one state's emergency measures.251 That process of
consultation, however, does not restrict in any way the scope of the underlying
measures, which appears to rest within the total discretion of the member state that
adopts them.252 The self-responsibility of member states for their security does tend
to imply that they are entitled to choose the system that optimally meets their
requirements for internal security-and that system could in theory include a policy,
or a legal obligation, of permanent neutrality. The right to choose neutrality is
therefore created implicitly rather than explicitly, but for some authors (and for
Austria), Article 297 offered a reliable mechanism to assure future compatibility.25 3
24 8 It is outside the scope of this Article to consider the implications for traditional treaty
suspension and termination of the transfer of sovereign perogatives that is the jurisprudential
signature of the EU. For an analysis of the constitutional integrity of the EU, see generally J.H.I.
Weiler & Ulrich R. Haltern, The Autonomy ofthe Community Legal Order-Through the Looking
Glass, 37 HARv. INT'L L.J. 411 (1996).
24 9 EC TREATY art. 297 (formerly art. 224).
25 0 Id. Article 297 was unamended by the Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties.
251 Thus, the Article opens by providing that "Member States shall consult each other with
a view to taking together the steps needed to prevent the functioning of the common market being
affected by measures which a Member State may be called upon to take in the event of' the
discussed emergencies. EC TREATY art. 297.
252 Binswanger asserted that Article 297 and its allied safeguard provisions together provided
an assurance that the pre-Maastricht EC Treaty envisaged only an economic organization, and
therefore afforded its adherents no guarantees as to their security. See Hans Christoph Binswanger,
Ist die Aufrechterhaltung der dauernen Neutralitidt mit einem Vollbeitritt zur EWG zu
vereinbaren? [Can The Maintenance of Permanent Neutrality Be Harmonized with Full
Membership ofthe [EU?], in ThE NEUTRALS IN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, supra note 17, at 177,
186.
253 See, e.g., Hans Christoph Binswanger & Hans Mayrzedt, Was wird aus den Neutralen
bei der Erweiterung der EWG? [Fhat Will Happen to the Neutrals After the EEC Enlarges?], 25
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Objections to this permissive view, however, came from two sources, one
political and one textual. The political objection was from the European
Commission, the EU's executive body charged with negotiating new member entry.
In its opinion in 1991 on Austria's application for EU membership, the Commission
rejected reliance on an Article 297 exemption as a mechanism to preserve neutrality
in situations, for example, when the EU collectively sought to impose economic
sanctions even in peacetime and outside the United Nations framework.254 The
EUROPA-ARCHIV [EUROPE ARCHIVES] 347, 352 (1970); see also Luif, supra note 211, at 81
(noting arguments that Austria's neutrality should be accepted as an obligation undertaken for the
purpose of maintaining international peace and security under Article 297 of the EC Treaty).
Binswanger and Mayrzedt also mentioned Article 296 of the EC Treaty, formerly Article 223. See
Binswanger & Mayrzedt, supra, at 352. Article 296(1)(b), also unamended by the Maastricht and
Amsterdam treaties, provides that:
[A]ny Member State may take such measures as it considers necessary for the protection of
the essential interests of its security which are connected with the production of or trade in
arms, munitions and war material; such measures shall not adversely affect the conditions of
competition in the common market regarding products which are not intended for specifically
military purposes.
EC TREATY art. 296(1)(b). The European Commission, the executive body of the EU, has
attempted to give a very narrow interpretation of products intended "for specifically military
purposes" so as not to restrict competition within the EU. See EUROPEAN COMMIssION, NINTH
REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 72 (1980) (noting disapplication of Article 296 in patent
dispute). Thus, even though this provision on its face would potentially ease some of the export
incompatibilities identified in the preceding section, a neutral member might nevertheless be
obliged to supply a number of commodities having the character of dual-use or strategic
importance to a fellow member state at war and would be prohibited from doing the same for the
other belligerent. A conflict could only arise, therefore, in relation to goods which are not
incorporated in this list. But the possibility for conflict is very real, because common Article 7 of
the Hague Conventions V and XIII speaks of"anything which will be of use to an army or a fleet'
and thus comprises more than arms, munitions, and war material. Moreover, actions taken by
member states under Article 296 (as under Article 297) are subject to review and possible reversal
by the EU supranational institutions. See infra text accompanying note 257. For these reasons,
Article 296 would not by itself be a sufficient safeguard. Ad hoc adjustments of the list, however,
are excluded by the fact that Article 296(2) provides that the Council of Ministers must act
unanimously to "make changes" in the list.
254 See Lahodynsky, supra note 147, at 27. The proposition advanced by the Austrian
govemment; that neutrality would contribute to the maintenance of peace and international security
and hence could exempt Austria from treaty obligations, was dismissed by the European
Commission in its opinion ofAugust 1, 1991, as simply unacceptable. See European Communities
Commission, The Challenge ofEnlargement: Commission Opinion on Austria's Application for
Membership, BULL. EUR. COMMUNMEs, Supp. 4/92, at 17 [hereinafterMembership Opinion]. See
also Lys~n, supra note 45, at 249. The Austrian attitude to EU compatibility has had undertones
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textual objection was premised on a parsing of Article 298 of the EC Treaty.255 This
provision requires the Commission, if the measures taken under Article 297 distort
the conditions of competition in the common market, to consult "with the State
concemed" and to "examine how these measures can be adjusted to the rules laid
down in this Treaty." 256 The putative consultations would not in themselves
interrupt neutrality, but Article 298 has a second paragraph which provides that the
Commission or any member state "may bring the matter directly before the Court
of Justice if it considers that another Member State is making improper use of the
powers provided for in [Article 297]." 257
The procedure explicitly short circuits the usual complex stages of consultation
and reply that must be completed before the court becomes seized of a Commission
or member state challenge to another member state's actions.258
Thus, a legally neutralitized member state may have its performance of the
duties of permanent neutrality evaluated, and perhaps prevented, by its treaty-based
submission to the binding jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice.2 59 There is
no anterior reason why the court should accept that "obligations... accepted for the
purpose of maintaining peace and international security," the operative words of
Article 297, should include neutralitization.260 That phrase may just as-if not
of complacency, if not hauteur. Austrian commentators, for example, argued for a political veto-
based on the dubious legality of the EU's "Luxembourg Compromise" insisted upon by President
de Gaulle in the late 1960s---that would enable neutral members to prevent any majority decision
of the EU Council of Ministers that wouldjeopardize neutrality. See Luif supra note 211, at 80-81
(discussing views of publicists). Ironically, the common foreign and security policy-in its post-
Amsterdam Treaty guise-may for the foreseeable future assure Austria precisely the legal veto
that it wanted, at the very moment when it feels tempted to yield its historical adhesion to
neutrality.
255 EC TREATY art. 298 (formerly art. 225). See KOCH, supra note 26, at 128.
256 EC TREATY art. 298 (formally art. 225). The phrasing is ambiguous-it might mean the
state which takes the measures, or a state whose conditions of competition have been affected by
them.
257 Id. (unamended by the Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties).
258 EC TREATY arts. 226, 227 (formerly arts. 169, 170). Thus, the Commission need not
deliver a "reasoned opinion," and a member state need not first request the Commission to do so.
See id.
259 Hummer regarded the consultation provision of Article 298(1) of the EC Treaty as
excluding the likelihood of a reference to the court under paragraph 2, but that theoretical
possibility remains and must be considered. See Waldemar Hummer, Neutralitatsrechtliche
Erwaigungen im Hinblick auf eine Mitwirkung an der EWG [Neutrality Cqnsiderations Arising
from Cooperation with the [EU]], in THENEUTRALS IN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, supra note 17,
at 162, 173.
260 However, this was certainly the expectation of the Austrian government. See supra note
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more-plausibly refer to the active obligations of collective security within the
United Nations.2 61
3. Site ofDanger: Permanent Neutrality Within the EU's Evolving
Security Policy
a. The Neutrality Enigma
A close legal reading of the founding EC Treaty, therefore, exposes provisions
with troubling implications for neutralitized states, but especially for states
professing legal permanent neutrality. In this respect, Switzerland and Austria, the
two European states for which neutrality has been most authentically an
international legal obligation, pursued strongly divergent practices after both signed
economic association agreements with the EU in 1972.262 Switzerland resisted any
261 See Lys n, supra note 45, at 249. As Lys n noted, the language of Article 297 of the EC
Treaty that concerns maintenance of international peace and security is that of the U.N. Charter.
Because Article 103 of the Charter declares its superiority to all other treaty obligations, this
exemption was required in order to allow the member states to comply with their obligations under
the Charter. See KELSEN, supra note 218, at 111 (discussing implications of Article 103). Indeed,
the EU's Court of Justice did give a strict interpretation of Article 297 (previously numbered
Article 224) in Case 222/84, Marguerite Johnston v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster
Constabulary, 1986 E.C.R. 1651, % 26, 27, 60. Manfred Rotter, a skeptic about the exemptive
power of Articles 296 and 297, pointed to the ad hoc nature of these Articles, which allow specific
measures to cope with specific exigencies, but do not propose any complementary emergency
action by the EU institutions. The structure of the Articles, in Rotter's view, aimed less at making
concessions to the need for emergency measures than at preventing the irregular functioning of the
EU caused by these measures. See ROTTER, supra note 22, at 224. He concluded, therefore, that
there would be no reason why the Court of Justice, instead of adjudicating the compatibility of the
measures with permanent neutrality, would not simply dispose of the issue by deciding that no
"objective" state of war existed to justify invocation of the law of neutrality. See id. Indeed, for
political reasons, the court might choose to do precisely that.
262 The history of the neutral states' repeated commercial negotiations with the EU lies
outside the scope of this Article. On the association agreements signed in 1972 by Switzerland,
Austria, Sweden, and Finland, see LISEIN-NORMAN, supra note 176, at 36,49. See also VERDROSS,
supra note 23, at 64; Hanspeter Neuhold, Permanent Neutrality in Contemporary International
Relations: A Comparative Perspective, I IRISH STUD. INT'L AFF. 13, 21 (1982). A special
dimension of Austria's relationship with the EU has been its possible conflict with Article 4 of the
state treaty, see supra text accompanying note 128, which prohibits direct or indirect political or
economic union between Austria and Germany. See AuSTRIAN CONSTTUTION (1983), supra note
60, at 98; see also KOCH, supra note 26, at 100. Koch argued that, other things being equal, Article
4 raised no obstacle to Austrian accession to the EC Treaty, which provides that the European
Community has "legal personality." EC TREATY art. 281 (formerly art 210). This provision would
make the European Community a separate international law entity from "Germany," and Germany
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further deepening of its economic and institutional relationship with the EU.263
Austria, joined by Sweden and Finland, applied for full membership in 1991.264 For
these three states (and for Ireland in 1973),265 the final decision for accession to the
EU hinged not on neutrality but on economic pressures, including the demands of
foreign investors wishing access to EU markets.266 In their approach to the EU,
indeed, it can be fairly charged that the member neutrals acted out of selfish
motives, impairing their geostrategic reliance on neutrality and whatever residual
sense of stability and security it provided in their respective regions.267
The EU responded pragmatically, but also prudentially, to the wave of neutral
state applications in the early 1990s. In considering Austria's application, for
example, the European Commission acknowledged the fact of Austria's permanent
neutrality, but suggested that the problems of conflict between neutrality and the
eventual and unforeseeable shape of the EU's legal and institutional infrastructure-
the so-called acquis communautaire268-- should not prove ultimately
in any event is a minority voting member within the voting system established under the EC
Treaty. See KOCH, supra note 26, at 100. Koch was writing, however, before the Maastricht Treaty
created an explicit European Union, an amorphous and complex organism which does not as yet
enjoy an autonomous international legal personality. See supra note 228 (discussing EU treaty
structure).
263 Switzerland, by referendum, rejected a second generation association status, called the
European Economic Area (EEA), which the EU originally proposed in 1992. See HAVEL, supra
note 27, at 275-76; see also Marsh, supra note 121. The EEA, to which Austria, Sweden, and
Finland all subscribed, included broad adoption of the acquis communautaire, the accumulated
legal and administrative heritage of the EU. See infra note 268.
264 No doubt the collapse of the Soviet Union vastly improved the prospects for treating
neutrality as an ancillary rather than central question. The French govemment, for example, had
declared as late as December 1991 that Austria could notjoin the EU while maintaining neutrality
toward the Soviet Union. See Paul Taylor, Mitte randBacksAustrian [EU] Entry, Differences on
Neutrality, REUTERLMR. REP., Dec. 3, 1991, at 1 (on file with author).
265 For consideration of Ireland's earlier accession in 1973, see supra text accompanying
note 197-98.
266 See McCartney, supra note 239, at B2; see also Goebel, supra note 187, at 1100
(describing the EU's economic success as the "magnet" that lured the neutrals, not the prospect
of an improved security shelter within the supra-sovereign organization).
267 This was a view shared (prospectively) by one commentator writing just after the 1989
revolutions. See Gasteyger, supra note 126, at 163.
2681Te acquis communautaire, literally the "community's given," is a staple of EU
jurisprudence-inserted into Article B of the Maastricht Treaty-that "conveys the idea that the
institutional structure, scope, policies and rules of the [Union] are to be treated as 'given'
('acquis'), not to be called into question or substantially modified by new States at the time they
enter." Goebel, supra note 187, at 1095. In accession negotiations with the neutral states, the
European Commission included the Union's political objectives, notably the common foreign and
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"insurmountable. 269 Nevertheless, the EU required Austria, Finland, and Sweden
(unlike Ireland two decades before) to sign statements appended to their treaties of
accession subscribing unreservedly to all the objectives of the Treaty on European
Union (the Maastricht Treaty),270 including the future evolution of a common
defense.271 Pragmatism and prudence were both fitting. As G. Porter Elliott has
described it, from the security perspective the neutrals "possessed monetary and
geostrategic resources to assist the development of a common European security
policy, [but also] brought with them the enigmatic third traif' of neutrality.272
Wrapped in the enigma of neutrality-and implicit in the statements appended to
the treaties of accession-was a troubling moral question that neither the
Commission nor the neutral applicants felt prepared to confront directly in the
accession negotiations: Could the prospective neutral members accept the immense
economic benefits of EU membership, while simultaneously refusing to defend the
Union, or any part of it, from external military attack?273
security policy, as nonnegotiable components of the acquis communautaire. See id. at 1096, 1114.
The EU foreign and security policy, in fact, has been specifically described as the acquispolitique.
See Redmond, supra note 184, at 210.
269 See Membership Opinion, supra note 254, at 18.
270 See supra note 228 (discussing EU treaty framework).
271 Treaty... Concerning the Accession of the... Republic of Austria, the Republic of
Finland and the Kingdom of Sweden to the European Union, Aug. 29, 1994, OJ. (94/C 241/07)
381 (Joint Declaration on Common Foreign and Security Policy); see also QUESTION No. H-
191/95 By MR. GAHRTON ON NEuTRAL MEMBER STATES, EuR. PARL. Doc. (95/092) (1995)
(containing question to and answer from the President-in-Office of the Council of Foreign
Ministers). In 1972, during Ireland's application process, the prospect of a common defense
appeared only dimly on the EU's future political horizon. See MEMBERSHmP OF THE EUROPEAN
COM4UNrINES: IMPLICAIONS FOR IRELAND, Prl. 1110 (1970), at 6 [hereinafter IRISH GOVERNMENT
EU MEMBERSI-UP WHITE PAPER] (this White Paper notes the difficulty of foreseeing in precise
terms the political consequences of membership, and whether a conmmon defense would ever be
included).
272 G. Porter Elliott, Neutrality, the Acquis Communautaire and the European Union's
Searchfor a Common Foreign and Security Policy Under Title V of the Maastricht Treaty: The
Accession ofAustria, Finland and Sweden, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COWP. L. 601,603 (1996).
273 See Joe Carroll, Former Taoiseach [Prime Minister] Believes Neutrality Is Morally
Dubious, IRISH TIMES, Feb. 12, 1996, at 4, available in LEXIS, News, By Individual Publication,
Irish Times File. The former Prime Minister in question was Dr. Garret FitzGerald, who left office
in 1987. The Irish government, in fact, had recognized the eventual development of a common
defense obligation as early as 1970. See IRISH GOVERNMENT EU MEMBERSHIP WHITE PAPER,
supra note 271, at 8 (recognizing that, "as the Communities evolve towards their political
objectives, those participating in the new Europe... must be prepared to assist, ifnecessary, in its
defen[s]e").
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b. Toward a New EUSecurity Architecture
By the mid-1990s, however, precisely as Austria, Finland, and Sweden
formally acceded to the Union, the accelerated pace of foreign and security policy
coordination, and the quest for a new European security architecture,274 had begun
to present formidable challenges to an enduring factual or legal permanent neutrality
within the EU.275 Despite the often deserved reputation of the common foreign
policy for pusillanimity and disanay, 76 the EU significantly intensified what has
274 See Christopher BellamyA NeutralAustria "Now in Question, "INDEPENDENT (London),
May 20, 1992, at 13. The notion of a reformulated European security "architecture" has entered
the discourse of the principal institutional organs. See generally Western European Union, Report
ofthe Extraordinary Meeting of the WEU Council ofMinisters, WEU's Role and Place in the New
European Security Architecture, WEU (Feb. 22, 1991) [hereinafter WEU Council Report].
275 The search for common EU foreign and security policies has been characterized as
paradoxical. See Yves Many, Preface to PARADOXES OF EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY ix (Jan
Zielonka ed., 1998). The paradox identified in Many's critique is central to the EU's very existence
as a polity: The EU "considers the rest of the world to be foreign, while at the same time, each
Member State continues to view the other members of the Union-and to some extent to relate to
them-as foreign countries as well." Id. In other words, Mny asserts pointedly, "[t]he new is not
yet bom and the old is still alive." Id. Jan Zielonka's keynote essay reprises the idea ofparadox,
identifying several sources of paradox in the EU's evolving foreign policy (an enormous
normative appeal as a rich, peaceful, and democratic community, but a weak operational and goal-
setting capability; a modernity designed to manage economic and political interdependence that
ineffectively confronts the challenges ofpremodem politics, the kind of military competition and
national interest revealed in the Balkans; a balancing act between "straightforwardness and
ambiguity," the inevitable legacy of a deliberate strategy to keep consensus behind the integration
project). See Jan Zielonka, Constraints, Opportunities and Choices in European Foreign Policy,
Introduction to PARADOXES OF EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY, supra, at 1, 11-12.
276 See Zielonka, supra note 275, at 1 (faulting the EU foreign policy for "[d]isguise,
ambiguity, and a general unwillingness to make bold choices"); see also Assembly of the Western
European Union, Maastricht I: The WEUAssembly's Proposalsfor European Cooperation on
Security and Defence, Reply to the Annual Report of the [EU] Council, Explanatory
Memorandum, WEU Doc. 1564 (May 9, 1997), 7 [hereinafter WEU Assembly Report]
(criticizing taking of political action outside the required institutional framework, including Bosnia
contact group, negotiations with Turkey by five EU states, French proposal to hold talks with
Russia over planned NATO enlargement); Timothy J. Birch & John H. Crotts, European Defense
Integration: National Interests, National Sensitivities, in THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNrrY, supra note 184, at 265,276 (noting how the EU's attempt to broker a cease-fire in
the Yugoslav crisis was marred by independent action by Germany); Elliott, supra note 272, at 622
n.103 (giving examples of individual member states' independent deviations from common
foreign policy positions); John J. Kavanagh, Note, Attempting to Run Before Learning to Walk.
Problems ofthe EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy, 20 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 353,
354 (1997) (criticizing EU's "toothless statements on major foreign policy issues").
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been aptly described as a "journey towards an unknown destination."277 Building
on earlier stages of foreign policy collaboration, the Maastricht Treaty (with
inflections introduced in the new Treaty of Amsterdam),278 developed the structure
for a more cohesive common foreign and security policy (CFSP) for the member
states, but for the moment stopped short of legislating common defense
arrangements. 27 9 Defense integration nonetheless remained an object of specific, if
sometimes obtuse, treatment in both the Maastricht Treaty and the Amsterdam
Treaty. In EU diplomatic echelons, the metronome of progress is often the subtle
textual movement from treaty to treaty. Thus, both the original Maastricht Treaty
and the revised text inserted by the Amsterdam Treaty predict that the CFSP will
include a common defense policy,280 but the Maastricht Treaty's suppositional
"eventual framing" of the policy gives way to a more agenda-conscious phrasing
("progressive framing") in the revised version of the Amsterdam Treaty.281
Similarly, the Maastricht Treaty's speculation that a common defense policy
"might in time lead" to a common defense has been modified by deleting the words
"in time," perceptibly narrowing the indefinite futurity contemplated in the pre-
Amsterdam document 282 While the hermeneutics of this style of treaty-writing can
be elusive, one must always be prepared to find the marks of a courteous
compromise. Thus, the phrase "common defense policy" inserted as a precursor to
a "common defense," and in the absence (typical of EU treaty-making) of
accompanying textual glosses,283 suggests a diplomatic shading intended to mollify
at least two opposing viewpoints about the future shape of EU security policy. A
common defense surely implicates an autonomous, integrated defense
organization-a common EU army and NATO-like deployment capacity-that
does not yet exist but that has strong support from the Franco-German fulcrum of
the EU.284 The more indeterminate idea of a common defense policy responds to
the objections of the United Kingdom, which has insisted that NATO should be
277 eAt the EEC's Door, supra note 122, at 16. The journey/destination metaphor has been
rejected by one EU political scientist as crassly teleological. Because it is not possible to foretell
where the EU foreign policy system is headed, the idea of destination must be 'mere
anthropomorphism." Chistopher Hill, Convergence, Divergence and Dialect s: National Foreign
Policies and the CFSP, in PARADOXES OF EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 275, at 35,48.
278 See supra note 228 (explaining the multiform EU treaty structure).
279 See IRISH GOVERNMENT WHrE PAPER, supra note 203, 2.28.
280 MAASIRCHT TREATY art. 17(1) (formerly art. J.7); AMSTERDAM TREATY art. 1(10).
281 Id.
282 Id.
283 See HARTLEY, supra note 233, at 77 (noting that the travauxpriparatoires for the Treaty
of Rome have never been published).
284 See infra note 287.
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preserved as the organizing mechanism of European defense.285
The goal of a common defense-or even a common defense policy-iight be
understood as mere programmatic rhetoric, were it not for an important institutional
signal in the two most recent EU treaties. In the Maastricht Treaty, the EU restyled
a virtually moribund defensive reciprocal military alliance, the Western European
Union (WEUJ), 286 into a kind of spectral projection of a future EU defense alliance.
The diplomatic triangulation of the EU, WEU, and NATO has not yet yielded
coherence, 287 not least because the WEU lacks the huge command and logistical
285 This position has had the curious consequence of making the United Kingdom (by
default) an ally of the EU's neutral members in resisting future defense integration. See infra note
287. This alliance of convenience, however, was always likely to be temporary as the major EU
military powers continued the process of compromise. Recently, for example, British Prime
Minister Tony Blair has agreed to support a new EU defense coordination initiative that may lead
to an autonomous EU defense capability separate from the NATO framework. See infra note 331.
286 The WEU was founded in 1954, but lay dormant until given fresh impetus by the
development of the EU's common foreign and security policy in the 1980s. It was established by
treaty in 1955. Treaty for Collaboration in Economic, Social and Cultural Matters and for
Collective Self-Defense, Mar. 17, 1948, 211 U.N.T.S. 51, amended by Protocol Modifying and
Completing the Above-Mentioned Treaty, Oct. 23, 1954, 211 U.N.T.S. 342. Article IV of the
treaty establishing the WEU (211 U.N.T.S. at 59), renumbered as Article V by the Protocol of
October 23, 1954 (211 U.N.T.S. at 346), is a copycat ofthe automatic mutual assistance guarantee
in Article 5 of the NATO Treaty, see supra note 217. Moreover, unlike NATO, the WEU is
technically not restricted in its geographical competence. See WEU Council Report, supra note
274, 10; see also Elliott, supra note 272, at 605, 617. All four EU neutrals have an ill-defined
observer status with the WEU. See IRISH GOVERNMENT WHITE PAPER, supra note 203, T 4.70; see
also M. Jos6 Cutileiro, WEU Secretary General, Speech entitled: Mutually Reinforcing Institutions
and Nations: The Role of the WEU (Sept. 4, 1998) (noting that the first joint WEU/NATO
exercises are scheduled for 2000) (on file with author).
2 87 See Hill, supra note 277, at 45 (noting the "imprecise" role of the EU in this triangularity).
The British Labor government of Tony Blair has been unwilling to formally integrate the WEU
into the EU, for fear of displacing NATO as the chiefpillar of European common defense. Indeed,
the United Kingdom allied itself with the four EU neutrals in blocking any proposed integration
within Maaslricht II, the Treaty of Amsterdam. See WEUIntegration in European Union Blocked
at Summit, DEUrSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, June 17, 1997, at 1; see also 1996 EU WHITE PAPER,
supra note 188, at 157 (noting U.K position of maintaining NATO and the United Nations as the
foundations of European security and defense policy). In the U.K. view, in fact, territorial defense
ofthe EU states must remain "a NATO prerogative." Id. On recent U.K. defense policy generally,
see Birch & Crotts, supra note 276, at 266. But see infra note 331 (discussing the new EU defense
coordination initiatives adopted in December 1999). Of course, the perspective of the neutrals is
wholly different from that of the United Kingdom, which is militaristic but disagrees with its EU
nonneutrals partners about the proper institutional and strategic expression of that militarism. The
United Kingdom has viewed the WEU more restrictively as a bridge to NATO, while serving as
a forum for coordination of a European defense capability within the Atlantic Alliance. See id. This
is current received wisdom within the WEU itself. See WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION, REPORT OF
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resources of NATO. Nevertheless, the Amsterdam Treaty now elevates the WEU
to "integral" status in the development of the EU, 288 and anticipates a possible final
integration of the WEU into the EU. 2 89 Somewhat precipitately in light of the
absence of a common defense arrangement the Treaty conscripts the WEU as the
instrument "to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the [EU] that have
defense implications.'" 90 These provisions reflect an inexorable militarization of the
EU, and hence of the foreign policies of the neutral members.2 91 With NATO's role
explicitly protected in the CFSP, 292 the issue of congruent membership among all
THE WEU COUNCIL OF MINIsTERs, EUROPEAN SECURrrY: A COMMON CONCEPT 170, WEU
(Nov. 14, 1995) (describing the "dual vocation" ofthe WEU as the defense component ofthe EU
and the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance). The WEU has used a
different metaphor, describing itself as a "hinge" connecting the EU with NATO. See M. Jos6
Cutileiro, The WEU's Role in the European Security Architecture, Remarks by the WEU Secretary
General (Mar. 20, 1998) (on file with author).
The French/European Commission approach, however, would be to merge fully the EU and
WEU, and indeed the former Commission President, Jacques Delors, advocated transferring
Article V of the WEU Treaty, the mutual assistance provision, see supra note 286, directly into
the EU foundational treaties. See Birch & Crotts, supra note 276, at 266. Under the Kohl
government, this was also official German policy. See WEUAssembly Report, supra note 276,
34. The diversity of member state views about the future of an EU defense policy was apparent
from member state positions notified to the European Commission in advance of the 1996
intergovernmental conference. See generally 1996 EU WHTE PAPER, supra note 188 (compiling
views of EU member governments). The Treaty of Amsterdam, which entered into force in 1999,
see supra note 228, refers to the possible integration of the WEU into the EU, and to unspecified
"arangements for enhanced cooperation" between the two bodies to be agreed upon in 2000.
AMSTERDAM TREATY, Protocol on Article J.7 ofthe Treaty on European Union, 1997 O.J. (C 340)
102. The vagueness of the wording, which seeks to turn a commitment to further integration into
an aspirational project, no doubt flowed from the Franco-German disagreement with the United
Kingdom on the role of NATO.
288 MAASrRICHT TREATY art. 17(1) (formerly art. J.7), amended by AMsTRAM TREATY a
1(10).
2 89 See id.
290 MAASTRICHT TREATY art. 17(3) (formerly art. J.7), amended by AMSRDAM TREATY art.
1(10).
2 91 The word "militari[z]ation" was used by Ireland's largest left-wing political party in
opposition to the Irish government's White Paper on foreign policy in 1996. See Sinn Fin
Reaffirm Commitment to Neutrality, Sinn FHin Press Release (Mar. 27,1996) (on file with author);
see also generally IRISH GOVERNMENT WHrrE PAPER, supra note 203. The WEU, at the core of
the new EU defense arrangements, is explicitly based on a strategy of deterrence and defense based
on conventional and nuclear weapons. See Western European Union, Council of Ministers,
Preliminary Conclusions on the Formulation ofa Common European Defense Policy 4, WEU
(Nov. 10, 1994) [hereinafter WEUDefense Policy Report].
292 See MAAsrjCHTTREATY art. 17(1) (formerly art. J.7), amended by AMSTERDAM TRFATY
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three organizations (EU, NATO, and WEU), as the Austrian government has
described it, will continue to present itself 293 It need hardly be added that no law
professor could have devised such a blurry institutional configuration.294
c. Neutrality Within the EU Security Policy: Three Possible Responsive
Strategies
Permanent neutrality-legal or factual-faces extinction within an EU that
becomes a military organization founded on obligations of automatic mutual
assistance and binding its members to the plenary commitments of a military bloc
in wartime including base operations, troop movements, and the unilateral supply
of war materials. For the EU neutralitized states, three responses seem possible. The
first, as I have shown in the case studies, is a preemptive repositioning of neutrality
(using both rhetorical and legal discourses) as one of a number of discretionary
art. 1 (10) (indicating that the evolving EU defense policy will "respect the obligations of certain
Member States, which see their common defense realized in [NATO]," and "be compatible with
the common security and defense policy established within that framework"). NATO's sway over
the EU security framework, in fact, has been enhanced in recent years through a NATO-affiliated
organization, the Partnership for Peace (PFP), to which all of the neutrals except Switzerland have
subscribed. The Partnership for Peace, launched by NATO in 1994, is an ill-contoured cooperative
security initiative designed to encourage flexible engagement with NATO by nonmembers,
including the four EU neutrals. Among its objectives are transparency in national defense planning
and budgets, democratic control of military forces, maintenance of capability and readiness to
engage in United Nations operations, and joint planning, training, and exercises to strengthen state
abilities to undertake peacekeeping, search and rescue, and humanitarian missions. See IRsH
GOVERNMENr WHrrE PAPER, supra note 203, % 4.44--4.53. Membership of the PFP does not
entail membership of NATO itself. See id. 4.51. It remains to be seen how deep this mutual
commitment will prove to be. Austria attempted to exclude from its ambit military exercises,
restricting involvement to humanitarian missions, peacekeeping, and international disaster aid. See
Didier Fauqueux, NATO Partnership Dents Austrian Neutrality, AGENCE FRANCE PRE SE, Feb.
9, 1995, at 1.
293 See Wolfgang Schossel, Austria and the New NATO (pt. 1), Keynote address to the
Participants of SHAPEX 1997 by the Vice Chancellor and Foreign Minister of Austria (Apr. 28,
1997), in Austrian Press & Information Service, (visited Apr. 23, 2000) <http:/Avww.austria.org/
press/13.html>; see also Charles A. Kupchan, From European Union to Atlantic Union, in
PARADOXES OF EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 275, at 147, 157 (proposing a formal
merger ofthe EU, NATO, and WEU into a single politico-economic civic community called the
Atlantic Union, ultimately including Russia and the other former Soviet states, but dispensing with
automatic security commitments).
294 This is an observation that I borrow from David J. Scheffer, Remarks on Structuring a
New Security Regime in Europe, 85 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 277, 288-89 (1991). Scheffer
described an alphabet soup of European security organizations, only some of which have found
a relevant place in the present Article.
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options of foreign policy. I will not discuss that strategy further here, except to note
again that it is most problematical for Austria, the only member state which has
experienced a plenary legal neutralitization. 295
The second response, not inconsistent with the first given the mercurial
progress of EU foreign policy, has been to draw a supposedly plausible distinction
between general issues of security-including the safeguarding of common values
of democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and advancement of nuclear
nonproliferation and disarmament generally-and pure defense issues such as troop
deployment.2 96 While the distinction has always seemed strained and overly
rhetorical,297 all four member neutrals have already jeopardized its basic premise
by agreeing to assist, albeit on a case-by-case basis, in the so-called "Petersberg"
tasks-including "humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of
combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking' 98-- originally set out
in a 1992 WEU declaration and incorporated expressis verbis into the Amsterdam
revisions to the Maastricht Treaty.299 The embrace of tasks of "crisis management,
including peacemaking" is particularly troublesome, because this formula has no
solid doctrinal moorings in international law and presumably could mean anything
from speedy emergency relief to outright military intervention.30
The postwar-and indeed post-Cold War-normative degradation of war and
neutrality is manifest in this litany of "tasks." Thus, the elemental idea of war has
given way to coded expressions like peacemaking-other examples include
preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, and post-conflict peace-building-while
Chapter VIII of the U.N. Charter (which enables regional arrangements or agencies
to deal with maintenance of international peace and security) has been repeatedly
summoned in aid of military operations that do not amount to classical states of
295 See supra text accompanying note 137-38.
296 See IRISH GOVERNMENT WHITE PAPER, supra note 203, M 4.59,4.64.
297 See Kavanagh, supra note 276, at 364. Former Belgian Foreign Minister Leo Tindemans,
one ofthe lions ofEuropean unity, warned the Austrian government as early as 1988 that it would
be impossible to determine "where politics and economics end and where the military side of an
issue begins." 40 CURRENT DIGEST SOVIETPRESS, Sept. 28, 1988 (No. 35), at 20.
298 MAASnuCHT TREATY art. 17(2) (formerly art. J.7), amended by AMSTERDAM TREATY art.
1(10).
299 Id. See Lionel Barber, EUNeutrals to Join Defen[s]e Initiative: Austria, Finland, Ireland
and Sweden Give Maastricht Review Its First Breakthrough, FIN. TIMES, July 23, 1996, at 2.
300 See IRISH GOVERNMENT WHITE PAPER, supra note 203, 4.73 (setting forth Petersberg
tasks). The question ofwhat "peacemaldng' missions might mean, in particular, is perplexing. Is
this epithet a new-age synonym for war? The Gulf War allies might certainly have described
themselves as engaged in "peacemaking." These are the first explicitly militaristic tasks that have
been included in the EU foundational treaties.
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belligerency.30' The EU's neutral members evidently have assumed (or pretended)
that functional lines of demarcation exist that separate these assorted postmodem
substitutes for war from pure defense issues, but crisis situations that may result in
Petersberg-type tasks can easily escallate into classical military defense operations.
Indeed, it seems odd for neutralitized states to embrace the open-textured Petersberg
tasks and yet balk at a common defense policy that in postbloc Europe may be
preoccupied almost exclusively with these very same tasks.302
A final response, thus far the most effective, plays off apparent textual
concessions to the neutral members in the Maastricht and Amsterdam agreements,
as well as the baseline intergovernmental rather than majority voting procedures that
still govern the CFSP and its future augmentation. As to the former, the Maastricht
and Amsterdam texts include language that suggests the conceivability of a
neutralitization opt-out from a future common defense policy (or common
defense).303 Article J.4.4 of the Maastricht Treaty, for example, included a pledge
that the CFSP, and any future common defense arrangements, would not prejudice
"the specific character of the security and defense policy of certain Member
States."3°4 The Irish government, the only neutral member at the time of the
Maastricht Treaty's adoption, claimed authorial credit for this wording, and that it
protected Irish neutrality (even though it mentioned neither Ireland nor
neutrality).3 0 5 In revisions by the Treaty of Amsterdam, the formula respecting the
301 See U.N. CHARTER arts. 52-54 (Regional Arrangements). The success of this verbal
masquerade has been helped by the intrastate nature of most latter-day interventions. See infira text
accompanying note 341; IRISH GOVERNMENT WHrrE PAPER, supra note 203, 4.19.
302 This is an inconsistency that undoubtedly accentuates the irritation with neutrality that
permeates the EU's nascent military establishment. See Report of the Political Committee,
Maastricht I. The WEUAssembly's Proposals for European Cooperation on Security and
Defense, Reply to the Annual Report ofthe Council, WEU Doe. 1564 (May 9, 1997),T 75 (noting
that plans to merge EU and WEU can never occur while neutral members exist; recommending
that EU should admit only new members able to become full WEU members).
303 See Birch & Crotts, supra note 276, at 278. The EU after the Amsterdam Treaty, in fact,
has been institutionally re-engineered to operate on a two-track basis, permitting some states to
develop more highly integrated relationships in certain fields than ordinary membership requires.
See Jean-Claude Piris & Giorgio Maganza, The Amsterdam Treaty: Overview and Institutional
Aspects, 22 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. S32, S45 (1999). And Austria has taken note of Denmark's
specific reservation of an opt-out from any future common defense arrangements (and
nonparticipation in elaboration and implementation of EU decisions having defense implications).
See Amsterdam Treaty, Protocol on the Position of Denmark, art. 6, 1997 OJ. (C 340) 102; see
also Lahodynsky, supra note 147, at 28.
304 MAASTRiCHr TREATY art. J.4.4, amended by AMSTERDAM TREATY art. 1(10).
305 See IRISH GOVERNMENT WH=TE PAPER, supra note 203, 4.12; see also Colm Boland,
The Maastricht Debate, IRISH TIMES, June 19, 1992, at 5, available in LEXIS, By Individual
Publication, Irish Times File. The Irish government specifically interpreted this treaty language as
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"specific character" of the security and defense policy of "certain Member States"
was retained, in circumstances where four states were now avowedly neutral. 306 As
a savings clause it raises obvious questions about the use of an elliptical and
ambiguous formula instead of a simple reference to neutrality or to its more
complex legal variant, permanent neutrality, if that indeed is what the drafters
intended.
The CFSP voting procedures, while not quite as congenial after the Amsterdam
Treaty revisions, do offer some specific preemptive power to the neutral members,
and in some circumstances could reverse the legal impact of the economic
provisions considered in the previous sections. With respect to defense
arrangements, as noted above, the Amsterdam Treaty provides for a common
defense policy leading potentially to a common defense, but that final step will only
occur should the European Council (the body formed by the heads of state and
government of the EU member states) so decide.307 A legal veto-in other words,
a requirement for consensus-is thereby implied. Moreover, any recommendation
for a common defense must be adopted by the member states under their respective
protecting Ireland's option ofneutrality in future conflicts, and its nonparticipation as members of
NATO or the WEU. See IRISH GOVERNM0ET WHrrE PAPER, supra note 203, 4.11. The Irish
government's interpretation found some support in the conclusions of the earlier Rome summit
of heads of EU governments in December 1990, which included an acknowledgment of the
"traditional positions" of some member states. At the time of the summit, and the ratification of
the Maastricht Treaty, Ireland was the lone neutral member of the EU. See Christa van
Wijnbergen, Ireland and the Ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, in THE RATIFICATION OF THE
MAASrRiCHTTREATY 181,188 (Finn Laursen & Sophie Vanhoonacker eds., 1994). The wording
was also included in a declaration on the role of the Westem European Union that was adopted by
the WEU/EU members at Maastricht on Dec. 10,1991. See WEU Council Report, supra note 274,
10-14.
306 MAASflCHTTREATY art 17(1) (formerly art j.7), amended by AMSMERAM TREATY art
1(10).
307 Ambiguity is ever-present, however. The relevant language of Article 17(1) of the
Maastricht Treaty reads as follows: "The [CFSP] shall include... the progressive framing of a
common defense policy... which might lead to a common defense, should the European Council
so decide. It shall in that case recommend to the Member States the adoption of such a decision
in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements." Id. Read literally, this could mean
either that a common defense, but not the framing of a common defense policy, requires the
decision of the European Council, or that only the common defense, and not a common defense
policy, requires this potentially fraught process. Moreover, it is not clear that a common defense
policy (unlike a common defense) will need to be submitted to member states for constitutional
approval.
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constitutional requirements.308 Identical preconditions govern the putative
integration of the WEU into the EU.309
Regular CFSP procedures, however, have evolved from clear
intergovernmental and consensus-driven procedures in the Maastricht Treaty to a
mixed intergovernmental and majoritarian process after Amsterdam. The
substantive activity of the CFSP will be manifested as "common strategies," 'joint
actions," and "common positions."310 This classification seems to have some
hierarchical force: Common strategies must be adopted unanimously by the
European Council,311 while joint actions and common positions, which are intended
to implement common strategies, become the stuff of ordinary Council of Ministers
meetings-and will be subject, using the supranational approach of the EC Treaty,
to the concept of the weighted majority.3 12 The critical issue for neutralitized states
lies at the intersection of the common strategy and the joint action.313 The latter is
a response to a specific situation "where operational action by the [EU] is deemed
to be required" (for example, imposition of economic sanctions in response to an act
of aggression involving third states).3 14 In normal circumstances, all states have a
legal veto within the European Council to prevent adoption of a common strategy.
While a joint action does not apparently require an initiating common strategy, the
revised treaty arrangements do not necessarily allow the Council of Ministers free
rein to adopt majoritarian joint actions when no common strategy has emerged in
the European Council. This is because a joint action without a backing common
strategy will probably be subject to the general rule ofunanimity for decisions of the
Council of Ministers' under the CFSP title.315 This flows arguably from application
308 See id.
309 See id. It is unclear, however, that in either situation the European Council would be
obligated to convene a further intergovernmental conference to propose amendments to the EU
treaties.
3 10 MAASTRICHT TREATY art 12 (formerly art. J.2), amended by AMsRDAM TREATY art
1(10).
311 See MAASTRICHT TREATY art. 13 (formerly art. .3), amended by AMSTERDAM TREATY
art. 1(10).
312 See MAASTRICHT TREATY arts. 14-15 (formerly arts. J.4, .5), amended by AMSTERDAM
TREATY art 1(10).
313 The common position seems reserved for more considered responses; the revised treaty
language refers to matters of"a geographical or thematic nature." MAASMCHT TREATY art. 15
(formerly art. J.5), amended by AMSTERDAMTREATY art. 1(10).
314MAASCHTTRTart. 14(1) (formerly art j.4), amended by AMSIERDAM TREATY art
1(10).
315 See MAASTRICHT TREATY art 23 (formerly art. J.13), amended by AMSTERDAM TREATY
art 1(10). Abstention will not prevent adoption of the decision. There is also a modified form of
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of the interpretive principle expressio unius est exclusio alterius, since only
decisions adopted on the basis of common strategies, and decisions implementing
(as opposed to adopting) joint actions or common positions, are explicitly subject
to weighted vote requirements. 316 And even if this were not so, Article 23(2) of the
revised Maastricht Treaty grants an extraordinary preemptive power to disaffected
states to announce opposition to a proposed majority decision for important reasons
of national policy, and thereby to foreclose a vote.317 While the consequences of
doing so might be formidable, a neutralitized state could invoke this power to
defend its neutrality obligations. The unilateral imposition of economic sanctions-
which, as noted earlier, presented a threat to neutrality under ordinary EC Treaty
provisions-is considered post-Maastricht as a CFSP matter.318 While it is too early
to judge the eventual impact of the revised CFSP voting processes, the best practice
for neutralitized states would be to ensure that the imposition of sanctions, or any
other "communauterized" action that displaces neutral behavior,319 should remain
abstention which allows the action to proceed, but requires the abstaining states to accept that the
decision commits the EU and to refrain (in a spirit of "mutual solidarity") from any conflicting or
impeding action. See MAASTRICHT TREATY art. 23(1) (formerly art. J.13), amended by
AMSTERDAMTREATY art. 1 (10). Ifthe states qualifying their abstention in this way represent more
than one-third of the weighted votes, the decision fails. Since neither abstention nor constructive
abstention defeats the proposed action, neutralitized states can insist on their legal veto as the
circumstances require.
3 16 See MAASTRICHT TREATY art. 23(2) (formerly art. J.13), amended by AMsTERDAM
TREATY art. 1(10). As one commentator has recently pointed out, the logic of this narrow group
of situations is to make majority decisions more politically acceptable, since in each case they will
be taken on the basis of a unanimous upstream decision (either a decision of the European Council
adopting a common strategy, or a decision of the Council of Ministers adopting ajoint action or
common position). See Giorgio Maganza, The Treaty ofAmsterdam 's Changes to the Common
Foreign and Security Policy Chapter and an Overview of the Opening Enlargement Process, 22
FORDHAMINT'LLJ. S174, S177 (1999).
3 17 See MAASTRICHT TREATY art. 23(2) (formerly art. J.13), amended by AMSTERDAM
TREATY art. 1(10). The Council may, by weighted majority, request that the matter be referred to
the European Council for decision by unanimity. If this happens, exercise of the preemptive power
has simply returned final decisionmaking authority to its original source (the European Council).
3 18 Article 301 of the EC Treaty, formerly Article 228a, empowers the Council of Ministers
to interrupt or reduce economic relations with one or more third countries on the basis of ajoint
action or common position adopted under the CFSP. No doubt the juristic link to the EC Treaty
comes through Article 133, formerly Article 113, the common (external) commercial policy. See
supra text accompanying note 237 (discussing scope of Article 133). The nature of economic
relations affected by the sanctions power seems plenary, since there is no limitation as to goods
or services.
3 19 See Goebel, Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 228, at S27 (using the word
"communauterization" to describe the transition from the ordinary sovereign veto power to
supranational control by EU institutions through weighted voting procedures).
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subject to consensus procedures at both European Council and Council of Ministers
levels.320
Despite the variety of procedures in place within the CFSP, as Christopher Hill
has observed in a 1998 study, "there is no consistent and comprehensive pattern of
decision making."32' Hill characterized the CFSP arrangements as more precisely
a complex, multi-actor culture for the creation of policy. 322 Thus, the moral
challenge of solidarity-intensified after Maastricht by real institutional
enhancements--retums to haunt the EU neutrals. A legalistic rationalization of their
presence in this increasingly uncongenial system of shared responsibility and
contrived common identity would insist that the unanimity rule grants them some
notional freedom of action for the future. The argument is counterintuitive,
however. Like earlier efforts to excuse U.N. collective security obligations on the
ground that neutral members might win exemptions from providing assistance,323
it assumes a system of collective action-and ultimately, of collective assent to a
common defense-that neutralitized members will be compelled to sabotage at the
very moment it begins to operate in its intended capacity. At present, therefore,
neutrality within the EU succeeds because the common policy is a compromise-
laden and unstable mixture of desired solidarity checked by a requirement of
unanimity.3 24 But future installments of the CFSP, if it acquires a defense
dimension, may not be so indulgent of the neutralitized members.325
4. Neutrality's Uncertain Future Inside the EU
320 For a discussion of the legal issues presented by use of economic sanctions under the
common foreign and security policy, see Karen E. Smith, The Instruments of European Union
Foreign Policy, in PARADOXES OFEUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 275, at 67,73-74. The
desire for unanimity-and discouragement of veto actions-is evident from Declaration No. 27
to the Maastricht final act, on CFSP voting, in which the conference of the representatives of the
member states' governments indicated that individual member states should refrain from dissent
if there is a weighted majority in favor of a common action. Unanimity on the vote was thus valued
separately from the issue of consent. For the text of Declaration No. 27, see Declaration on Voting
in the Field of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, 31 I.L.M. 369 (1992).
321 Hill, supra note 277, at 43.
322 See id.
323 See supra text accompanying note 218.
324 See Reinhardt Rummel & J6rg Wiedemann, IdentifyingIns'ttutionalParadoxes of CFSP,
in PARADOXES OF EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 275, at 58, 60.
325 Germany, for example, argued powerfully in its preconference position paper on the 1996
post-Maastricht intergovemmental review conference for elimination of the legal veto in
decisionmaking under a new common defense policy. See 1996 EU WHnE PAPER, supra note 188,
at 35. Germany also advocated establishment of a common market in arms and munitions. See id.
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Wedged between the demands of law and policy, the neutralitized EU members
have retrenched pragmatically to the core elements of their position-
nonparticipation in military alliances, nonstationing of foreign troops on their
territory-to press the viability of their status.326 But if the EU emerges as a full
military alliance, as intended by its most powerful economic members,327 even that
essentialist pretense will fail.328 Certainly, the EU itself has no aspirations to
neutrality in the global arena;329 after the Kosovo crisis in the spring of 1999,
European defense planning advanced toward an eventual WEU-EU merger and a
more formalized (and equalized) operational partnership with NATO. 330 And, in
326 See Alois Mock (former Foreign Minister of Austria), Austria's Role in the New Europe,
NATO REVIEv, March 1995, at 15, 17. But see Hill, supra note 277, at 47 (suggesting that
neutrality has been "inevitably attenuated" as a result of participation in the common foreign and
security policy and active involvement in conflict prevention).
327 In an ominous signal, the Kohl government in Germany advocated in 1996 that all EU
member states should eventually become members of NATO. See 1996 EU WHrrE PAPER, supra
note 188, at 35. New member states, in fact, should accede simultaneously to the EU/NATO/WEU
triad. See id. France, meanwhile, indicated support for a so-called "political solidarity clause" in
the revised EU treaties, whereby member states which did not participate in military actions
(assuming such neutrality were even tolerated) would be required to express their solidarity
through public support and, where necessary, financial aid. See id. at 84; see also WEU ASSEMBLY
REPORT, supra note 276, In 14, 16 (endorsing these ideas). And, even though the Maastricht and
Amsterdam treaties currently contemplate voluntary participation in military actions, the
underlying philosophy of a common defense policy would hardly be served by independent action
or neutrality. Thus, the WEU Council of Ministers in 1994 noted that, while each sovereign state
would join specific operations by its own sovereign decision, "a common defense policy
presupposes, in the operational sense, the readiness of participating nations to share in practice the
responsibilities in the execution of operational tasks. The principle of European solidarity, or even
European burden sharing, would seem to be relevant here" WEUDefense Policy Report, supra
note 291, 34 (emphasis added). See also infra note 331 (discussing the new EU defense
coordination initiatives adopted in December 1999).
328 See Lahodynsky, supra note 147, at 25 (noting Austrian Chancellor Franz Vranitzky's
hopeful finger-crossing when he rejected NATO membership for Austria but not participation in
a system of collective security).
329 See Martin Bangemann, Remarks to the Vienna International by the Club Vice-Chairman
of the European Communities (Mar. 7, 1991) (Commission of the European Communities) (noting
that political union ultimately implies a common army, and that neutrality must bejudged against
the EU, and the new "European peace order " of the future) (on file with author). But see
Vranitzky, supra note 10, at xxi (indicating that the issue of a pan-European neutrality has been
raised in the United States, but arguing also that large states inevitably are factors of power in the
international arena and must by definition "projecf' this power, thereby precluding a condition of
neutrality).
330 NATO, almost by default, intervened "out of area" to become the key stabilizing factor
in the Balkans. See IRISH GOVERNMENT WHrrE PAPER, supra note 203, % 4.37,4.38 (discussing
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December 1999, the EU took a significant step toward abolishing the cumbersome
WEU-NATO duality by deciding to develop an autonomous rapid deployment force
that would have military and political command structures located within the EU's
Council of Ministers. 3 31
NATO's contributions to United Nations efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina, including close air
support for the U.N. Protection Force in Bosnia and its role in the military aspects of implementing
the Dayton Peace Agreement for Bosnia-Herzegovina). See also European Integration, supra note
148. The NATO Treaty does not expressly preclude joint NATO action in out-of-area conflicts,
but neither does it require it. The treaty's collective defense obligations apply only to attacks
against a defined North Atlantic geographic region. See North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 217,63
Stat. at 2244, 34 U.N.T.S. at 246. See Stromseth, supra note 221, at 283. NATO's recent
emergence in Kosovo as a highly mobile fire-brigade force outside its geographical bailiwick may
presage its further development as the pillar of EU common defense operations. NATO, in
Stromseth's pithy paraphrase of Dean Acheson, "has lost a mission and has not yet found a role:'
Id. at 286.
It is worth noting the presence among U.S. security analysts of a strain of thinking that rejects
the U.S. role in Europe using NATO as its conduit, and calls for NATO to be superseded by the
indigenous capability of the EU/WEU. See BARBARA CONRY, THE WEsrERN EUROPEAN UNION
AS NATO'S SuccEssoR (CATO Institute Policy Analysis Paper No. 239, 1995) (arguing that
NATO is a Cold War alliance that lacks purpose in the absence of a defined adversary, and that
the EU states have many more security interests in common with one another than they do
collectively with the United States); see also infra note 331 (discussing the EU autonomous
defense initiatives adopted in December 1999).
331 In its Millennium Declaration at Helsinki in December 1999, the European Council
(comprising EU heads of state and government) agreed to develop an autonomous capacity to launch
and conduct EU-led military operations in response to intemational crises. See Helsinki European
Council, Presidency Conclusions (last modified Dec. 10 & 11, 1999) <http://www.europaeu.int/
council/ot'conclu/dec99/dec99_en.htn> [hereinafter Presidency Conclusions]. The so-called European
Security and Defense Initiative (ESDI), which may require treaty amendments to become fully effective,
foresees an EU "rapid-reaction corps" of fifty thousand to sixty thousand European troops by 2003. Id.
2. New political and military bodies and structures would be established within the EU Council of
Ministers to ensure political guidance and strategic direction for the planned corps. See id. The corps
would focus on implementation of the EU's Petersberg tasks of crisis intervention and peacekeeping.
See id.; see also supra text accompanying note 298 (explaining Petersberg tasks). But the new ESDI,
while significant as a marker of the EU's progressive militarization, has yet to address two challenges
raised in this Part. First, it is unclear how the ESDI will manage or institutionalize its future relationship
with NATO. At Helsinki, the European Council declared that NATO would remain "the foundation of
the collective defense of its members." See Presidency Conclusions, supra, at Annex IV. Second, the
ESDI does not alter, or propose to alter, the antimajoritarian treaty provisions that allow the neutral states
to veto a formal common defense policy and to retain some operational flexibility with respect to actions
proposed or initiated under the EU's common foreign and security policies. See supra text
accompanying notes 307-320. Indeed, the Millennium Declaration restates the Amsterdam and
Maastricht treaty formula that respects "the specific character of the security and defen[s]e policy of
certain Member States." Presidency Conclusions, supra, at Annex IV. This textual compromise has been
interpreted to allow a posture ofpermanent neutality within the EU. See supra text accompanying notes
303-06. Also, the Declaration states, in an apparent concession to neutral member sensitivity, that the
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Security policy must be adapted to changing needs, and the EU neutralitized
states undoubtedly have concluded that neutrality in its traditional practice no longer
meets the challenges presented by nationalism, environmental disasters,
uncontrolled migration, organized crime, and international terrorism3 32 Collective
efforts in common institutions, therefore, are an expected part of interstate
relationships. 333 The EU, the world's most advanced model of economic integration,
has decided that it must engage also in collective military security, and appears to
have closed the question of whether this form of action is best suited to manage all
forms of dislocation.334 Traditional conceptions of neutrality, in a security milieu
of solidarity, cannot indefinitely survive.
V. PERMANENT NEuTRALrrY iN AN AGE OF PEACE: SEVERING THE LINK
wrrH WARTRME NEu ry
The legal status of neutrality has been in flux since the drafters of the U.N.
Charter sought to suppress war as an instment of lawful state action.335 Moreover,
the recent post-Cold War resurgence of doctrines of collective security, most
conspicuous for present purposes in the explicit militarization of the European
Union, has created unsolved (and perhaps insoluble) obstacles to the assertion of a
legal, or even factual, status of permanent neutrality in peacetime.
A. A Definitional Fine-Tuning
The specific issue ofneutrality in a world without classical wars might require
only a definitional stabilitization. The Jessup/Schwarzenberger thesis, for example,
regards all intermediate stages between a comprehensive state of war based on the
parties' intentions, and the state of peace, as a mixed or middle status. 336 This
envisaged rapid-reaction corps "does not imply the creation of a European army." Presidency
Conclusions, supra, 2.
332 See Mock, supra note 326, at 17; see also HOFFMAN, supra note 10, at 8 (discussing
emergence-and overlap--of "security communities" such as the EU and NATO with aim of
extensive cooperation in these fields).
333 See HOFFMAN, supra note 10, at 60.
334 See Birch & Crotts, supra note 276, at 265 (attributing the embrace of collective action
to EU failures in the Gulf War, which exposed the continent's lack of institutional machinery and
military power).
3 35 See Lysin, supra note 45, at 238.
3 3 6 See generally GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, THE FRONTIERS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
234-55 (1962); Philip C. Jessup, Should International Law Recognize an Intermediate Status
Between Peace and War?, 48 AM. J. INT'L L. 98 (1954); see also GREEN, supra note 6, at 77
(citing numerous publicists). Schwarzenberger's thesis, set forth in an earlier article, was
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obviously departs from the principle laid down by Grotius (citing Cicero)--that
nothing lies between war and peace 337 -which was the maxim from which the
classical law of neutrality derived its meaning. Such an intermediate category,
however, could bridge the conceptual gap between traditional and modem practice,
since it would sweep into the basic war/peace paradigm of permanent neutrality all
those intermediate hostile measures short of full-scale war-such as economic
blockade, humanitarian intervention, punitive action, and even
propagandization 338-which do not involve or necessitate the policy of employing
the maximum application of force, by which the state of war was historically
defined.339 Effectively, modem treaty practice seems to assume that the term
"armed conflict" (or "international armed conflict") should replace the classical
notion of war.34° In a further recognition of the shift in discourse, a restabilized
particularly compelling:
Whether the state of peace continues with the [s]tate against which limited force is
applied or not, depends on the latter's decision. Similarly, it is left to third states to decidefor
themselves whether, in their relations with the contending [states, they prefer the laws of
peace or neutrality. Even if all [s]tates directly and indirectly concerned acquiesced in the
limited use of force, it appears to be a misnomer to call such apax bellicosa by the name of
peace. It is equally unwan-anted to call war a state in which both contending [s]tates insist on
the continuation of their peaceful relations, merely because third [s]tates wish to apply the law
of neutrality during such a bellumpacifcun. These constellations are incompatible with the
states of peace and war, they constitute a state of their own, a status mbita.
Georg Schwarzenberger, Jus Pacis ac Belli? Prolegomena to a Sociology ofInternational Law,
37 AM. J. INT'L L. 460,470 (1943) (emphasis added).
337 Or, as originally (and more elegantly) expressed, "inter bellum et pacern nihil est
medium." DE JURE BEUj Ac PAcis, Bk. IM, Ch. XXI, s. 1 (1625). See Hari Haya Aiyar, Address,
in LEGAL ASPECrs OF NEUTRALITY, supra note 15, at 40,45. An inflexible war/peace polarity has
substantial, if somewhat outdated, precedential and academic support. See GREEN, supra note 6,
at 76-77 (citing legal decisions and publicists).
338 See Vranitzky, supra note 10, at xx (noting that classical international law has little to say
on these modem forms of interstate confrontation, which in his view must be tacded as questions
of neutrality policy).
3 39 See Neuhold, supra note 20, at 187; see also GREEN, supra note 6, at 128 (concluding,
based on survey of doctrine and of military operations amounting to armed conflict, war,
compulsory measures short of war, and measures of self-defense, that "traditional definitions of
war to apply to all situations and in all circumstances have outlived their usefulness"); Guttman,
supra note 3, at 58 (appearing to reject neutrality with respect to internal human rights violations).
340 Thus, the Geneva Convention on treatment of prisoners of war specifically takes into
account the existence of "non-war" armed conflicts and stipulates that only one belligerent need
declare war for the Convention to take effect. Geneva Convention I Relative to Treatment of
Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 2, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 3318, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 136. Similarly,
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definition of neutrality would allow for the prevalence ofpostbloc intrastate armed
conflict by recognizing a formal status of neutrality with respect to all internal
disputants. 341
B. Toward A Substantive Change: The Lessons ofNeutrality Policy
In an era of solidarity and interdependence, however, definitional enhancements
of old concepts rooted in the law of war may have limited appeal. Collective
security systems, as this Article makes clear, pose the most formidable post-Cold
War challenge to permanent neutrality. In Part IV of this Article, I demonstrated
that membership of the United Nations, of NATO, and potentially of the EU, cannot
be reconciled with a regime of neutralitization that requires its adherents to
guarantee their future nonparticipation in all third party conflicts, to remain outside
all military alliances, and not to permit their territory to become the base for future
military operations. No measure of interpretive alchemy will force a neutralitized
status, with its fundamental norm of future nonparticipation, into concordance with
a reciprocal defensive (or offensive) military alliance. What this Article offers
instead is a reconceptualized, more politically assertive idea ofpeacetime permanent
Geneva Protocol I of 1977 substitutes the phrase "international armed conflict" for war. Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), Dec. 12, 1977, art. 1(4) 1125 U.N.T.S. 3,
4.
341 To this extent, a redefined neutrality would be in step with what appears to be a broader
paradigmatic shift in the international law of armed conflict. See GREEN, supra note 6, at 128-29
(calling for adaptation of the law to "realities of the situation," inter alia in order to give effect to
humanitarian laws); see also Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadi6, 36 I.LM. 908, 60-74 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia 1997) (holding that the term'aws and customs of war" should include
prohibition of acts committed both in international and internal armed conflicts (citing Article 3
of the Geneva Protocol II of 1977)); Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.CJ. 14 (June 27) (holding that common Article 1 of the Geneva
Conventions applies to noninternational armed conflicts); see ROBERTS & GJELFF, supra note 13,
at 171, 194, 216, 272, 449-50. But see GREEN, supra note 6, at 219-20, 407, 409 (questioning
internal application of Article 1 as a juridical matter, since "black-letter law" provides that war
crimes can be committed only during an international armed conflict, but accepting the special
importance of applying international humanitarian law even to noninternational conflicts). Costa
Rica, which declared itself permanently neutral in 1983, stated that its policy would extend to
armed conflicts within states. See SUBEDI supra note 78, at 147. The creation of an International
Criminal Court will be an important step in eliminating the distinction between treatment of
international and noninternational conflicts. See generally M. Cherif Bassiouni, Historical Survey:
1919-1998, in THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY I (M. CherifBassiouni ed., 1998) (explaining and assessing the evolution of the new
tribunal).
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neutrality. This new neutrality will be divorced from its historic underpinnings in
the law of war. It will accord greater flexibility to states that choose neutralitization
to cooperate with collective security operations while remaining outside formal
alliances. The EU member neutrals, if they wish to preserve their neutralitized
status, will then face a unique political challenge: Preserving this reformed,
"activist" neutrality within a collectivist system that they would join only on a
selective, case-by-case basis.
The basis for reform, I believe, lies in a dimension ofpermanent neutrality that
I have until now mentioned only in passing. The European neutrals, in particular,
have long practiced a kind of prophylactic neutrality policy in order to emancipate
themselves from the passivity-and franldy, occasional unwelcomeness-of their
fundamental posture of neutralitization. 342 The law of permanent neutrality has
never contained any requirement that a neutralitized state should shape its foreign
policy in peacetime so that third states are not in doubt as to its commitment to
observe neutrality in all future international wars. 343 While states may sometimes
practice forms of economic or even ideological neutrality in order to give assurance
to the universe of would-be belligerents,344 there is no coordinate duty in the law of
classical neutrality that would project an antecedent peacetime secondary duty to
conduct an equivalent neutrality policy.345
A neutralitized state has full discretion not only in choosing whether to pursue
a peacetime policy of neutrality, but also in devising the mix of its constituent
elements. The Swiss jurist Max Huber, writing in 1937, observed that neutrality
policy comprised "the flexible part, as it were, of neutrality." 346 To a great extent
342 This policy should be initially distinguished from the factual neutralitization-also a
matter of policy-that describes the discretionary foreign policy choices of Sweden, Ireland, and,
despite a thin legal neutralitization, probably also Finland. See supra text accompanying note 153,
171.
343 Although that commitment is, as I have shown in Part HI, the premise of ajuridical status
ofneutralitization. See supra text accompanying note 56.
344 Neither economic nor ideological neutrality has ever been required by the law of classical
neutrality-and therefore, by the analogical process of norm-derivation used in Part II, could not
form part of the law ofpermanent neutrality. See supra text accompanying notes 30, 64-65.
345 For the derivational techniques used to formulate the peacetime norms of permanent
neutrality, see supra text accompanying note 56.
346 VERDROSS, supra note 23, at 15. 1 have noted this apparent flexibility in relation to such
concepts as the level of defense preparedness a neutralitized state should seek to maintain, as well
as the so-called entrance price strategy. See supra text accompanying note 62. It is hardly
surprising that a neutralitized state would practice a foreign policy that seeks to build confidence
in its chosen status and to present to the world community the image of a dynamic and socially
beneficial security policy that might retain a place in modem geopolitics. The Swiss Political
Department, now the Department of Foreign Affairs, declared as early as 1956 that Switzerland
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no doubt, the spuming of military alliances, and compliance with the other
secondary duties of permanent neutrality in peacetime, represent in themselves the
fulfillment of a peacetime policy of neutrality by neutralitized states. Schweitzer,
in fact, has described fidelity to the peacetime secondary duties (the
Vorwirkungen347) as the practice of '"neutrality policy in the widest sense."348
Nevertheless, my concern here is with a pattern of official state conduct that goes
beyond the discharge of obligations which are mandated in any event by
international law (or, in the case of factually neutralitized states, which provide the
template for certain specific characteristics of a discretionary foreign policy).
What, then, is included in this accretion of foreign policy initiatives? In Ireland
(a factually neutralitized state), the ascription of moral power to neutrality, its
missiological potential as an instrument of promoting peace, has sometimes been
described as "principled" or "positive" neutrality 49 And this self-conscious use of
neutrality as a talisman ofpeace has a proven historical record. In the Cold War era,
the European permanently neutral states were in the vanguard of the quest for
disarmament and arms control and the relaxation of East-West tensions.3 50 Hans
Mayrzedt called attention to one of the signal successes of activist neutrality, the
perceived special merit of neutral states to act as mediators.351 This service was
"in many ways exceeds the demands of duty... for political reasons so as to reinforce confidence
in the maintenance of its neutrality." VERDROSS, supra note 23, at 15-16 (quoting the Conception
officielle suisse).
347 See supra text accompanying note 55 (discussing this doctrine of"pre-effects").
348 Sc iwFazER, supra note 16, at 144.
349 For Ireland, the focus ofthis species ofneutrality has been participation in United Nations
peacekeepiig activities. See Patrick Smyth, European Diary, IRISH TIMES, Mar. 3, 1995, at 8,
available in LEXIS, News, By Individual Publication, Irish Times Files; see also supra note 197.
350 See Neuhold, supra note 20, at 183. The flavor of an activist foreign policy for the
European neutrals was suggested by the former Chancellor of Austria, Dr. Bruno Kreisky:
[W]e had to be concerned not to allow neutrality to be the occasion for an isolationist
policy .... Rather, we gave to our foreign policy (which of course was always to be
understood as aneutrality policy) a global aspect, and thus a thoroughly active character. We
participated in the work of the Council of Europe and in the United Nations, and we regarded
this co-operation as the precise correlative of our neutrality policy.
GINTHER, supra note 125, at 127. Thus, neutrals could sometimes undertake diplomatic initiatives
that members of military blocs might have found difficult to launch. Lehne mentioned Austrian
relations with the German Democratic Republic in the 1970s and its resumption of diplomacy with
Poland after the imposition ofmartial law in 1981. See Stefan Lehne, Austia"s Changing Role in
a Changing Europe, in EUROPFAN NEUTRALS, supra note 10, at 201,203.
351 See Hans Mayrzed, Verdndenngen der politischen Bedingungen der Neutralitat
[Changes in the Political Conditions ofNeutrality], in TBE NEUrRAI.sIN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION,
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rendered most effectively by the participation of four of the five European neutrals
in the Hammarskj6ld-inspired U.N. peacekeeping missions since 1956.352 The sum
of this activity has demonstrated what Mayrzedt referred to as the contrast between
the dynamism of the real world and the relative stasis of international law. 353
Moreover, as Dieter Koch insightfully suggested, it is precisely from the
correspondence and crystallization of the peacetime policies of neutrality of the
neutralitized states that what might be called the second generation of norms of the
law of permanent neutrality will be evolved.354
C. A New Permanent Neutrality
I propose, therefore, a new conceptual articulation of permanent neutrality that
emphasizes-indeed gives primacy to-its service to the law of peace.355 As a
technical matter, this new regime of permanent neutrality will exploit the modem
normative degradation of the law of war by severing the juristic link between
neutralitization and wartime neutrality. Neutralitization in this reworked design will
be chosen explicitly as an institution of the law of peace, neither legally nor
supra note 17, at 32, 37.
352 On peacekeeping missions generally, see Suy, supra note 197, at 258-65. Indeed, all of
the neutrals have used the auspices of the United Nations as a useful vehicle for neutrality policy.
Thus, every twelfth U.N. soldier has been an Austrian. See Lahodynsky, supra note 147, at 26.
353 See Mayrzedt, supra note 351, at 37. These initiatives did not entirely quiet critics of
permanent neutrality, of course. One recidivist critic of Swiss neutrality has written that the
offering of conference facilities for intersystemic disarmament talks can be regarded as "a
geographical role rather than apolitical one." JEANZIEGLER, SWn'ZERLANDEXPOSED 130 (1978);
see also ZIEGLER, supra note 3, at 169 (revisiting this caustic sentiment 20 years later). And it
remains to be seen whether future arms control treaties will entrust neutralitized states with tasks
of verification. See Hanspeter Neuhold,Austrian Neutrality on the East- West Axi, in NEUTRALrIY
AND NON-ALIGNMENT, supra note 118, at 62, 68. But the neutrals continue to offer this service,
and there is a sympathetic politico-cultural response to the idea. Austria and Finland, for example,
extended an open invitation to host the 1998 Northern Ireland peace talks. See Austria, Finland
Likely to Host Ulster Peace Talks, Xintnua News Agency, Jan. 5, 1998, available in LEXIS,
News, Wire Service Stories.
354 See KOCH, supra note 26, at 133.
355 There has been a growing sense among scholars that permanent neutrality, even in its
existing form, had become part of the law of peace. Konrad Ginther, in a 1975 retrospective on
Austrian neutrality policy, traced an evolution in the official interpretation of Austrian permanent
neutrality from its original military-oriented imitation of the Swiss prototype to its emergence from
the rnid-I 970s as a positive instrument of foreign policy inspired by the Soviet doctrine of peaceful
coexistence. See GINrHER, supra note 125, at 57. Ginther concluded that "[p]ermanent neutrality
can nevertheless be understood, even though it stands in a direct functional relationship with the
contingency of war, as an institution in the service ofpeace." Id. at 150 (emphasis added).
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analogically subordinate to the antecedent effects of a contingent future status of
classical neutrality. In contrast, the tension-reducing initiatives of the existing
neutralitized states have served chiefly as a policy adjunct to the primary goal of
their international law status (or chosen political status), to remain outside all future
wars. 356 In the reformed regime, a state which chooses a neutralitized status will do
so in pursuit of the broad mission ofpacig&ance, the geostrategic management of
peaceful initiatives.357 Unbound from the law of war, neutralitization as an
instrunent ofpeace will offer a flexibility to join collective security actions that-
quite apart from the basic incompatibility of permanently neutral membership of
these organizations-previously carried a perpetual risk of violating the wartime
norms of nonparticipation, abstention, impartiality, and prevention.
According to this blueprint the new institution would be formally adopted by
states using one of the modes ofneutralitization discussed in Part II,358 and would
derive its substantive content from the overarching obligation to maintain and
pursue peace. This obligation would supersede the existing core duty not to enter
into any arrangements which in case of war would commit a neutralitized state to
conduct contrary to classical neutrality.359 Because a commitment to peace (or even
356 This reconceptualization ofneutrality, focusing on measures of dtente, has continued to
be of interest to the post-Communist Russian leadership, which has stressed the positive potential
of neutral states through peacekeeping operations and contributions to stability. See Official
Kremlin International News Broadcast: Press Conference with Yevgeny Primakov, Foreign
Minister of Russia, and Wolfgang Schfissel, Foreign Minister ofAustna (Federal Information
Systems Corporation, Nov. 4, 1996 ).
357 Former Austrian President Dr. RudolfKirchschlager suggested the labelpacigdrance, a
neologism meaning "management of peace," to summarize the irenic initiatives with which
permanently neutral states have become identified. See GINTHER, supra note 125, at 127.
Kirchschlager also proposed the terms Fiedenspolitik [peace policy], Friedensfiihrung aufder
staatspolitischen Gnmdlage der imnerwhrenden Neutralit [the pursuit of peace on the political
basis of permanent neutrality]. See id.
358 The choice of mode would be determined, presumably, by each neutral's geopolitical
circumstances. To maximize the number ofnations respecting the status, and to enhance the appeal
of the status, the tri-form method of unilateral promise, notification, and recognition has obvious
advantages over the more confined process of treaty-making. The choice will also depend on
whether a newly-neutralitized state wished to receive a guarantee of its chosen status-including,
if need be, military support in the event of a violation-from a specific circle ofparticipating states.
See supra note 80. Because the reformed institution explicitly breaks with the law of war, however,
candidates for neutralitization might prefer to avoid the "alliance-building" connotations of
neutralitization by treaty, or by promise and recognition. An alternative, therefore, would be to
issue a simple unilateral declaration and to rely on the consequences attributed by the Nuclear
Tests jurisprudence. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
359 See supra text accompanying note 215 (discussing Swiss exposition of this core
obligation).
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topacig&ance) would not impose on neutralitized states a necessarily more onerous
obligation than that shared by all members of the United Nations to refrain from the
threat or use of force,36° the existing anterior duties of permanent neutrality-
including nonparticipation in military alliances, avoidance of treaties that would
obligate them to channel war materials or troop contingents, a ban on present or
future military bases on neutralitized soil, and a ban on troop transit or the use of
neutral airspace for military purposes--will continue to bind neutralitized states,361
independently of the law of wartime neutrality, as the specific marks of their new
status. The proposal I make here is, very deliberately, an inversion of the historical
practice of the neutralitized states, which used neutrality policy solely as a
mechanism to obtain respect for their existing commitment to the secondary duties.
A reformed permanent neutrality, as an institution of the law of peace, would
be an appropriate geostrategic response to the unsettled and atomized circumstances
of the post-Cold War order. The hard certainties of interpower confrontation, which
made the institution of permanent neutrality so reliable and predictable, have
vanished. Moreover, a brutally realistic assessment of international affairs might
suggest, contrary to liberal utopian hopes for a world society and universal peace,
that force as an instrument of state policy has not been abandoned. It has merely
been reconditioned as a matter of law--though not very satisfactorily- and is liable
to erupt sporadically and incoherently in widely-separated ethnic conflicts, civil
wars, and failures ofpostcolonial independent states.3 62 A flexible neutralitization,
in these circumstances, serves coordinate purposes. It builds on the most successful
peace-enhancing aspects of neutrality policy, while allowing neutralitized states to
decide, on a case-by-case basis, whether and to what extent particular situations
require intervention in support of peace. The forms of intervention, incidentally, will
only rarely require resort to military engagement or assistance to a military
engagement Neutrality policy has shown the success of broadly-sculpted initiatives
such as support for policies of nonproliferation in a world where lesser powers have
access to nuclear know-how, humanitarian aid to refugees, and reinforcement of the
authority of international institutions (including regional arms limitation and
peaceful dispute settlement and mediation).
Within this framework, moreover, there is still a place for the simple
declaration of nonparticipation, rather than of classical neutrality, as a choice for
360 See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 4 ("All Members shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state,
or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations').
361 See supra text accompanying note 56 (deriving obligations of peacetime permanent
neutrality).
362 See HOFFMAN, supra note 10, at 23 (discussing the skepticism of political scientist
Hedley Bull concerning emergence of a genuinely"transnational" society).
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peace. The neutralitized states, which typically do not exercise either global or
regional hegemonic power, would not be expected to engage themselves in all
collectivized actions purportedly pursued in the name of human rights. 363 This is a
political reality in a system where the rules of armed intervention and non-
intervention are not at all clear, and (as the Kosovo experience has taught) the
United Nations system is not even technically adept to determine what these rules
might be.364 The rules of engagement for the "hegemonic enforcers," as Hoffman
has described powerful regional security organizations such as NATO, remain
highly indistinct and contingent.365 In the absence of agreed international principles
of intrastate enforcement, 366 for example, a neutralitized state might justify its
absence from intrastate conflict-and even nonparticipation in humanitarian
efforts--on the principle that it wishes to use its nonparticipation in pursuit of
alternative resolutions, including diplomatic initiatives or regional pacific
363 It may be, moreover, that this reformed permanent neutrality will be a better conceptual
fit with an emerging individual-centered approach to human rights reflected in global conventions
on genocide, human rights, and racial discrimination, as well as the Geneva Conventions and their
protocols. See generally Prosecutor v. Dugko Tadid, 35 I.L.M. 32 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia 1995) (discussing normative shift of international legal system toward human rights).
The recognition of fumdamental human rights as norms of jus cogens, indeed, will allow
permanently neutral states, within this new flexibility, to join enforcement measures-whether or
not armed force is involved-against states which engage in human rights violations, without
having to justify exceptions from possible wartime obligations of neutrality. On this final point,
see The Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.CJ. 226,262 (July 8) (noting
that the principles and rules of law applicable in armed conflict have, at their heart, "the overriding
consideration of humanity"); see also HOFFMAN, supra note 10, at 68 (writing of a superordinate
human right to peace as the proper fundamental norm ofmodem international relations).
364 
"[T]he international 'community' has recognized Croatia, Bosnia, and Eritrea, but not
Biafia, Chechnya, or the right of the Kurds and Tibetans to states of their own." HOFFMAN, supra
note 10, at 79. Hoffman noted that the United Nations was created to manage a constellation of
interpower conflicts, so that many of its post-1991 interventionist exercises have simply exceeded
its capacity. See id. at 81. The United Nations, in fact, lacks any permanent force for preventive
action or peace-building in intrastate crises. See id. at 82.
365 See HOFFMAN, supra note 10, at 81 (noting lack of coherence in U.S. policy, which
comprises a laundry list of worthy goals but no predictable strategy for intervention).
366 Hofian presents four kinds of measures that could set the terms for collective
intervention in a domestic setting for humanitarian purposes (viz., a treaty that defines the
circumstances for collective intervention; a Security Council resolution under Chapter VII defining
a civil war as a threat to international peace and security and authorizing a peacekeeping mission
or even a peace-enforcing one; a system of treaties protecting minorities through cultural and
administrative autonomy, with refusal to accept a treaty being penalized at least by exclusion from
credits and economic benefits ofinternational organizations and banks; and a reinforced system
for monitoring human rights violations, again enforced by exclusion from economic and military
aid). See id. at 136-37.
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settlement. Again, an opportunity for the rules of permanent neutrality-albeit
reconditioned by postbloc events--has been created in the context of an
international vacuum in power relations. This is precisely how international law
rules should function, as regulators of state action in shifting geopolitical
situations. 367
D. A Remodeled Neutrality Within the EU
Within the EU, the challenge ofpacigdrance is particularly acute, given the
momentum of change discussed in Part IV. Under a reconceptualized permanent
neutrality, neutralitized members, in virtue of their status, would have a duo--no
longer merely a discretionary option of foreign policy-to influence their fellow
members toward a conception of the EU as a peace project, even as it acquires the
trappings of militarization. 368 Preventing the evolution of the EU into a military
superpower with ambitions to project its power "out of area" may be an objective
ofpacigdrance in itself.369 At present, the neutral members might be able, given the
367 See supra text accompanying note 10.
368 At one time, such a suggestion was considered merely a matter of Soviet propaganda,
weakening the EU's emergence as a military power from within through the presence of neutrals.
See Bo Petersson, Is There Today a Specific Soviet Outlook on Neutrality?, in EUROPEAN
NEUTRALS, supra note 10, at 185, 189.
It is possible to conceive of the permanent neutrals in the EU allied together as a collective
neutrality, adopting a specialized form of interstate alliance that modem international law, based
on principles developed by Indian diplomacy in the 1970s, treats as a "zone of peace" (ZOP). See
SUBEDI, supra note 78, at xli-xlii (explaining ZOPs as latter-day multistate derivatives of
neutralitization and demilitarization). The conditions of a zone of peace resemble the hard core
obligations of permanent neutrality-nonparticipation in military alliances and a complete
prohibition on the establishment of foreign military bases. See id. at 157-58. The difference
between adoption of permanent neutrality and ZOP status is the difference between acting as an
independent sovereign state (in choosing permanent neutrality) and acting in a concert of powers
(by forming a ZOP). See id. at 157-61. But it is not at all clear, however, that a ZOP is properly
a form of neutrality. If one of the states in a ZOP is attacked, the others are typically expected to
intervene on its behalf, a strategy scarcely consonant with permanent neutrality (and
indistinguishable, in fact, from the duties of the partners to a reciprocal defensive military alliance).
Intemational law, in fact, has yet to evolve a mechanism for a collective neutrality in which the
participating states remain impartial even when a member of the group is attacked; perhaps the
very idea is a logical impossibility. It is at least a legal impossibility as long as neutrality is defined
in terms of adoption by individual sovereign states rather than groups of states. But there is no
reason why a model of collective neutrality, with mutual defense obligations engaged for
protection of the neutrality of the collective, could not develop in the future. See id, at 157-60, for
an enlightening discussion of some of these issues.
369 But, as one leading European political scientist has recently asked, would turning the EU
into a civilian power or new type of "condominium" deprive it of the ability to cope in an
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requirement of consensus, to dissuade their EU partners from pursuing the
seemingly inexorable logic of matching military and political weight to economic
strength.370 That objective will become even more urgent, and concomitantly more
difficult, as the right of legal veto is cut down in future stages of the common
defense policy.
It is supremely ironic that the EU, founded on the almost quixotic objective of
Franco-German entente, is now potentially transforming itself, after the Cold War,
into a military hegemon in its own right.371 A civilian EU, as Karen Smith has
recently proposed, would respond to the idea that security in the post-Cold War era
has a much broader meaning than military security, giving the EU a long-term
comparative advantage, having renounced the use of force among its members, to
use what Smith calls civilian instruments-propaganda, multiple species of
diplomacy, economic assistance and cooperation-to control and inoculate against
potential crisis environments.372 It would not be inconsistent with these alternatives
to militarization, however, for the EU to maintain a crisis management structure
modeled on its Petersberg principles,373 but for neutralitized members participation
in these interventions-particularly in light of the normative uncertainty of rights
"uncivilized" world? See Zielonka, supra note 275, at 2.
370 The political difficulties of doing so cannot be underestimated. The WEU's parliamentary
assembly, for example, has shown intense hostility to the neutrality of four EU members, accusing
them of halting the EU's emergence as a military power. See WEUAssembly Report, supra note
274, t 111-13. Moreover, the WEU Secretary General has rejected ad hoc "coalitions of the
willing" as the proper future direction of EU defense arrangements on the ground that they will
lead to renationalization of defense policies and the promotion ofregional ad hoc arrangements
over permanent European interests. In the Secretary General's view, such coalitions evoke a
nineteenth century Westphalian vision of Europe rather than the "single market, single currency,
common foreign and security policy Europe of the twenty-first century." See Cutileiro, supra note
286.
371 This was precisely the argument raised in a 1998 report on Irish neutrality by the
conference of the Methodist Church of Ireland. See Patsy McGarry, Church Backs Peacekeeping
Role for Army, IRISH TIMES, June 10, 1998, at 3, available in LEXIS, News, By Individual
Publication, Irish Times File (noting report's comment that the original institutions which evolved
into the EU "were founded on the moral principle of banishing war and oppression from Europe").
The geostrategic justifications for a common EU defense policy included the risks posed by the
Balkans crisis, the weakness of the EU's contribution to the Gulf War mobilization, and even the
emergence of a common European currency. See WEU Council Report, supra note 274, 8. But
it remains unclear why the EU itself should be the centrifugal military as well as economic power,
given the longstanding separate existence of the NATO commmd structure. This appears to be the
current British opinion. See supra note 287.
372 See Smith, supra note 320, at 79.
373 See supra text accompanying note 298; see also supra note 331 (discussing the new EU
rapid deployment force, designed to implement Petersberg tasks).
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of military intervention-must remain an opportunity forpacigirance rather than
an a priori obligation.3 74 Unfortunately, as I have noted earlier, there is as yet no
sensible distinction to be drawn between traditional peacekeeping and peace
enforcement. A crisis management capability that is based on solidarity,
humanitarianism, and enlightened self-interest, and that stakes out a boundary
between crisis intervention and militarist adventures, represents the best practice for
a reformed, activist neutrality.375
E. A Final Thought on the New Neutrality
Commentators will not be slow to perceive-or to reproach-the powerful
change of emphasis from traditional permanent neutrality that this reformed
neutralitization will herald. One can expect to hear repetition of the now infamous
comment of President Clinton's campaign advisor Michael Mandelbaum that
foreign policy should not become merely "a branch of social work."376 I previously
noted Swiss jurist Daniel Frei's opinion that no adequate substitute for the
"precision" of the classical notion of neutrality-and of the derived secondary
norms of permanent neutrality--has yet been devised.3 77 Edgar Bonjour, the great
historian of Swiss neutrality, concluded a 1980 essay on Austrian and Swiss
permanent neutrality with an almost mocking suggestion of how a new activist
neutrality might be integrated into classical theory:
374 There remains, however, the logical quandary of a separate enforcement action under
U.N. mandate. If an EU member state were attacked, and the neutralitized EU members remained
outside the conflict, would the Security Council not then mandate action to restore the territorial
integrity of the attacked state-and require the participation of the neutrals in any event? This is
precisely why participation in the United Nations is incompatible with the notion of abstention
from military alliances. In its plenary operation, the United Nations is a military alliance, except
that its mutual assistance commitments are relayed through a cumbersome bureaucratic apparatus.
Unfortunately, the legal legerdemain of assistance treaties, and the providential geopolitics of
stalemate, kept neutralitized states complacent about U.N. membership until the end of the Cold
War. See supra note 218 (discussing conditionality of assistance treaties).
375 Admittedly, one can expect skepticism about a positive, active neutrality, as though these
expressions were mere camouflage for the inner moral vacuity of the position, its moral
indifference to the suffering of other countries and peoples. But those are issues best treated in
another place, not in the framework of ajuristic study. See ZIEGLER, supra note 3, at 168 (noting
embrace of "positive" neutrality by Swiss political and business oligarchies).
376 Mandelbaum, in fact, was criticizing the open-ended nature of potential humanitarian
interventions, which were likely to result in "deep, protracted, and costly engagement in the
tangled political life of each country." Michael Mandelbaum, Foreign Policy as Social Work, 75
FOREiGNAFF. 16, 18 (1996).
377 See supra note 9.
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When the Austrian Foreign Minister sees in neutrality a 'duty to [conduct] a
constructive foreign policy,' which allegedly suits Austria's interests, but which
also 'takes account in the presentation of its goals of the justifiable interests of other
states in a balanced European and global policy,' that definition smacks almost of
a renunciation of the conventional international law neutrality principle of
impartiality, and sounds like partisanship in the cause of peace, like an obligation
to strengthen peace in the Community of States .... 378
But partisanship in the cause of peace is precisely what a reformed
neutralitization will engender. This new conceptualization offers a transition, in
other words, from a traditionalist, isolationist preoccupation with the inevitability
of war and the need for a credible armed neutrality to an activism that
self-consciously seeks to protect the state ofpeace, and that commits its adherents
to specific strategies, both passive and active, toward that end.
VI. CONCLUSION
The future of permanent neutrality, like its past, will be tied to the vitality of
state sovereignty, and therefore indeed to the future development of international
law itself. If the present trend toward interdependence among states continues, and
if political animosities are increasingly sublimated through powerful supranational
institutions, then conceivably the need for classical or permanent neutrality, or even
for the reformulated code presented here, will truly wither away. That Marxist
outcome would not, in fact, necessarily disturb the states which have chosen
permanent neutrality. If the ultimate purpose of adopting a neutralitized status is to
safeguard national security,379 then the means used to assure that end need not be
an unswerving addiction to the nostrums of neutrality.380 Only a decade after the
end of the Cold War, however, it would be wrong to subvert the entire law of
neutrality as an irrelevancy. Indeed, it is quite possible that the current international
state of affairs is a temporary reflex consequence of the fall of Soviet power, and
that there may be an eventual resuscitation of interstate ideological and political
rivalry.381 And writing at the close of the Clinton period of international politics, a
378 Bonjour, supra note 24, at 838.
379 This is true also in the context of a reformed pemanent neutrality that seeks to promote
the state of peace.
380 After all, concept slippage has intensified since the end of the Cold War. Public opinion
among the neutral states has become less specific in its understanding of the idea of neutrality,
which can range from the simple aspect of not taking part in wars to a cipher for national
sovereignty. See Steve Pagani, A ustria's Neutrality Is Obsolete, Defence Minister Says, REUTER
TEXU , Nov. 9, 1993 (on file with author).
381 Hoffman asks the same question, speculating whether the "present anomie' might be
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diminution in the number of international and domestic flashpoints cannot easily be
predicted. Time has not altered the validity of the concluding prediction in Denise
Robert's 1950 exposition of Swiss neutrality, that as long as there exists a certain
number of sovereign political entities, the option of neutrality in some form must
remain.382
The science of international law, which almost always follows rather than leads
the practice of states, accordingly will continue to comprehend institutions based on
some mix of attributes derived from classical and permanent neutrality. What is
required now is an updating of that whole conspectus of law to take account of the
normative weaknesses of the law of war, and of the need for neutralitized states to
have the flexibility to treat participation in collective security actions as a legitimate
element of a new primary duty to pursue and maintain peace.
explained as a "post-cold war [sic] withdrawal fling by the United States, a transitional muddle and
turmoil in Russia, the tail end of Maoism combined with the beginning ofcapitalism in China, [or]
a gradual shift in Japan and Europe from merely 'civilian' toward all forms ofpower." HOFFMAN,
supra note 10, at 155. The system, in other words, could in the future be multipolar, or even
bipolar, or an array of regional powers dominating regional subsystems. See id.
382 See ROBERT, supra note 25, at 92.
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